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The aim of this study is to defend the view of a small but increasing 
minority of scholars that Gotama did not deny but affirmed the self, or 
'atman'. The Buddhist tradition assumes that he denied it when he tqught 
that we should not say of the various aspects of our personality which we 
recognize to be impennanent and involved in suffering: 'This belongs to me, 
this I am, this is my self. 1 But the saying is anbiguous. If Gotama 
believed (which he nowhere says that he did) that the perishable aspects 
of personality are all that we are, it follows that he denied the self of 
the mystics, the atman. If, however, his analysis was intended only to 
identify what is perishable as not the essential self, the reality of the 
atman is implied. Buddhism would no longer be an anomaly. Gotama I s 
utterances would be seen to belong with other Indian expressions of 
apophatic mysticism, like the 'neti! neti!' of the Upani�ads (although 
they cannot simply be equated since deep philosophical and sociological 
differences separate the traditions). The study has three parts: 
1. A survey of Western scholarly views over the last 150 years, 
evaluating the handling of textual evidence and the way in which 
scholars have taken sides over the meanings of anatta and �ibbana. 
2. A survey of Theravadin views, ancient and modern, seeking reasons 
for the misunderstanding of Gotama's utterances in the period of dog­
matic consolidation and loyal literalism after the early preaching. 
3. A reassessment of the Pali Nikayas, examining especially the 
figures of speech, parables and imagery relating to the self. 
It is argued that Gotama affinned the self elliptically to discourage 
speculation and focus on the practical nature of the path. 
It is concluded that there has indeed been a two thousand-year misunder­
standing of Gotama's teaching about the self, but the tradition compensated 
for it by shifting onto the concept of nirvaoa all of the significance 
that at first was shared with the atman. The view still held by some 
scholars that nirvana at first meant simple extinction collapses entirely. 
2 
INTRODUCTION 
Of all the alleged sayings of Gotama recorded in the Pali Nikayas 
the one most frequently repeated, and which is most typical of his 
teaching, is the brief question-and -answer exchange on which tradition 
bases the belief that he denied the existence of the self. This 
exchange is incorporated into perhaps a hundred dialogues without 
alteration in any significant detail. One example is the following: 
What do you think about this, Aggivessana? 
shape permanent or impermanent? Are feeling . .  
the habitual tendencies permanent or impermanent? 
think about this, Aggivessana? Is consciousness 
impermanent? 
"Impermanent, good Gotama. 11 
Is the material 
. perception . 
What do you 
permanent or 
"But is what is impennanent anguish or is it happiness?" 
11 Anguish, good Gotama." 
11But is it fitting to regard that which is impermanent, 
anguish, liable to change as 'This is mine, this I am, this is my 
self' ? 11 
"This is not so, good Gotama. 111 
In the recitation of the sutta the whole exchange is repeated for each 
of the five factors of personality (khandhas), so the point is made with 
great insistence that all that we normally take ourselves to be - -this 
whole psycho-physical complex--is perishable; that because of its 
transience we experience suffering; and because it brings us suffering 
we ought not to regard it as the essential self or atman ( 1 atta 1 in Pali). 
This atman, in the Indian tradition was by definition permanent and beyond 
suffering. As the innermost self it was the goal of yogins to realize it 
and liberate it from the round of suffering. It is obvious that Gotama, 
too, uses the word in this sense from the way in which he contrasts it 
with all that is impermanent and caught up in suffering. Plainly, he is 
urging us not to identify ourselves with the perishable body and mind. 
Since this interpretation of the dialogue makes excellent sense, 
how has it come to be understood by all later Buddhists as a denial 
1Middle Length Sayings I p. 286 
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that the atman exists? The misunderstanding did not arise for some 
centuries after the time of Gotama, we know,. since it is absent from 
the Sutta Pitaka. Evidently the first 9eneration of his followers 
understood what kind of utterance it was because they were still in touch 
with the many and varied forms of Indian intellectual and religious life. 
But as the Buddhist corm,unities grew in size they created an intellectual 
world of their own, and in their isolation their ideas, like Darwin's 
Galapagos finches and turtles, underwent a gradual change. In order 
to deal with dissension within the Order, each branch of early Buddhism 
developed its own dogmatic system of textual interpretation in which there 
was little room for nuances of meaning, and even less for figurative ways 
of speaking. This, it seems, is how it came about that Gotama's most 
characteristic figurative use of language, his apophatic or elliptical 
way of speaking about the atman, was understood as a negation of the 
atman. If the Buddhist communities had still been in contact with the 
broad stream of Indian religious life they would never have countenanced 
the idea that their founder had denied the atman, because this would have 
been absurd. A mystical teacher does not set out to deny the very aim 
of the yoains' path. Surely, the only explanation must be that the word 
itself had undergone a change of meaning within the small society of the 
Buddhists themselves, akin to the semantic change that overtakes words in 
society at large. The figurative meaning of Gotama's utterances was lost 
and their logic reversed as the monks, with irrmense devotion and loyalty, 
took all that he had said literally. 
This is very understandable, in terms of the dynamics of large 
religious institutions. Every such institution needs, as a binding force 
within itself and as a means of self-definition in relation to other 
'faiths', some dogma to follow, if not blindly, at least with unswerving 
loyalty. Operating within such institutions, too, is the pressure of 
rationalism to eliminate all enigmas and ambiguities. For such rationalism 
religious significance is not the impelling force so much as the 
creation of system. There is a tendency to preserve the letter of 
the foundation documents of the institution because these are the 
charter for its very existence. In this way the belief in 1 no self' 
has become the great defining characteristic of Buddhism for all the 
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world. The doctrine is what sets Buddhism apart from Hinduism and makes 
it unique, and yet it is a pointless and perverse teaching which has 
created endless difficulties for the Buddhists themselves, such as how 
to reconcile it with the belief in rebirth. However, nothing that 
detracts from its value is as powerful as the value the doctrine has 
in terms of its institutional momentum. Buddhists are very unlikely 
to give it up, whatever scholars may say. 
But the scholars are not about to ask Buddhists to give up believing 
that Gotama denied the self. because the view to the contrary is held by 
only a small minority, even amongst those whose special field of interest 
is early Buddhism. The Buddhists have thrown so much dust in everyone 's 
eyes over this issue that we are only beginning to see clearly what the 
character of the earliest form of Buddhism was. Many scholars say anyway 
that their chief interest is in what Buddhists think, or in the living 
religion, and they are not about to embark on a quest for the historical 
Gotama. Their motives are admirable, yet this is a myopic attitude 
because all religions look back to their founders and revere their 
utterances, and it is an important stimulus to a religion 's growth 
and vitality for it constantly to review and reassess the founder 's 
words. Buddhism in India already expresses a degree of ecumenism, and 
the rediscovery of Gotama 1 s affirmation of the atman would no doubt aid 
its development. Scholarship obviously has a role to play in the 
contemporary self-criticism and evolution of religion, although the 
Buddhist co1T1Tiunities have not yet encountered the findings of scholarship 
in the way that the Christian churches have in this century. 
In fact we are still a long way off from the stage at which 
scholarly opinion can exert an influence on Buddhism because of the 
confused state of scholarship itself. Nearly half of the present study 
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is taken up with an effort to see why this is the case. From it several 
extraordinary ironies emerge. Western scholars have tended to be ve�y 
narrow specialists in the field of Buddhist studies, which has meant, in 
effect, that they have taken upon themselves the limitation of the Buddhist 
scholiasts and interpreted the tradition from within itself. Yet they 
also tried to preserve their critical detachment, with the ironic result 
that they have added a further layer of rationalist misunderstanding to 
the Buddhists' original one, concerning the doctrines of anatta and nibbana. 
Whereas in Buddhism the early, mystical significance of the word 'atman' 
fell away but the concept of nibbana retained its transcendental meaning-­
taking over the whole of a meaning that the atman idea had once shared 
with it--the Weste� scholars made the mistake of thinking that nibbana too 
was empty of any transcendental significance. 
The Western scholars who have taken this point of view attribute to 
Gotama an austere, pessimistic and sceptical outlook, interpreting his 
refusal to indulge in speculative metaphysics about the goal of his Path 
as a foreshadowing of contemporary empiricism or positivism. On this 
account the transcendental interpretation of his teachings was a later 
corruption, tu�ing what was only a gloomy philosophy of life into a 
mystical religion. As the first chapter of this study shows, this view-
point is still that of a significant number of scholars, four of whom at 
least have published substantial books in the last few years arguing that 
the original goal was simply extinction, or to bring to an end the round 
of suffering by preventing any further rebirth. 
One of the ironies of this is that the interpretation rests upon 
a partial recovery of the original meaning of the word 1 atman 1 , so that 
it appears to these scholars that Gotama denied any mystical reality in 
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denying the reality of the atman. In the Buddhist tradition, on the 
other hand, the 'self' that it cam:? to be thought th� Buddha had denied 
was something else, about which it is impossible to be clear since the 
doctrine defies the best Buddhist minds still to make sense of it. With 
the original meaning of the word lost the texts simply are not coherent 
and the only meaning that can be attached to them is a sophistical one. 
Yet this impossibility of achieving clarity has been made serviceable 
in the tradition by turning it into a mystical paradox and allowing it to 
confirm the Buddha's insistence that the dhamma lies beyond the grasp of 
the rational intellect! The doctrines of anatta and nibbana are held in 
tension: we have no self, and yet we can enter nibbana, or as Buddhaghosa 
expressed it, 'Nibbana exists but not he who enters it. ' We must not 
overlook the important ways in which the tradition succeeded in preserving 
much of the spirit of the anatta teaching while reversing its logic, for 
there was a sense in which Gotama denied the self. He denied that all 
that we normally take to be our self belongs to, or can be identified 
with, the ultimate Self. Buddhists have grasped that this was not a 
denial of the common-sense self's existence but of 1t :imacy, which 
means that they have been able to read a great many of the texts in their 
intended spirit despite the logical misunderstanding. The characteristic 
Buddhist expression: 'There is no permanent self', although not what 
Gotama meant at all, is serviceable provided the focus of attention in 
saying it is on our perishable nature. 
But there has been a price to pay for the misunderstanding in that 
the goal, nibbana, was made More remote and unintelligible than Gotama's 
silence had made the atman. The concept of the atman, India's most 
fruitful mystical idea, even if it is placed beyond all speculation as 
Gotama placed it, still has the power to suggest our innennost reality 
as being something great and valuable. Buddhists cut themselves off 
from this resource in the expression of their mysticism, which is surely 
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one of the reasons for the shifting of the goal in the Mahayana tradition 
from the abstract nirvaQa to that of oneself becoming a Bodhisattva or 
a Buddha. This should not be put down merely to the Hindu influence. 
The personal element in the goal, having been lost, needed to be reintro­
duced. 
The point of view that is taken in this study, as it was mentioned 
earlier, is held by only a small number of scholars. It was first argued 
by George Grimm in 1916 and has been defended since then by others who 
evidently took little account of Gri11111 1 s work, amongst them Mrs Rhys 
Davids, Horner, Coomaraswamy, Radhakrishnan and Nakamura. George Grimm, 
who, incidentally, had the reputation of being 'the most benevolent judge 
in Bavaria', went far more deeply into the problem than any of the others 
mentioned. Then, in 1980, Joaqufn Perez-Remon published his extremely 
full and careful study of all of the relevant material in the Pali Nikayas. 
This book came to hand when the present study was half completed and turned 
it in another direction. After Perez-Rem6n 1 s book Buddhist studies can 
not be the same again, because even if there is strong disagreement with 
his thesis it will have to be answered and his powerful readings of 
particular passages will have to be acknowledged. The present study is 
essentially a response to his work. 
This 'Introduction' has been an attempt to draw some of the general 
implications for the Buddhist tradition as a whole which Perez-Remon 
has stopped short of drawing in confining himself strictly to the study of 
the texts. In the first chapter the scholarly debate about anatta and 
nibbana is traced, leading up to his work and outlining his arguments 
and conclusions. In the second chapter the Theravadin tradition is 
discussed, from the Abhidharrma Pitaka, through Buddhaghosa to the present, 
emphasizing the views of contemporary Theravadins who have written about 
their tradition in a scholarly as well as a popular way. This chapter 
IIIIIIIIL 
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seeks for reasons for the misunderstanding of Gotama' s teaching of anatta 
and tries to show how the concept of nibbana became the focus of the 
transcendental significance that once (if our theory is correct) also 
attached to the �tman or atta. One interesting modern exception to the 
viewpoint of contemporary Theravadins is discussed, that is the empiricism 
of David Kalupahana. He shares the view of some Western scholars that 
Buddhism was originally a philosophy rather than a religion and rejected 
a trans-empirical reality. Very much enamoured of modern Western 
empiricism, Kalupahana sees Gotama as a forerunner of this outlook. 
The long final chapter in this study is a fresh assessment of the 
evidence both for and against the view that Gotama affirmed the self 
in the Pali Nikayas. The method is not to select passages which appear 
to support the theory but to seek out the passages that are most typical 
of the Nikayas as a whole and of Gotama's message as a whole, in order 
to show that what is called for is a radical reinterpretation of his 
message. The evidence for the theory comes from the passages which 
everyone acknowledges to be central to the Buddhist teaching, and not 
from merely a few peripheral texts. In order to try to complement 
Perez-Rem6n's work to some degree, an attempt is made to focus on the 
figures of speech, parables and imagery in the suttas. These proved 
to be surprisingly consistent in the support they afford to the view 
that Gotama affinned the essential or inner self. This emphasis on 
the similies and stories in the texts enabled the present writer to 
use his experience and methods acquired as an academic in the field of 
literary criticism.to elucidate a valuable aspect of the Pali texts 
which has not before received close attention. 
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CHAPTER I 
A SURVEY OF WESTERN SCHOLARLY VIEWS 
I THE NINETEENTH CENTURY1 
Although discussion and speculation about the Buddhist goal began 
in the West in the Eighteenth century, it is Eugene Burnouf (180 1 -5 2) 
whose claim is strongest to being the first true scholar of Buddhism 
in Europe. Prior to his work all that was known of Buddhism came from 
Sanskrit polemical writings which branded it as n!stika or heresy on 
the grounds that it was atheistic and denied a beyond. Burnouf studied 
the Nepalese Buddhist texts and became aware of the need for a proper 
historical study of the Northern and Southern traditions, but his early 
death prevented him from accomplishing more than his L' Introduction a 
1 'histoire du buddhisme indien (1844). He brought to this dispassionate 
work the European assumption that the most important difference between 
religious ideologies is their view of God (as one, many, or non-existent), 
and divided Indian religions accordingly into theistic and atheistic 
systems. Buddhism he placed on the atheistic side with the S!mkhya, 
and he reasoned that in denying God they made their goal simply complete 
annihilation. For this he found etymological support when he traced 
the word 'nirvapa ' to a compounding of 1 nir 1 with 1 v! 1 which was used in 
non-philosophical discourse to mean the blowing out of a lamp. However, 
he stated his conclusions only tentatively and urged that further careful 
textual study should be carried out. 
1For my account of the earliest European scholars--Burnouf, Saint-Hilaire, 
Muller, Oldenberg, D 1 Alwys and Childers--whose books I had no access to 
I have used G. R. Welbon's book The Buddhist Nirvapa and its Western 
Interhreters (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1968) which quotes at s4fficient lengt from these scholars to enable one to assess their contribution. 
Welbon's study stops at the 1930s and has some notable omissions, for 
example Grinrn's important work which had appeared in fourteen editions 
by 19 26, and Coomaraswall\Y'S valuable book published in 1916. 
.... 
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Bun1ouf had said enough to spark off a debate in Europe and his 
friend Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire (b. 1805} had less compunction about 
asserting that Buddhism was nihilistic. Saint-Hilaire was a classicist 
who seems to have been motivated by a desire to uphold the superiority 
of Westen1 culture while writing disparagingly about Easten1 thought. 
For example, he describes as follows the belief in transmigration: 
// 
The prevailing sentiment of the entire population--no only 
Buddhist but Brahmanic--is an unappeasable horror of life and all 
its attendant ills. The idea of transmigration pursues them like 
a terrifying phantom. At any cost the hideous image must be 
driven off, and all of Brahmanism was applied to finding a means 
of deliverance. (le Bouddha et sa Religion, 1 860). 
This attempt at a psychology of the Indian mind was only one of many 
put forward by various people to explain how a great world religion 
could have as its final aim the extinction of individual existence. 
Max Muller (b. 1 823) the pioneer of Sanskrit scholarship in Europe, 
studied under Burnouf and was deeply influenced by him, although Buddhist 
studies were only an excursion from his life 's work on the Vedas. The 
goal of Buddhism was for him an irritating paradox because he greatly 
admired the Buddha for his ethics and his disregard of class barriers 
and privileges, yet it seemed that his logic expressed in the Four Truths 
and the doctrine of Causality had driven him into a doctrine of final 
annihilation: 'Such a religion, we should say, was made for the mad-house, ' 
he wrote, 'but Buddhism was an advance if compared with Brahmanism. •2 
Muller develooed his own theory of how religions come to hold impossible 
beliefs for which he used the tenn the 'philosophical myth', that is, a 
false belief which has become entrenched because of certain inherent 
weaknesses in language. He believed, however, that this myth was 
confined to the Abhidha11111a and was not present in the earlier strata of 
the Canon in which he found ' sayings in open contradiction to this 
Metaphysical Nihilism. •3 The earlier strata, he beleived, showed that 
1Quoted in Welbon p.7 2 
2 Max MOller Selected Essays II 1881 p. 2�0 
Quoted in Welbon p. 112 . 
31 bid. p. 30 2 (Welbon p.124). 
11 
nirvaua was an ineffable, indescribable experience simply characterized 
as the deathless (amata). He quoted eighteen verses from the Dharrmapada 
which he said could not have been composed under the assumption that 
nirva9a was utter annihilation.1 
. In 1871 James D'Alwys, a missionary in Ceylon, published his 
Buddhist Nirva9a: A Review of Max Maller's Dharrrnapada in which he 
attacked Muller and asserted that the nihilistic nirvaQa was the teaching 
of the whole Pali Canon and not just the Abhidhamma. He based this 
conclusion on the observation that the whole Canon teaches that neither 
a Supreme Being nor an immortal soul exist. The Buddha' s silence 
about the state of an Arahant after death he explained as being because 
it is hard to say much about nothing! The positive tenns used of 
Nirvaoa in the Canon refer, he said, to the happiness of one who knows 
that he has extinguished all craving and will have no further existence. 
Robert Childers, a member of the Ceylon Civil Service and, later, 
professor of Pali at University College, London, like D'Alwys rejected 
MOller's explanation of there being two contradictory teachings about 
nirv3pa in the Canon in tenns of the historical stratification of the 
texts . The two meanings of nirvana, he said, applied to the state of 
the Arahant while alive (which was often described as 'bliss' or in some 
other positive language) and to his annihilation at death. There was 
no contradiction to be explained. 
T. W. Rhys Davids (1843-1922) was also a civil servant in Ceylon 
and inherited Childers' chair in Pali. He founded the Pali Text Society 
which by the time of his death had issued 94 volumes of texts. Rhys 
Davids held that Muller, in arguing for a positive view even of the 
post-mortem nirvaQa, had taken inadequate account of the centrality of 
the anatta teaching in relation to the khandhas or five groups of the 
factors of personality. These groups, argued Rhys Davids, are an 
exhaustive description of the 'constituent parts and powers of man', 
1verses 21, 23, 97, 114, 134, 160, 184, 203, 218, 225, 285, 323, 368, 369, 374, 381, 383,411. 
.... 
12 
and it is in the nature of all of them, the texts make it abundantly 
clear, to arise and pass away. .Therefore the nibbaoa attainable in 
this life is the only real goal and is not to be thought of as other­
worldly or transcendental. Nor was there anything to be annihilated, 
which is why the Buddha denied that he was an annihilationist, and his 
silence when asked what became of an Arahant after death was to be 
explained as the only suitable response to an absurd question . Nibb!na 
is 'purely and solely an ethical state, •  he wrote in his Pali-English 
Dictionary (1921-5} , ' to be reached in this birth by ethical practices, 
contemplation and insight. It is therefore not transcendental. 1 As 
a wholly this-worldly goal it is to be conceived as emancipation from 
lust, hatred and illusion. 
With Rhys Davids ' authority behind it this was virtually the only 
accepted view by the end of the Nineteenth century. But in order to 
give nibbana such a positive ethical connotation Rhys Davids played down 
a feature of the texts which is everywhere apparent, that is, the strongly 
positive feeling that is expressed about extinction or the non-arising 
of any future rebirth. Paradoxically, the early Buddhists seem to have 
been most positive about the most negative feature of their doctrine! 
This problem that Rhys Davids succeeded for a time in submerging soon 
surfaced again. 
Meanwhile, on the continent, Hermann Oldenberg (d.1920}, although 
he began in the 1 880s with a viewpoint very like Rhys Davids ', pursued 
the question that remained a great enigma of the apparent desire that 
is expressed in the texts for cessation. Oldenberg had an altogether 
subtler mind than the blunt and dogmatic Englishmen Childers and Rhys 
Davids possessed and he penetrated the problem further than anyone else 
in the Nineteenth century. Our own century has not so much added to his 
insights as demonstrated why they were correct- -not that they have 
yet won acceptance amongst all scholars by any means, as we shall see . 
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In his remarkable book published while he was still in his twenties, 
Buddha: Sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde (1881), Oldenberg wrote: 
The official teaching of the church represented that on the 
question whether the ego is, whether the perfected saint lives 
after death or not, the exalted Buddha has taught nothing . . . . 
. . . Our researches must accept this clear and decisive solution 
to the question, recurring often in the sacred texts, as it is 
given; it needs no interpretation, and admits of no strained 
construction. Orthodox teaching in the ancient Order of Buddhists 
inculcated expressly on its converts to forego the knowledge of the being or non-being of the perfected saint. 
But he was not content with this--obviously the further question arises 
of why the repeated question was disallowed. On the one hand the logic 
of the teachings moves unavoidably to the conclusion: 'The ego is not. 
Or what is equivalent: the NirvaQa is annihilation. •2 On the other, 
this very conclusion of dialectic is forbidden to the disciple. �,hy? 
He came to realise that the question does call for interpretation. 
The answer he found by searching for the nuances in the texts, for 
example in the well-known dialogue between Khema Thert and King Pasenadi: 
We shall scarcely be astray in supposing that we discover in 
this dialogue a marked departure from the sharply defined line to 
which the course of thought confines itself in the previously quoted 
conversation between Buddha and Malukya. True, the question as to 
the eternal duration of the Perfect One is as little answered here 
as there, but why can it not be answered? The Perfect One's 
existence is unfathomably deep, like the ocean: it is of a depth 
which terrestrial human thought with the appliances at its corrmand 
cannot exhaust . The man who applies to the striclty unconditional 
predicates such as being and non-being, which are used properly 
enough of the finite or the conditional, resembles a person who 3 attempts to count the sands of the Ganges or the drops of the ocean. 
He concluded that the answer was a 'Yes--no being in the ordinary sense 
but still assuredly not a non-being: a sublime positive, of \-Jhich thought 
has no idea, for which language has no expression, wnich beams out to meet 
the cravings of the thirsty for i�rtality . . •  One who clearly and 
definitely renounced an everlasting future would speak in another strain. •4 
Oldenberg reached this conclusion, which is surely the very least that 
1-4 These quotations all come from Oldenberg's Buddha (1 881 ) pp. 274-82, 
and are quoted by Welbon on pp. 201 -4 of his book. 
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must be said about the dialogue mentioned (and also a great many other 
passages which will be examined in the third chapter of this study), 
without the benefit of the comparative studies in mysticism which now 
enable us to identify much more positively the type of utterance that 
recurs··so often in the Pali texts. These can now be recognized as the 
utterances typical of the kind of mysticism known as the 'via negativa', 
of which the most frequently repeated example in the Pali texts is the 
teaching of anatta. In this teaching Gotama, taking in turn factors that 
constitute our personality, says: 'This is not mine, I am not it, it is 
not my self. 1 This expression, which recurs countless times throughout 
the Nik�yas, \>Jas evidently Gotama 's most frequently repeated utterance. 
Ironically, it is also his most misunderstood utterance, as George Grimm 
was the first scholar to realise. 
II  THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 
George Grimm 's work, which appeared in the second decade of the 
century, was, however, ignored by the two most prominent scholars of 
the nineteen-twenties and thirties, the Belgian Catholic Louis de La 
Vallee Poussin and the Russian Th. Stcherbatsky. Their work will 
therefore need to be considered first, 1n order to show how Buddhist 
scholarship went stumbling on, taking no notice either of Oldenberg 's 
insights or Gri1m1 1 s revolutionary perceptions which are only now gaining 
a little of the respect they deserve. 
Louis de La Vallee Poussin ( 1869-193 8) was, like Saint-Hilaire, 
a professor of Classics for whom Buddhism was a private obsession. He 
worried over the unsolved problem of nirvana for over forty years and 
wrote �re about it than anyone before or since. Yet he never had a 
sympathy for Eastern thought. The following passage from his 1916 
Hibbert lectures at Oxford show�the attitude of cold distaste for 
the subject that he could nevertheless not relinquish: 
As a matter of fact we know what nirvana is as well as the 
Buddhists themselves, and it is not our fault that we a"e unable 
to give an unambiguous statement. The Buddhists were satisfied 
with descriptions which do not satisfy us. 
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On the one hand, whereas we have been for centuries trained 
to make our ideas clear, this was not the case with Indians. The 
historian has not to deal with Latin notions worked out by clear­
sighted thinkers, but with Indian 1 philosophumena 1 concocted by 
the ascetics . . .  men exhausted by a severe diet and often stupefied 
by the practice of ecstasy. Indians do not make a clear distinction 
between facts and ideas, between ideas and words; they have never 
clearly recognized the principle of contradiction. ! 
The last assertion is nonsense; the Indians have long shown in their 
treatises on logic that they know very well what contradiction is. 
They have also known when and how to use it deliberately as a part of 
the special figurative language of mysticism. Ironically, this passage 
is as near as La Vallee Poussin came to perceiving the centrality of 
mysticism to the problem of the interpretation of nirvaoa that obsessed 
him for so long. 
The following passage from the same lectures shows the mixture of 
contempt and serious fascination with which he approached the subject: 
NirvaQa is looked upon as deliverance, just as a man who is in 
jail wants only to be free--even so Man does not want to be happy, 
he only wants to be freed from the miseries of life. That is pessimism 
It is not absolute nihilism, nihilism boldly looked in the face. 
It is a negative attitude . . .  The monk strives for unqualified 
deliverance; he does not inquire whether deliverance is destruction 
or a mysterious kind of existence •. .. 
Buddhism ends in an act of faith; Sakyamuni will lead us to 
salvation provided we close our eyes and blindly follow his ordinances. 
The important thing in Buddhism is not dogma but practice, not the 
goal, the mysterious and unascertainable Nirva9a, but the Path, 
Sanctity. 2 
This account of Buddhism as fundamentally pessimistic, but a nihilism not 
faced up to, to be followed blindly merely as deliverance from birth, 
disease, old age and death, is not unsubtle like the British version of 
Childers and Rhys Davids. There is more than a grain of psychological 
plausibility in the suggestion that human beings may feel like prisoners, 
1Louis de la Vallee Poussin The Wa
r to Nirva�a (The Hibbert Lectures 
for 1916) 
(Cancridge University Press, 1917 p.111 
2Ibid. p.13 2  
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unconcenied about what they shall do when they are freed, wanting only 
not to be wher� they are--release is enough and preferably an early one 
for good behaviour! (Suicide, which would do just as well, is the 
nihilism that is not faced squarely). This is all too close to the 
truth of what monastic Buddhism became to be dismissed lightly, not 
least the observation that it was felt to be something not to be 
questioned but to be followed blindly. As we shall see, the misunder­
standing of the teaching of anatta which tunied it into a perverse and 
pointless dogma was followed with a blind literalism in which the sole 
admirable ingredient was loyalty. 
The great merit of La Vallee Poussin 's work is that for all his 
insistence that 'incoherence is one of the chief features of Indian 
thought' , 1 he was never content with his own grasp of the subject while 
there were texts which defied it. Nine years after the lectures from 
which we have quoted he wrote in his Foreword to his classic attempt to 
solve the problem, entitled Nirvana (1925): 
Neither was my conviction resolute nor my ideas precise. I should 
certainly be afraid to re-read the pretentious statements that I 
have dedicated to nirvaoa in �ny articles. And the more recent amongst them are not less bad. 
He now took the approach of the historian of religions, stressing the 
backgound from which Buddhism sprang, viewing it no longer as an isolated 
puzzle but as a branch of yogic mysticism. 'All yogins pursued the same 
goal by parallel roads, ' he wrote, 'but they willingly changed sect and 
master. •3 Buddhism, he became convinced, preceded the impact of the 
Upani�ads, so it could not be viewed as a reaction to the Atman-Brahman 
identification. It was, rather, an earlier, non-metaphysical branch of 
1La Vallee Poussin 'Nirvaoa' in Encyclo}edia of Reli,ion and Ethics ed. James Hastings (Edinburgh, 1908-26 Vol. IX (191) p. 379a 
2 I La Vallee Poussin Nirvaoa (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1925) p. xvii 
quoted in Welbon p.279. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. p. 26, quoted in Welbon p. 281 
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yoga, from which the idea of nirvana derived as 'a basic given', which was 
'free from all metaphysical speculation (involved rather in myth than in 
metaphysics). Nirvaga is an invisible abode into which the saint--often 
amid the flames of a sort of apotheosis--disappears. •1 It was an i!T1Tl0rt­
ality which was 'declared to be ineffable',2:and which bore no ontological 
relationship to the world of suffering, transmigrating beings. 
The Russian scholar Th. Stcherbatsky was outraged at the turn that 
La Vallee Poussin's thought had taken because he cherished the idea that 
Buddhism originated not as a practical form of yoga but as a purely 
philosophical enterprise: 
Between the Materialists who denied retribution and the 
Eternalists who imagined a return to a pure spiritual condition 
Buddha took a middle course . •. .  The originality of the Buddha's 
position consisted in denying substantiality altogether and con­
verting the world-process into a concerted appearance of discrete 
and evanescent elements. Forsakirrg· the monism of the Brahmanists 
and the dualism of the Sankhyas, he established a system of the most 
radical pluralism. That the essence and the starting point of 
Buddhism were speculative appears very clearly if we give credit 
to the records a�out the other wandering teachers who were the 
contemporaries of the Buddha and often engaged in controversies 
with him. The questions at issue between them were of a speculative 
nature. 3 
The difference between the two scholars lay in which sources they respected. 
La Vallee Poussin was examining the sOtra literature of Buddhism, while 
Stcherbatsky maintained that the true and original Buddhism was to be 
found in the sastra literature, and he waved aside the question of which 
was more historically authentic as the teachings of Gotama: 
Accuracy is indeed not to be found at all in the Pali Canon. 
Accuracy is not its aim. It is misleading to seek accuracy there. 
Accuracy is to be found in later works, in works belonging to the 
sastra class. All Buddhist literature is divided into a� and 
a sastra class. The first is popular, the second is scientific. 
The first is propaganda, the second is precision. 4 
Obviously, Stcherbatsky's criterion of 'accuracy' ·was. not historical but 
1La Vall�e Poussin Nirvana (1925) p. 57, quoted in Welbon p. 283 
2 Ibid. 
3Th. Stcherbatsky The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana (1927) pp. 3- 4 
4Th. Stcherbatsky 'The Doctrine of the Buddha' in Bulletin of the School 
of Oriental Stu�ies VI (1930-2) p. 8 68, quoted in Welbon p.292 
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philosophical. It is still question-begging to claim that the sastras 
reported the true thoughts of the Buddha if the issue of historical 
accuracy is swept aside in this cavalier way. Stcherbatsky's book 
The Central Conception of Buddhism (19 23) takes as its principal source 
the Abhidhannakosa of Vasubandhu, which stands in relation to the actual 
dialogues of the Buddha as a systematic exposition of a corrmentary on 
the conmentarial literature of one early sect of Buddhism! This makes 
it difficult to take seriously his claim that the starting point of 
Buddhism was speculative and that the original position of the Buddha 
was annihilationist . He expresses this position as follows: 
The picture of the universe which suggested itself to the 
mental eye of the Buddha represented thus an infinite number of 
separate evanescent entities in a state of beginningless conrnotion, 
but gradually steering to quiescence and to an absolute annihilation 
of all life, when its elements have been brought one after another 
to a complete standstill . . . .  The Buddhist could promise nothing 
else but quiescence of life and its final annihilation, a result 
which, taken by itself, was not very remote from what was offered 
by simple materialism. The latter promised annihilation after 
every life. Buddha promised likewise annihilation but after1a long series of efforts in virtue and concentrated meditation. 
This conviction about the nature of early Buddhism led Stcherbatsky to 
contrast it with the developn�nt of the Mahayana, with the aid of some 
rhetorical sleight of hand, in what is surely the most memorable of all 
sentences in the scholarly literature: 
When we see an atheistic, soul-denying philosophic teaching of a 
path to personal Final Deliverance consisting in an absolute extinction 
of life and a simple worship of the memory of its founder,--when we 
see it superseded by a magnificent High Church with a Supreme God, 
surrounded by a numerous pantheon and a host of Saints, a religion 
highly devotional, highly ceremonious and clerical, with an ideal 
of Universal Salvation of all living creatures, a Salvation by the 
divine grace of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, a Salvation not in annihil­
ation but in eternal life,--we are fully justified in maintaining 
that the history of religions has scarcely witnessed such a break 
between new and old within the pale of what nevertheless continues 
to claim co1T1110n descent from the same religious founder. 2 
The remarkable discontinuity that Stcherbatsky thought he saw is not, 
1Th. Stcherbatsky The Conception of Buddhist Nirv�na ( Varanasi: Bharatiya 
Vidya Prakashan, no date supplied, original publication 1927) pp. 5-6 
2Ibid. p. 59 
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it should be noted , between the Buddhism of the Pali Canon and of the 
equivalent Mahayana texts, but between the most abstract parts of early 
Theravadin philosophy and popular Mah�y�na religion. The contrast is 
drawn between two incommensurate things. There is no such radical 
discontinuity between the Buddhism of the P�li Nikayas and that of the 
Prajna-paramita and Madhyamika literature, as T. R. V .  Murti has shown 
in his book The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (1955) which, incidentally, 
borrows its title from Stcherbatsky. 
A discontinuity of an earlier and different kind was argued by 
George Grimm (1868-1945) who is the dark horse of early Buddhist studies. 
His work has been scon1ed or neglected in the English-speaking world, 
although he gained recognition in Germany, where, for example, Neumann, 
the pioneer scholar of Buddhism in that country who died in the year 
that Grirrrn' s The Doctrine of the Buddha appeared (1915), said : 'The work 
is undoubtedly the most important exposition of Buddhism since Oldenberg's 
book. Nevertheless it is incomparably deeper and more comprehensive. • 1 
Other leading German scholars such as Zirrmermann and Seidenstucker also 
agreed with Grirrm's radical reinterpretation of early Buddhism. Edward 
Conze, late in his career, came out in Grirrm's defence, saying : 'The more 
I am concerned with theses things, the more convinced I become that George 
Grirrrn's interpretation of the Buddhist theory of atman comes nearest to 
the original teaching of the Buddha. 1 2 Even a very prominent Theravadin 
scholar from Sri Lanka, A. P. Buddhadatta, agreed that Grirrrn ' was the 
recoverer of the old genuine doctrine of the Buddha which has been 
submerged. ' Ordinary people who came to the Buddha, however, understood 
him, Buddhadatta maintains: 'They could easily understand when the Buddha 
preached that " your body , mind, etc. are not you or yours, therefore cling 
not to them , give them up . . . and so on ," ' whereas, he says, 'When we 
1George Grirrrn The Doctrine of the Buddha (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 19 58 , 
originally published in 1915, tr. into English 192 6) Preface , p. 12 
2Quoted from the dust-jacket of George Grirrm Buddhist Wis�om: the M__ystery 
- o f  the Self ( Del h i : Mot i h1 R � rn � rc:: i ,h c  "' "  " "" "� "" - - -
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read our Pali texts and the connentaries, we get the idea that Buddhism 
is a kind of Nihilism. • 1 . 
This statenent by Buddhadatta gives the essence of Gri11111 1 s reinterp­
retation. Gri11111 is really the hero of this study because he had the 
nerve to go back to the simple and direct meaning of the teachings 
attributed to Gotama, without viewing them as everyone else has done 
through the distorting lens of the Theravadin interpretation. In 
essence what Gri11111 said is that it is a misunderstanding that the Buddha 
taught that there is no self ; all that he said was that the perishable 
body and mind are not the self. Always in the texts the denial of self 
refers merely to what is impermanent in man, which the Buddha analysed 
in tenns of five groups (the khandhas ) which he called the 'groups of 
grasping ' . It is important, Grirrm argued, to realize why these aspects 
of our temporal personality were called this: it is because we imagine 
that they are all that we are. We cling to the khandhas because we 
think that they are all that we consist in, 'as if a man with hands smeared 
with resin caugnt hold of a twig ' (A IV 178). It was precisely in order 
to persuade us that the khandhas are not all that we are that the Buddha 
repeated so often the words: 'This is not mine, this I am not, this is 
not my self. ' The great irony is that within a few centuries he was 
taken to mean that the khandhas are an exhaustive analysis of all that we 
are, and that therefore the repudiation of the khandhas as containing a 
self means that we have no self or atta. 
As we shall see in the third chapter of this study, there is no good 
evidence that Gotama denied the existence of the att!, which is by definition 
the permanent essence of personality. All that the texts say is that the 
khandhas cannot be this permanent essence because our experience tells us 
that they are changing and perishable. But the problem does arise of why 
1George Gri1T111 The Doctrine of the Buddha Preface, p. 9 
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Gotama did not affirm the atta in clear, unmistakeable tenns. Why 
did he confine himself to statements about suffering and impermanence 
and the need to escape themJ The answers are not simple, as it will be 
seen in the last chapter of th i s  study, but George Grimm addressed h i mself 
to the problem and suggested reasons for the Buddha's si lence wh i ch, we 
shall argue, are basi cally correct. He maintained that the great Buddhist 
hope was that whatever it is that suffers and is i mpermanent is not of our 
essence. Only if this is  true can there be release from sufferi �g, as 
distinct from mere anni hilation - -wh i ch Gotarna emphatically denied that he 
taught. Consequently the entire emphasis of Buddhism was placed on 
grasping the truths of the impennanence, suffering and soullessness of 
all condi ti oned existence (the so -called ' three marks ' of all existence), 
i n  order to enable us to 'see through, as it were, the realm of the not­
self, in i ts quality as not our Self. •1 
Why, i f  the truth of Grirm,'s interpretati on is so lumi nously obvi ous, 
did the English and French scholars ignore it? The questi on is puzzling, 
but it may be that the French sti ll felt the influence of Burnouf and 
Saint -Hilaire, while the British-based Pali Text Soci ety was so i nmersed 
in the Theravadi n conmentarial literature that it  never occurred to them 
that it might be mistaken. The Bri tish, too, have tended to be less 
sympathetic to mysti cism than the Germans and perhaps therefore more 
ready to view the Buddha as only an empiricist. A further strength of 
the Getmans was their depth of background knowledge about the di fferent 
strands of Indian religion and thought, compared to the English who tried 
to proceed i n  a vacuum in  the i r  attempt to understand the Pali texts. 
Certainly, the English would have been offended by the long digressi ons 
of Schopenhauerian-style phi losophis i ng which interrupt Gri rm,'s argument. 
In fact, one Engli sh scholar, no less than the wife of the great 
T. W. Rhys Davi ds--after h i s  death- -made her own off-beat re interpretati on 
1George Grirm, The Doctrine of the Buddha p.146 
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of the Pali texts. It is to her great credit that she perceived the 
inadequacy and psychological implausibility of the version of Buddhism 
that Childers and T. W. Rhys Davids had propogated, but what she put in 
its place was, if anything, even ITX)re wide of the mark. The 'original 
gospel I of Sakyamuni, she maintained, exists onl in fragments scattered 
through the P�li Canon which is for the ITX)St part the work of a ITX)nk­
dominated institutional Buddhism. The original gospel was neither 
world-negating nor atheistic and its goal was not nibbana (extinction) 
but attha ( a  word which simply means 'the goal I or 'that which is 
advantageous '). It is true that this word is used in the texts in place 
of nibbana fairly frequently, but Mrs Rhys Davids' attempts to define it 
do not inspire confidence: 
. . .  The word is positive, not a negation. It is that which is 
sought for, � to be won. It is not something that is NOT. 
Lastly, it is not something which having won, a man judges to be 
so 1 void 1 that he cannot value. It is ever true as being that which 
man, in seeking, ever figures as the Best, the Most he can yet 
conceive. 1 
In turning Buddhism into a positive, humanistic ' folk-gospel 1 , Mrs 
Rhys Davids had to assert that most of what has come down to us as the 
utterances of Gotama are 'monkish gibberish '. She tended to accept one 
part of a sutta as original and reject another as inauthentic on 
the sole grounds that it �as not in accordance w i th her conception of 
the founder of a 'great religion' to have denied the reality of sel f  
or to have made extinction his goal . 
The point of view that is argued in this study does not involve 
cutting up the texts in this way, although it must be acknowledged that 
M'.s Rhys Davids identified some genuine stratification in the texts. 
Grirrm's reinterpretation, and the ITX)re thorough defense of it by Perez­
Rem6n which is discussed at the end of this chapter, depend not on being 
selective with texts but on a complete reassessment of their meaning as 
a whole body of literature. There is remarkably little that needs to be 
1 C. A. F. Rhys Davids Wayfarer ' s  Words II ( London : Luzac & Co. 194 1) p.654 
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explained in tenr1s of the later monkish over-writing of the Pal i texts , 
as distinct from the monkish misinterpretation of them which is implied 
by Gri11JTI 1 s thesis. But the latter does not make its appearance in the 
Sutta Pitaka so much as in the Abhidhanma Pitaka which is the first true 
Theravadin product. The suttas recorded in Pali appear to have come from 
the co11JTion stock of remembered dialogues of Gotama and his early disciples 
which circulated in all of the early schools of Buddhism. Although 
there are discernible strata within parts of the Sutta Pitaka, on the 
whole the material exhibits great consistency. 
Ananda Coomaraswamy, whose book Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism 
was published a year after Gri1T111 1 s, in 1916, came within an ace of hitting 
upon the same theory. He noticed the profound similarities of the goal 
of nibbana to the Upani�adic Brahman, and the similarity of these to other 
mystical goals : 'What are Mok$a to the Brahmin, Tao to the Chinese mystic, 
Fana to the SOf f, 'Eternal Life ' to the followers of Jesus, that is nibbana 
to the Buddhist :1 he wrote, and quoted the evidence of the Chandogya 
Upani?ad ( 8: 15 : 1) : 1 as the highset goal there opens before them 
the eternal, perfect Nirvanam. 1 Since the ai�s were so similar he concluded 
that the Buddhists had simply not heard of the Atman-Brahman identification : 
There is nothing then to show tbat the Buddhists ever really 
understood the pure doctrine of the Atman which is 'not so, not so •. 
The attack which they led upon the idea of soul or self is directed 
against the conception of the eternity in time of an unchanging 
individuality ; of the timeless spirit they do not speak, and yet 
they cl aim to have disposed of the theory of the Atman! In reality 
both sides were in agreement that the soul or ego (manas, ahamkara, 
vijnana, etc.) is complex and phenomenal, while of that which is 
'not so' we know nothing. Buddhist dialectic, by the simile of the 
chariot and so forth is directed to show that things are 1 Empty 1 ; 
when their component elements are recognized there is no remainder 
but onl y the 1 Void 1 ; he who realises this attains Nibbana and is freed. 
But we cannot distinguish between this 'Void ' or 'Abyss' and the 
Brahman which is 'No thing' , 2 
Coomaraswamy noticed an important absence in the early texts of any real 
1Ananda K. Coomaraswamy 
Universi ty Books, 1969 
2Ibid. pp.199-200 
Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism ( New York : 
1916 ) p . 1 15 
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dialogue between Gotama and believers in the Upani�adic Atman : 'Those 
whom he defeats in controversy so easily are mere puppets who never put 
forward the doctrine of the unconditioned Self at all. Gautama meets 
no foeman worthy of his steel, and for this reason the greater part of 
the Buddhist polemic is unavoidably occupied in beating the air. •1 
He goes on to say : 1 • • •  that Atman of which it is said 'That art thou ' 
is neither the body nor the individual 'soul 1 but like the future 
state of the Arhat it lies on the other side of experience, invisible, 
2 -unutterable and unfathomable. ' The Atman of the Upani�ads, says 
Coomaraswamy, 'is precisely that which does not transmigrate, ' and he 
quotes in evidence the Gfta : 1 11 That 1 1  is never bom and never dies ' (ii, 22). 
This means that Gotama 's attack on the Atman is beside the point, as if 
the compi lers of the Dialogues merely wished to represent him as victorious 
in argument and set up a straw man for him to knock down : 'Coining the 
terTI an -atta to imply the absence of a perduring individuality is a triumph 
of ingenuity, but the perduring Atman of Ved3nta is not any sort of 
individuality anyway. • 3 
Implied here is a view not very different from Mrs Rhys Davids ', i. e. 
that the anatta doctrine in the texts is a later monkish invention and was 
not original to Gotama. They both came remarkably close to the view 
which is taken in the present study and is a growing minority opinion 
amongst scholars, the main difference being that it is not a monkish 
invention that gave rise to the Theravadin conception of anatta but a 
monkish misconstruction placed upon the authentic teaching which remains 
available to us in the Nikayas. It shows just how much dust the 
Theravadins have managed to throw in the scholars' eyes that Coomaraswamy, 
whose insight is so penetrating into the real nature of the Buddhist 
teaching, was unable to read the texts in the fresh way that GrilTITI did. 
1Ananda Coomaraswamy Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism p. 200 
2Ibid. p. 202 
3Ibid. p. 203 
III THE LAST FIFTY YEARS 
Between the earl y 1930s and the 1950s there is something of a gap 
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in Buddhist schol arl y  work of any great interest , after the appearance of 
E. J. Thomas 's History of Buddhist Thought (1933) and his earl i er The .L i fe 
of Buddha as History and Legend (192 7). Like Coomaraswamy, Thomas 
observed the fact that the neuter Brahman appeared to be unknown to the 
compil ers of the Pal i Canon . He noted, too, that 'Even in the Brahma­
jal a  sutta, where al l the heresies are supposed to be incl uded, there 
is no denial of an atman,' but took it to be 'impl icit' in the scheme 
of the khandhas that there is a 'denial of something else cal l ed an !tman. •1 
Neverthel ess, it remains a mere deduction and not something we can say 
is definitel y  asserted that there is no atman. As for nibbana, Thomas 
took a view simil ar to Mul l er 's, Ol denberg 's and Coomaraswamy 's: 
Existence (bhava) for them depended upon knowl edge obtained through 
the six senses, except for the knowl edge of the permanent attained 
at enlightenment. They recognized the individual as consisting of 
el ements perceptibl e  to the senses. They had before them the 
question as to what becomes of him when everything that can be 
predicated of him is withdrawn. What the cl airvoyants and spirit­
ualists can tel l us of discarnate spirits is of no hel p  here. That 
is merel y about existence in another pl ane of the universe. The 
Buddhists had reached the conception of a state of which neither 
existence nor non-existence as we know it coul d be asserted . . . •  
everything is withdrawn by which anything can be asserted. He 
who is re l eased is "profound, intreasurabl e, hard to fathom, l ike 
the great ocean" .  And if the discipl es refused to assert anything, 
they were not being agnostics or eel -wriggl ers, but were me�l y  thinking cl earl y  and refusing to express the inexpressibl e. 
It has al ready been mentioned that T. R. V. Murti countered the view 
that there is any real discontinuity between earl y Buddhism and the 
phil osophy of the Mah!yana, which is why he coul d cal l his book The 
Central Phil osophy of Buddhism ( 1955) . He took a view simil ar to 
Thomas ' s  and quotes approvingl y  the above passage, adding that the 
Buddha was wel l acquainted with the different specul ations, al l of 
1Edward J. Thomas The History of Buddhist Thought 2d ed. ( London: 
Routl edge & Kegan Paul, 1951) PP.9 8-9 
2 t bid. p. 1 2 8 
-
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which he characterised as �ogmatism and consistently refused to be 
drawn into the net. This was because he was alive to the insuperable 
difficulties in 'conc�iving the Transcendent in tenns of the empirical': 
The utter inability to relate and characterise the Unconditioned in 
tenns of the phenomenal is the reason why the questions about the 
Tathagata and others cannot be answered outright. Dogmatists 
invariably confound the Transcendent with the empirical. They 
take the �pa, vedana, vijnana etc. to be the self . The Tathagataon the ot er hand, does not take these to be the self, not the sel f
to have the rupa, nor the rupa in the se 1 f, nor the se 1 f in the rupa. 
Deeply conscious of the empirical nature of these categories, the 
Tathagata does not indulge in such unwarranted extens i ons ; he does 
not spin speculative theories. He has realised that the Real is 
transcendent to thought. l 
Where both Thomas and Murti differ from Gri111T1 and Perez-Rem6n is in 
holding back from the proposition that the Buddha implied the reality 
of the atta as a name for the transcendent itself. Nothing in what 
Murti says here ought to be any obstacle to saying this much, since it 
does not imply that the Buddha made any positive assertions about the 
nature of the atta. The thesis of GrilllTI and Perez-Rem6n is that 
the Buddha defined the atta only negatively, for the very reasons that 
Murti here identifies, in the utterances that take the fonn :  ' the self is 
not. in the ruoa, etc. ' 
� --
To acquiesce in the Theravadin view, as Murti 
does, that 'self' here is unreal, makes the uttPrances fall quite flat 
rhetorically and logically. For all their acuity, Thomas and Murti 
have not been able to remove their Theravadin spectacles. 
In the 1950s another Indian scholar G. C. Pande published a huge, 
extremely learned but badly organized and scrappy book entitled Studies 
in the Origins of Buddhism (1957). Apart from some valuable detailed 
work on the stratification of the Pali suttas and on the Vedic background , 
there is a very detailed chapter on Nirvana. In it Pande gives hundreds of 
citations from the texts which tend to show that the goal was conceived 
1T. R. V. Murti The Central Philoso�hf of Buddhism: A Study of theMadhyamika System (London: George l en and Unwin Ltd. 1955) pp. 44 -5 
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by the early Buddhi sts as a 'transcendent , ulti mate reali ty whi ch i s  
changel ess , beyond death , beyond thought or measure , resti ng on nothi ng 
else , and that whi ch i s  the most worthwhi le goal! The tenns , says Pande , 
whi ch can be translated as ' cessati on' , 'di sappearance ' ,  or 'exti nction' , 
were ' only i ntended to negate the phenomenal. • 1 The i tems destroyed 
i n  nirvana were only i gnorance and passion ,  cravi ng a · d i mpulses , mi sery 
and the ' fi ve groups of grasping ' ,  i . e. the khandhas. N irv aoa i s  beyond 
the elements and words fall back from i t ,  yet i t  i s  the supreme bli ss. 
'In nirv �oa the fluctuati ons of  v i nn�na ( consci ousness) cease ; i t  i s  
released from acci dental i mpuri ti es and rests i n  i ts own natural infini ty 
and lumi nosi ty .  • 2 As for the deni al of  self , · �!hat i s  deni ed i s  that 
anythi ng w i th in  the i mpennanent world may be the atta . . . Why? Because 
i t  was a death-blow to the source of  the deepest worldly attachment. • 3 
These observati ons Pande makes enti rely on the basi s of texts from 
the Pali N i kayas , but he 9oes on to survey the hi story of the v i ews of 
the di fferent early schools of  Buddhi sm ( of whi ch there were ei ghteen ) 
and concludes : 
Thi s  survey shows that hardly ever di d the Buddhi sts regard 
ni rvaoa as just the blank of anni h ilati on. Even the Sautr�nti kas 
generally admitted the survi val o f  a subtle spi ri tual consci ousness . 
. . . The schools , further , agree that si nce ni rvana presents no 
parti culari si ng trai ts ,  i t  i s  i mpossi ble to express i t  properly i n  
speech ; i t  can only be i ntui ted. F i nally, i t  i s  the ulti mate Good , 
the end of  all restlessness and str iv ing. We may generali se and 
say that the Buddh ist concepti on of ni rva9a always i ncludes that of  
eternal and i neffable peace. 4 
The Theravada school , Pande says , 'throughout i ts long hi story , consi stently 
held nirva9a to be posi ti ve ,  experienceable , i ndescri bable and supreme--
the most worthwhi le . •, 5 Thi s i s  a conclusi on whi ch we shall deJOOnstrate 
i n  deta i l  i n  the next chapter to be almost ent irely correct. The si ngle 
excepti on that I have been able to fi nd ·  i s  Davi d Kalupahana , a contemporary 
Therav�d i n  scholar who has becorre enamoured of modern Western emp i ri c i sm 
and takes a v iew of  the early teachi ng si mi lar to that of T .  W .  Rhys Davi ds. 
1Govind Chandra Pande Studi es i n  the Origi ns of  Buddhi sm ( Delh i : Moti lal 
Baaarsi das, 195 7 )  p . 479 
2 Ibid . p . 494 3Ibi d .  p. 502 4 Ib i d .  p . 451  5 1b i d. p . 445 
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In 195 8 there appeared one of the more important books in the 
study of Indian thought generally, Mircea Eliade's Yoga, Immortality 
and Freedom, in which there is a valuable chapter on Buddhism linking 
it more clearly than has been done before to the long tradition of Yoga 
in India . The Buddhist texts, Eliade shows, indicate that Gotama was 
well grounded in the doctrines of Sa�khya and the practices of Yoga, 
even if he is portrayed as having progressed beyond them : 
Naturally, the majority of the canonical texts allege an irreducible 
distance between the Enlightened One and his masters and contemporaries . 
This is a polemical position, which requires rectification . The 
Buddha himself proclaimed that he had ' seen the ancient way and 
followed it . ' { M I 164ff . )  The 'ancient ' ,  timeless way was that 
of liberation, of nondeath, and it was also the way of Yoga . l 
On the question of whether the Buddha denied the atta Eliade takes a position 
like that of Thomas and Murti, stoppi ng short of asserting as Grimm did that 
Gotama never denied the atta but defined it only in terms of what it is not . 
Nevertheless, Eliade comes very close to Grimm's position when he writes : 
If he took over the pitiless analysis to which preclassic Sa�khya 
and Yoga submitted the notion of 'person' and of psychomental life, 
it was because the 'Self' had nothing to do with that illusory 
entity, the human ' soul 1 • But the Buddha went even further than 
Sa�khya and Yoga, for he declined to postulate the existence of a 
purusa or an atman . Indeed he denied the possibility of discussing 
any absolute pri nciple, as he denied the possibility of having an 
even approximate experience of the true Self, so long as man was 
not 'awakened' . 2 
Here Eliade is trying to have his cake and eat it, with regard to the 
concept of the atta, reflecting the confusion that hangs over this whole 
subject . When he capitalises 'Self' he means that the atta was affinned 
by Gotama, as Grirrm maintained, but then he turns full about and says that 
the Buddha ' declined to postulate the existence of an . �tman . 1 We 
can not have it both ways . Surely Grimm' s answer is the only way out of 
this confusion : the Buddha defined the atta or atman only negatively, but 
in doing so he meant to leave us in no doubt that the Self exists and it 
is the goal of the spiritual life . 
1Mircea Eliade Yoga, Irrmortality and Freedom (Princeton University Press, 
1969, originally published in 1958) p . 162 
2Ibid . p . 163 
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Eliade, however, goes on to make it quite clear that the Buddha 
was not denying a reality beyond this perishable world which human beings 
can know and participate in�which is, after all, precisely what the 
atman means in Indian mystical thought: 
More careful analysis shows that the Buddha rejected all 
contemporary philosophies and asceticisms because he regarded them 
as idola mentis interposing a sort of screen between man and absolute 
reality, the one true Uncon ditioned . That he had no intention of 
denying a final unconditioned reality, beyond the eternal flux of 
cosmic and psychomental phenomena, b ut that he was careful to speak 
but little on the subject, is proved by a n umber of canonical texts . 
Nirvana is the absolute in the highest sense, the asa�skrta- -that is, 
what {s neither born nor composed, what is irreducible, transcendent, 
beyond all human experience . . . .  Nirvana can be 'seen' only with 
the 'eye of the saints ' (ariya cakku) --tfiat is, with a transcendent 
'organ '  whi eh no longer participates in the perishable world . l 
Given all this, it makes no sense at all to assert that the Buddha denied 
the reality of the atman . All that he could possibly have denied was 
some people 's conception of the atman, or, that the perishable aspects 
of our personality are the atman . �lothi ng proves he den i ed an i nner rea 1 ity, 
call it an 'organ '  or whatever , capable of experiencing the transcendent. 
Surely, a l l  that can be said is that the Buddha did not choose to make 
use of the metaphor of 'Self ' in a positive way in order to point to this 
'beyond ', but confined himself to speaking of what the Self is not- -which 
is surely still a use of the metaphor . The important difference is that 
it is not a use of the metaphor of 'Self' which invites speculation, but 
one suited perfectly to the practical, experimental approach that is the 
Buddhist path. To concentrate on what is not the Self is to get on with 
the task of winning detachment from all that is perishable and painful. 
Who is it that becomes detached, if there is no Self? • Se l f I is the 
great Indian metaphor for the transcendent that is more than a metaphor� 
it is the kind of symbol identified by Tillich which participates in the 
reality to which it gives expression . If Gotama denied the reality of 
the Self it can only mean that he was a sceptic of the claims of the mystics 
that there is a transcendent reality in which we can participate . This is 
1Mircea Eliade Yoga, Immortality and Freedom p . 164 
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just what many scholars still think, some of them very capable linguists 
with a great mastery of detail as we shall see. The viewpoint of Thomas, 
Murti, Pande and Eliade has by no rreans yet won the day, while the even 
greater challenge to the scholarly establishment represented by Grirm, 
and Perez-Remon (and the present small study) has hardly yet entered the 
field. 
A. K. Warder is the most senior of  these contemporary scholars who 
have taken the completely negative or 'extinction only' view of nibbana, 
basing it on the belief that the Buddha denied the reality of the atta 
of the mystics, i. e. the transcendental self. Like the other scholars 
whom we shall go on to discuss who have taken the 'simple ' view of 
Buddhism--repeating old mistakes, it is tempting to say--Warder suffers 
from a narrowness of  focus and lacks the depth of contextual knowledge 
of Indian thought and religion that the older scholars like La Vallee 
Poussin had acquired. Yet he has written a standard text-book in Pali 
and his work is highly rreticulous, for example he has made a study of 
the rretre in verse passages in the suttas in order to assist the process 
of arranging the texts into their proper strata in the development of the 
Canon. His large study entitled Indian Buddhis,� (1970), however, resembles 
his Pali text-book in that it is hard to believe that the ideas expounded 
in the one or the language in the other were ever those of living human 
beings. Inconsistencies and nuances in the texts do not exist for him ; 
the texts which fit his nihilistic view of Buddhism are dragooned into 
perfect logical formation and the unfit simply ignored. 
Yet his kind of mind was undoubtedly a shaping force in the compiling 
bf  the suttas themselves. There is nothing new about the rationalism 
with which he approaches the material- -one of the early schools, the 
Sautr!ntikas, took a similar point of view of the Buddha 's teaching and 
firmly believed they were adhering to the very letter of  it, hence their 
name. Rationalism always wishes to eliminate the mystical. Warder 's 
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work is a useful reminder that the texts can be read consistently from 
the purely negative point of view, provided it is always assumed that 
when they speak of suffer i ng and impennanence and the not-self they are 
then referring to all that exists (rather than merely to conditioned 
existence in the phenomenal world). Warder does assume this , as the 
following passage about the reason for the Buddha 's refusal to say whether 
or not the Perfected One exists after death illustrates: 
As there is no cont i nuing being, which would be tantamount to a 
soul, the alternatives do not apply . . .  There is no being, or 
'thus-gone ', which exists or is destroyed at  death. There is 
only the seq�ence of conditions , the cycle of the universe so 
conditioned. I 
Here Warder is supplying us with a premise which is never stated in the 
texts, i . e. that there � only the sequence of conditions which are 
described in the paticcasamuppada or chain of causality. Without this 
premise, which is nowhere even hinted at--quite the contrary--in the vast 
number and variety of texts in the Sutta Pitaka , Warder 's argument crumbles. 
The premise is a rationalist or empiricist superimposition on the texts . 
Rune Johansson (b. 1918), who like Warder has written a text-book for 
students of P!li, is a psychologist working for Swedish Defence Research 
and has written two books on psychological aspects of early Buddhism: 
The Psychology of NirvaQa (1969) and The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism 
(197q) ,  He is a subtle writer who is very attentive to detail and brings 
out features of the subject that have been overlooked in the past, but he 
has virtually no knowledge of the context in Indian thought of what he is 
discussing. His view of nibbana is detennined by his amateur interest in 
therapeutic psychology, so that he views it as 'the solution to a problem' . 
Nibbana , he says, is ' freedom of the personality . . .  freedom from the 
personal compulsions, obsessions and inhibitions that make a realistic , 
purposeful way of life impossible. •2 The most common context of the word 
1A. K. Warder Indian Buddhism (Delhi: Motil al Banarsidas , 1970) p. 125 
2 Rune Johansson The Psychology of Nirvaoa (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 
1969) p.32 
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' nibbana' , he points out, is the progressive series of which it is the 
climax : ' This monklife leads to complete detachment, to freedom from 
craving,' to cessation, to peace, to superknowledge, to the highest insight, 
to nibb�na, ' The word is also frequently associated with coolness (with 
all that means in a tropical country ) ,  with pleasure, release, health, 
peace, happiness, security, kindness and freedom from disease. As if 
to clinch his case that nibbana is the goal of a therapy, he points out 
what is undoubtedly true, that 'the most important aspect of nibbana is 
the destruction of the obsessions. 1 This does not mean, he insists, 
'complete absence of motivation, nor passivity. The active and energetic 
frame of mind is frequently mentioned in descriptions of arahants. •1 
Nibbana is, very simply, psychological health in this life, replacing the 
motivation of obsession, anger and hatred with that of understanding, 
friendliness and compassion. It is fundamentally a transformation of 
the personality, by which Johansson means ' the deeper layers of conscious ­
ness and the centre of personality,' which he argues is denoted in the 
texts by the word 'citta' • 2 
Johansson can see no justification in the texts for taking nibbana 
to refer to any transcendent reality. His view is an ethical one like 
that of T. W. Rhys Davids, but given a modern psychological ring : 
The new, transformed state of citta is nibbana :  a state of fulfilment 
in which all needs and emotions have�one, a state of calm contentment 
and of complete intellectual insight. It is a state of inten,al 
freedom, where all insecurity, dependence and defence have disappeared. 
Ethical behaviour has become second nature, and the attitude towards 
others is friendliness, acceptance and humility.3 
Yet he goes on to say that the texts indicate that there was thought to 
be no essential difference in the Arahant' s consciousness before a nd after 
death, asserting : 'It is fairly well documented that the citta was thought 
1Rune Johansson The Psychology of N� rvana p.29 
2Ibid. p.36 3Ibid. p.131 
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to survive death, ' ( that is, the death of the arahant). Other texts 
'prove', says Johansson, that the Tathagata was thought to continue 
existing in some fonn after death just as the 'immeasurable , unfathomable 
ocean' to which he is often compared certainly exists. 1 Thus, although 
he denies that nibbana is transcendent, Johansson also denies the pure 
extinctionist point of view to be correct. 2 
A recent scholar who does still take the pure extinctionist point 
of view is John Garrett Jones, whose book Tales and Teachings of the 
Buddha ( 197 9) compares the ethical, social and doctrinal aspects of 
the 'tales' ( Jataka stories) and ' teachings' ( suttas). John Jones, who 
supervised my thesis and greatly stimulated my thinking, emphasizes the 
anatta teaching: 'Gotama ' s  way of release,' he writes, ' consisted in the 
profound realisation of anatta. Once one was convinced that one had no 
soul or enduring self, samsara lost its sting because there was no longer 
anyone to be reborn . , 3  Nibbana is simply cessation of the i�pennanent 
'pseudo-self ' and one's final death 'would be no ordinary death because 
it would be the prelude to no other life of any sort whatever. ' 4 Gotama 
had decisively rejected 'the Hindu doctrine of moksha or mukti (release 
by realising the unity of cttman and brahman) on the ground that this 
doctrine was based on speculative theories for which there was no basis' 5 
Accordingly, Jones sharply rejects the transcendental view of nibbana: 
It has frequently been maintained that nibbana is in fact 
something more positive than this, a kind of blissful, transcendent 
state of being which can only be known in experience and which is 
quite unalll:!nable to any kind of description. If this is the case, 
I can find no b asis for it in the Four Nikayas. So far as I am 
aware, there is not one word in the Four Nikayas which lends support 
to the idea of nibbana as some positive, transcendent state of bliss. 
If Gotama intended nibbana :to have such a meaning, it would be hard 
to explain why he was so reluctant to say so and even harder to sge what basis such a meaning would have in the rest of his teaching. 
1Rune Johansson The Psychology of Nirvctna pp. 60-2 
2Arvind Shanna made a brief, unconvincing attempt to 'answer Johansson on 
the subject of the permanence of the citta in 'Rune Johansson ' s Analysis 
of citta: a Criticism' in the Joun1al of the International Association 
for Buddhist Studies Vol. 4 No. 1, 1981 pp. 101-7 
3-6john Garrett Jones Tates_and Teachings of the Buddha pp . 150-2 
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This passage shows how differently the texts can appear to different 
people: whereas for Jones ' not one word' in the whole of the Four Nikayas 
supports the transcendental view of the goal, for the writer of the 
present study not one word fails to do so. 
Another recent study which takes the same negative point of view 
as Jones does, and bases this similarly on the non-existence of an atman, 
is Pratap Chandra's Metaphysics of Perpetual Change : the Concept of Self 
in Early Buddhism (197 8). He finds in the Pali Nikayas ' an emphasis on 
perpetual change, on continuous becoming, to the total exclusion of any 
fixed entity whatsoever. •1 But early Buddhism was not pessimistic, he says, 
because although it is painful to be part of a reality in which nothing 
stays the same for two consecutive rroments the malady is curable, ' and 
that too by an individual 's own efforts rather than by the whims of divine 
grace. •2 The cure is complete extinction, although Chandra does not say 
so in so many words--strong medicine for the sickness in question ! But 
the conclusion follows from the absence of an atta in what Chandra views 
as not so much a religion as a tough-minded empiricist philosophy: 
To the Buddha goes the credit for viewing the self dynamically 
for the first time in human history. As a realist, he could hardly 
deny the reality of the psycho -physical continuum. As a responsible 
leader of the masses, he could hardly deny karma and transmigration. 
But as a thinker who shunned speculative imagi nation, he could 
certainly deny metaphysical status to the psycho-physical seriPs, 
which is all that is connoted by the term'self' in early Buddhism. 
The middle path clearly signifies t ,e acceptance of self as it is 
found in experience, but not of an imaginary 3ne invented for the purpose of escaping � he rigours of existence. 
Early Buddhism, says Chandra, ' set the greatest store by empirical values, 
personal conviction and realistic analysis. Speculative imagination had 
nardly any place in early Buddhist thinking,' which is why it taught 
the ' absence or unreality of a permanent, irrmutable and blissful self. •4 
In the absence of such a self, ' Deliverance signified nothing rrore than 
1Pratap Chandra Metaphysics of Perpetual Change: the Concept of Self 
in Early Buddhism (Bombay: Somaiya Publications Pvt. Ltd 197 8) p.24 
2Ibid. p.26 3Ibid. p.166 4Ibid. pp.164-5 
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the stopping of the series of existence. • 1 We shall encounter exactly 
this point of view again in the next chapter in the section about modern 
Theravadin views of nibbana-- David Kalupahana also views his own tradition 
as a foreshadowing of modern, atheistic empiricism. Clearly, this is 
one way of construing the Buddha ' s  ban on all speculation. The other 
way is to see it as a refusal to indulge in futile theorising about the 
ineffable or transcendent reality , an attitude that is not incompatible 
with the realism and empiricism that Chandra quite rightly draws attention 
to in the texts. 
In 1980 Joaquin Pe rez-Rem6n' s big book Self and Non-Self in Early 
Buddhism appeared. No scholarly evaluation of it has yet come out in 
the jou rnals, but it can be said with no uncertainty that it is the most 
substa�tial and detailed work of linguistic scholarship on the Pali Nikayas 
that has yet been carried out, being an exhaustive study of every relevant 
and problematic text in which the self is mentioned. 1 When the work of 
this brilliant Spanish schol ar (who carried out his research in Bombay) is 
eventually recognized, its impact will be revolutionary in Buddhist studies� 
and have troublesome reverberations in the Theravada Buddhist coll111unities� 
because of the sheer weight of evidence and force of argument that is brought 
to the defence of the position taken by George Grimm in 1916 ( and by a few 
scholars since who did not take the trouble to make out a proper case for it ) . 
vlhereas Gri111T1 almost buried his insights under a mass of Schopenhauerian 
speculation, Perez-Rem6n writes in a very spare and direct style and devotes 
all of his space to dissecting the meanings of words and sentences in the 
Pali and reassessing how they should be translated into English and the 
resulting message construed. 
Because Perez-Rem6n ' s  work is so detailed and so radical in its 
implications, it is not easy to assess. The present study is an attempt , 
1P ratap Chandra The M�taphysics of Perpetual Change p. 204 
2only Pande ' s  �tudy, which has been mentioned, and Jayatilleke ' s  which will 
rece1 ve attent, on 1 n  the next chapter, deal with the texts in comparable depth and de tail . 
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as it was said in the Introduction, to evaluate three things which bear 
on whether or not Pe rez-Rem6n is right: fistly, what the weight of 
scholarly opinion is on both sides of the question (which the present 
chapte r has been about) ;  secondly, the puzzling question of just whe re 
and why the The ravadin tradition came to misinterpret its own scriptures, 
as it must have done if the thesis is correct ; and, finally, the Pali 
texts themselves, plainly, had to be read afresh in order to see how 
plausible the inte rpretation really is. Thus, although Perez-Rem6n 1 s 
book did not come to hand until towards the end of my research for this 
study, the study has effectively been turned into a response to it. 
The essence of Perez-Rem6n 1 s argument is stated in the sentence from 
his conclusion which poses the question: ' If the self was no reality what 
sense did it make to establish the fact that something was not the self 
as the impelling motive to discard it, to get rid of it, to work for its 
utter cessation? 1 1 The logic of this question penetrates ve ry deeply 
into the accumulated misunderstandings of the The ravadin tradition and of 
the Weste rn scholarly tradition which read the Pali texts through the 
distorting lens of Theravadin doctrine. Whereas Mrs Rhys Davids hypoth­
esized that the contradictory coexistence of many texts affirming the atta 
and texts asse rting anatta in the Canon meant that the latte r must be a 
later development�a ' pitiful monk-wail '---Perez-Rem6n is able to show that 
this is an entirely unnecessary inference. All that the monks did was to 
misunderstand what were, after all, baffling utterances of their master. 
The misunderstanding consisted, essentially, in taking anatta in an 
absolute sense, rather than a relative one ; as Perez -Remon says of anatta, 
' it does not deny the reality of the self in an absolute way but limits 
itself to the denial of selfhood regarding the empirical factors as a 
motive for their rejection. 1 2 This, Perez-Remon beleives, was well enough 
1Joaqufn Pe rez -Rem6n Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism (The Hague, Mouton 
Publishers, 1980} p.303 
2 Ibid. p. 302 
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understood by the ' immediate' followers of Gotama. These were the ones 
who composed the suttas 'in which both the reality of the atta and the 
doctrine of anatta are clearly taught. 1 1 The 'scholastic ' corrmentators 
came much later ; as Perez-Rem6n is able to demonstrate, the first generation 
of corm,entators were the ones who wrote the Niddesa-:-one of the books 
included in the Sutta Pitaka--which even 'waxes eloquent' about the atta, 
far from teaching its non-existence, and 'is a model of the balanced 
attitude between the doctrine of atta and the doctrine of anatta, a balance 
that begins to be broken in the Patisambhidamagga in favour of the latter, 
a fact that shows unmistakeably that an evolution of thought was possible 
in this matter. , Z  Perez-Remon sums up his argument as follows: 
The anatta doctrine taught in the Nikayas has a relative value, 
not an absolute one. It does not say simply that the self has no 
reality at all, but that certain things, with which the unlearned man 
identifies himself, are not the self and that is why one should grow 
disgusted with them, become detached from them and be liberated . 
Since this kind of anatta does not negative the self as such but denies 
self-hood to the things that constitute the non-self, showing thereby 
that they are empty of any ultimate value and to be repudiated, instead 
of nullifying the atta doctrine complements it . . . .  what is radically 
rejected in the Nikayas is the self of the sakkayaditthi, that is to 
say, the self that is wrongly identified with the khandhas . This 
wrong notion of the self is supposed to prevail in all non-Buddhist 
systems . . .  Therefore all the passages where any sort of controversy 
with non-Buddhists is the point at issue, or passages where the 
bhikkhus themselves are warned of the dangers of any doctrine of self 
(attavada), become clear if they are taken to refer to the wrong self 
of the sakkayaditthi. The true self is never brought into question . 
. . . Original Buddhism belonged by right of birth to the non-Brahmanic 
world, where the plurality of selves was accepted as a matter of fact . 
If then the ultimate reality in each man is said to be transcendent 
what else can that reality in every man be but man's true self? This 
transcendent self was the one asserted whenever one was made to say of 
the empirical factors, 'This is not mine, this I am not, this is not 
my self' , a formula that equi�alently says, 'I am beyond all this, my self transcends all this' . 
A small but vital item of evidence in support of this view is the 
fact that ' the empirical factors are always said to be not "that which 
has no self" (adjective), but simply " the non-self" (noun) , placing the 
empirical factors in clear opposition to the self, which transcends them, 
1Perez-Rem6n Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism p. 303 
2 Ibid p. 304 3Ibid. pp. 304- 5 
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and accepting both the extremes of the opposition as real in their own 
right. •1 But the main support for Pirez -Rem6n 's thesis comes from the 
hundreds of examples he locates in the suttas in which the word atta is 
used uninhibitedly and effectively to evoke the true self, and the hundreds 
of further examples that cover the entire range of denials of self in the 
literature . Not one of these unambiguously requires the interpretation 
that has been placed on them by tradition. What have been taken to be 
deni als that the self exists read much more naturall y  as denials that the 
perishable personality is the true self. In the final chapter of this 
study Perez-Rem6n 's findings are examined afresh against the texts, and 
especially one feature of the texts to which he did not direct so much 
attention, that is, the parables and imagery that are used for the self. 
His thesis emerges as thoroughly convincing to an extent that certainly 
was not expected when the study was begun. 
With hindsight, however, it is possible to see that the opposition 
to the received Theravadin account of anatta, along with opposition to the 
negative interpretation of the goal of Buddhism of Western scholarship, 
was steadily growing. It has been mentioned already that Edward Conze 
decided, late in his life, that Grimm had been right all along. Although 
he was primarily a Mahay!nist scholar, . Conze had an extremely subtle 
grasp of the tradition as a whole. In what is perhaps his best book, 
Buddhist Thought in India { 1 962 )  he shows that he had come very close 
to stating the thesis himself : 
On reconsidering the argumentation behind the fonnula 'this 
is not mine, l am not tbis, this is not my self' we find that any­
thing which falls short of the standard of complete self-control 
should be seen as 'not-self ' and should therefore not be appropriated . 
. . . Our, dreads, worries, solicitudes, outbursts of anger, etc. , 
indicate as many abortive hankerings after complete ownership. 
In getting rid of all that restricts our absolute freedom, in 
rejecting it as 'not our self ', we take an extremely exalted view 
of ourselves, and we may tremble at our audacity. But unless we 
dare to be ourselves, dare to be quite free, the external accretions 
1Perez-Rem6n Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism p. 305 
will stick to us for ever , and we will remain submerged , and 
alienated from ourselves. 
There is, I think , reason to believe that in any case we all 
the time unknowingly take this most exalted view of ourselves ,  
and that, 1what is more , it is a healthy thing for us knowingly to do so. 
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The Buddhist view , according to Conze, was that we should reject totally 
'all that is not the Absolute as es sentially alien to us. • 2 
It has already been mentioned too that Mrs R�ys Davids affinned the 
view of the reality of the self in early Buddhism. In her 1931 book 
Sakya , or Buddhist Origins she wrote that a man who lives according to 
the dhanTTia 'is living according to the hidden Divinity , Who, by virtue 
of his manhood , he was. 1 3 And in her Introduction to The Book of the 
Gradual Sayings Vol. I ,  she writes , (speaking of how Gotama used the word 
dhanma) 'Deliberately , we are told , and told with utmost  emphasis, he chose 
it to mean that inTTianent Godhead of his day: the Thou art That of the 
Upani�ads , Whom alone he held meet he should worship. • 4 I. B. Horner , 
who was a student of Mrs Rhys Davids' , has expres sed a similar point of 
view in many places, for example in her The Early Buddhist Theory of Man 
Perfected (1936 } she writes that Gotama believed ' that there is an order 
which transcends the personal, and one which each of his disciples should 
aspire towards, lit by the light of the Self, the Dhamma within hiM. • 5 
In her Introduction to Vol. II  of the Gradual S�yings she writes of a 
Majjhima pas sage: 'Atta is not denied here, or anywhere else in the Pali 
Canon ; it is accepted. 1 The same has been said by R. C. Zaehner (see 
page 8 1  of the present study) and by the doyen of Japanese Buddhist scholars 
Hajime Nakamura , who writes: 'The Buddha clearly told us what the self 
1Edward Conze Buddhist Thought in India (University of Michigan Press ,  
1967 , originally published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd in 1962) p. 45  
2 Ibid. p. 46 
3
c .  A. F. Rhys Davids Sakya, or Buddhist Origins (London: Kegan, Paul, 
Tench, Trubner & Co. Ltd. , 1931) p. 68 
4The Book of the Gradual Sayings I (London: Pali Text Society, 1932) p. viii 
5 I. B. Horner The Early Buddhist  Theory of Man Perfected (London : Williams 
and Northgate, 1936) p. 146 
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is not, but he does not give any clear account of what it is. It is 
quite wrong . to think that there is no self at all according to Buddhism . 
. . . The Buddha did not deny the soul but was merely silent concen1ing it. 
Moreover, he seems to have acknowledged that the true self in our existence 
will appear in our moral conduct conforming to universal norms. •1 
All of this needs to be placed in perspective by reminding ourselves 
that the early Buddhists had many different words for the goal, and that 
the word 1 atta 1 is not used often except in the apophatic mode that is so 
characteristic of the via neQativa kind of mysticism--that is to say, the 
mode of speech or figurative use of speech in which the positive meaning 
is deliberately skirted by means of negation. Other words came to take 
on the role of 'atta ' when a positive affirmation was appropriate, for 
example the word 1 dha111T1a 1 and, of course, 'nibbana •. 2 In the next chapter 
we shall see how, by a process akin to semantic change, the apophatic 
use of 1 atta 1 fell away in the tradition, being ill-adapted to the phase 
of dogmatic consolidation that followed the composition of the suttas , 
and other words, particularly 1'asankhatc1 1 meaning the 'Unconditioned ', came 
to bear the transcendent significance that 'atta ' almost certainly conveyed 
in the early tradition. 
1Hajime Nakamura ' Unity and Diversity in Buddhism ' in Kenneth W. Morgan (ed) 
The Path of the Buddha (New York, Ronald Press Co. 1956) p. 377 
2see John Ross Carter' s important study of the word 1 dha111T1a 1 in the 
tradition, listed in the Bibliography. 
CHAPTER I I  
THE RAVADI N V I EWS ANCI ENT AND MODE RN 
I THE ABH I DHAMMA P I TAKA 
As it has already been said, the Sutta Pitaka can not properly 
be classed as a Theravadin product because it is made up of material 
4 1  
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which all the evidence suggests was circulated amongst all of the early 
Buddhist corrmunities. The first truly Theravadin product is the 
Abhidhanma Pitaka, or the third 'basket' of scriptures in the Pali Canon . 
Whereas the Sutta Pitaka reflects the existence of much controversy 
between Buddhists and other sects, the Abhidhamma Pitaka reflects disputes 
which were internal to Buddhism and the felt need to set down the true 
doctrine in order to settle these disputes. 
The first clear division on matters of doctrine ( as distinct from 
the earliest schisms in the Order in the lifetime of Gotama which were 
over the issue of rigour versus laxity in the discipline and various 
subsequent disagreements over matters of style or leadership) took place 
some 150 years after the death of Gotama. This was the dispute between 
the Theravada and Mahasamgika schools in which the latter vigorously 
advocated the supramundane nature of the Buddha and Bodhisattvas, and 
at the same time disparaged the Arahants and questioned their fallibility. 1 
The retrenchment of the Theravadins took the form of an intense concent­
ration on the analysis of conditioned and unconditioned dharrmas, which is 
the main theme of the Abhidharrma Pitaka--as its title to some extent conveys. 
The fifth book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka called the Kathavatthu or 
'Points of Controversy' begins with the most important dispute that next 
1
s .  N. Dube Cross Currents in Early Buddhism ( New Delhi, Manohar Publications 
19 80) pp. 64, 110 
flared up which was about the existence of the soul or 'person '. This 
was not given the name of 'atta' but of 'pudgala.' The Pudgalavadins or 
' Personalists ' are portra�ed in the Kathavatthu as twisting and turning 
in order to remain orthodox in their denial that the pudgala can be 
identified with any of the khandhas, although they speak of it as 
deriving from them. 1 The ir main concern seems to have been not to 
proclaim a mystical Absolute such as the atta but nerely to explain 
transmigration coherently, because it seemed to them inconceivable 
without the continuity of the 'person '. They quoted Gotama as saying : 
'This sage Sunetra, who existed in the past, that Sunetra was I ', and 
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'He rejects one body and takes up another ', etc . To them this implied an 
entity denoted by the words 'I ' and ' he '. Their favourite scripture 
was the Bharahara Sutta which they argued firmly distinguished the 
carrier of the burden from the five khandhas symbolised by the burden. 
It is not irmiediately apparent why the Theravadins regarded the 
Pudgalavadins as a threat. The problem lay in the fact that by this 
time the Theravadins had refined to a high degree their analysis of all 
dha11111as into the two categories of conditioned (sankhata) and unconditioned 
(asankhata). Anything that suggested that the khandhas might fall between 
the two categories of this dualism was a threat to the whole system. The 
Theravadins are shown in the Kathavatthu refuting their opponents by 
quoting the Dfgha Nikaya III, 274: 'There are, bhikkhus, these two 
irreducible categories, the conditioned . . .  the unconditioned, these 
are the two ', and trapping the Pudgalav!dins into saying that the person 
is neither. 2 We can see, therefore, how the Theravadins were gradually 
driven by their own rational dialectic into adopting an absolute view 
of the teaching of anatta. Because everything had to be categorized as 
either conditioned or unconditioned (nibbana being the sole 'unconditioned ' 
dharT1T1a), the self or att!�and anything that anyone proposed that resembled 
the atta, such as the pudgala�had to be declared non -existent. 
1Points of Controversy: The Kath�vatthu (Pali Text Society, 1915 )  p.33ff 
2Ibid. pp.54-5 
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The Theravadi ns  preserved the mystical nature of their teaching 
by turning the relationship betv,1een anatta and nibb ana into a paradox . 
Taken alone the doctrine of  anatta yields a nihilistic meaning ; it is 
only when it is viewed in relation to nibbclna as the Theravadins 
understood it that the two together generate a significance very 
close in s pirit to the mysticism that can be discerned in the actual 
utterances of the Buddha ( in so far a s  we can isolate them in the 
suttas ) .  The cornerstone of the Therav�din view of nibbana is its 
u11ique status as the a s ankhata dhatu or • unconditioned element ' .  
I n  the Dhammasanghal)i it is cha racterised in a way that rules out 
the view that it could amount to utter extinction or nothingnes s :  
The a s ankhata dhatu ( unconditioned element) is indeterminate, 
neither result nor p roductive of result, neither gra sped at nor 
favourable to �ra sping, neither vitiated nor vicious, without 
applied or sustained thought, to be put away neither by insight 
nor culture, that which makes for neither the piling up nor the 
undoing of rebirth, neither appertaining nor not appertaining 
to training, infinite, excellent, that which does not entail 
fixed consequences, invisible and non-reacting, not a root­
condition, �-1ithout root conditions as concomitants, not 
as sociated with a root-con di ti on , without materi a 1 form, 
supramundane, not an asava, not having asavas, disconnected 
with the asavas, not a fetter, unfavourable to the fetters, 
disconnected with the fetters, not a hindrance, unfavourable 
to the hindrances, disconnected with the hindrances, not a 
perve rted belief, unfavourable to a perverted belief, disconnected 
with a perverted belief, without conconmitant object of thought, 
not mind, not mental p roperty, disconnected with thought, 
detached from thought, not something coming into being because 
of thought, not something coming into being along with thought, 
not something to undergo change after thought, not deri ved, 
without the attribut:e of gras ping, disconnected with g ra sping, 
disconnected and not favourable to gra s ping, without the 1 
attribute of vice, not vicious, disconnected with the vices, etc. 
I t  is easy to understand the kind of monkish work that has gone into 
a list such as this ; what is also important to recognize is the 
underlying purpose of the enterprise, that is, to set nibbana apa rt 
1Quoted by Vishwanath Pra sad Varma in E arly Buddhism and its Origins, 
( New Delhi, Munshi ram Manaharlal Publishers, 1 97 3) p. 258 . 
as a rea1 ity which is not reducibl e  to anything whatever in this 
changing worl d, even, it shoul d be noted, thought itsel f. In this 
way the Theravadins preserved intact the via negativa preached by 
the Buddha despite what I am arguing is their misunderstanding of 
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the doctrine of anatta .  The concept of nibb�na is now carrying a l one 
a meaning it shared with the 'atta ' at first. But they gained in that 
their understanding of anatta as an absol ute denial of sel f  serves to 
heighten the dual ism (between the conditioned and the unconditioned) 
that is the keynote of their exposition of the Buddha 's teaching 
in the Abhidharrrna Pitaka. This means that they have not strayed 
essential l y  from the original teaching ;  they have mere ly  removed 
some of its nuances, its subtlety and its reserve . To say this is 
not to assume arrogantly  a superiority of judgment to theirs, it is 
on ly  to recognize the difference betv,een the workings of a great and 
original mind (which we can discern in the material preserved so 
faithful l y  in the Sutta Pitaka) and the systematizations of those 
v,ho were fo 1 1  owers . Many of these discipl es may have been mystics 
as accompl ished as their master, but creative genius is something e lse .  
. I I  BUDDHAGHOSA 
Buddhaghosa' s main work the Visuddhimagga or 'Path of Purification' 
has been the chief guide to Theravadin discip l ine since the Fifth century 
and no account of the meaning of nibbana in Theravada Buddhism wou ld  be 
compl ete without mentioning his strong defence of its real ity . We 
may take it that what Buddhaghosa writes is the purest Ceylonese ortho­
doxy since he states his aim as being to expound the teachings of the 
'(h.,,e l l ers in the Great Monastery ' at Anuradhapura rather than to advance 
opinions of his own�he has, in fact, been criticised for a l ack of 
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original ity. 1 In the Visuddhimagga the goal throughout is stated to 
be 'the unfonned dharm,a', refl ecting the division of al l dharm,as into 
the two categories that we have already seen in the Abhidharm,a Pitaka. 
In discussing the meditati on cal l ed 'Recol l ection of Peace' (another 
name for the goal ) ,  Buddhaghosa uses a number of other tenns which are 
derived from the suttas : 
This is how peace, in other words, nibbana, shoul d be 
recol l ected according to its special qualities beginning with 
disil l usionment of vanity. But it shoul d also be recol l ected 
according to the other special qual ities of peace stated by the 
B l essed O"e in the suttas beginning with 'Bhikkhus, I shal l teach 
you the unfonned . . .  the truth . • •  the other shore . . .  the 
hard to see • . • the undecaying • . .  the l asting . . .  the 
undiversified . . • the deathl ess . • . the auspicious . • .  the 
safe . . .  th: marvel l ous • . · . the intact . . .  the
1
unaffl icted 2 . . .  the purity . • . the i s l and . . .  the shel ter. (S IV 360-72) 
In the same section we are tol d that a 6hikkh� who devotes himsel f  to 
this recol l ection of peace ' s l eeps in bl iss and wakes in b l iss. ' 
The first part of the Visuddhimagga, from which these quotations 
come, is about practice. It is onl y  in the second, theoretical part 
that we find actual arguments for the real ity of nibbana. In the 
most famous passage Buddhaghosa responds to the chal l enge: 'Is nibbana 
non-existent because it is unapprehendabl e, l ike the hare's horn?' with 
the repl y :  'That is not so • • •  it shoul d not be said that what the 
foolish ordinary man does not apprehend is unapprehendabl e. '  If 
nibbana did not exist the path woul d be futil e, he insists. The texts 
show, he says, that Arahantship is not mere destruction fol l owed by no 
further arising, yet what it is cannot be stated 'because of its extreme 
subtl ety . . • and because a Nobl e One's eye is needed to see it. • 3 
Nibbana is pennanent and 'irm,aterial because it transcends the individual 
essence of matter . • 4 He careful l y  expl ains that the 'non-existence' 
Visuddhima a) tr. Nyanamoli Bhikkhu, Va l . I  ......-�.-----.��.,.....a-....�ur-T"ii�c-a�t�o-n�s-,--=-1,._.,,,..........�l956 ) �ntroduction pp.xiv,xix 
2Ibid. pp.319:20 3Ibid. Val . II pp. 57 8-5 81 4Ibid. p.5 81 
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that we associate with the word ' nibbana' applies to the 'aggregates 
of exj stence'. These are the ' result of past clinging' of the Arahant, 
i . e. his khandhas. ' The Buddha' s goal is one and has no plurality' , 
he writes , to indicate that it is an error to think of the nibbana 
before death as being any different fundamentally from the state of 
the Arahant after death: the difference is only that in the nibbana 
before death there are still ' the results of past clinging left', 
wkereas, 'after the last consciousness of the Arahant who has abandoned 
arousing future aggregates and so prevented ka1T1T1a from giving result 
in a future existence, there is no further arising of aggregates of 
existence, and those already arisen have disappeared. 1 He continues : 
Because it can be arrived at by distinction of knowledge 
that succeeds through untiring perseverance ; and because it is 
the world of the Omniscient One, nibbana is not non-existent as 
regards individual essence in the ultimate sense ; for this is 
said: 'Bhikkhus, there is an unborn, an unbecome, an unmade, an 
unfonned . • l 
Much of the language here is the result of a long evolution of technical 
terminology in the tradition, so we cannot assume that when Buddhaghosa 
says that nibbana ' is not non-existent as regards individual essence 
in the ultimate sense ', he means that the individuality of the Arahant 
continues to exist. It is more probable that he merely means that 
nibbana possesses its own unique essence. We might well ask how an 
individual can enter nibbana minus any individual essence of his or her 
own. But Theravada Buddhism had by this time carried the rationalization 
of anatta to such an extreme that it was no longer able to avail itself 
of the strong affirmation of an individual essence or ' true self' that 
was implied in Gota�a 's repeated denial that the perishable khandhas 
are that self. The Theravadins had cut themselves off from the main 
stream of Indian mystical thought for which that which survives in 
liberation most emphatically is the innennost self. 
1The Path of Purification Val .II, p. 581. The quotation is from Udana 80 . 
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II[ SOME CONTEMPORARY THERAVADIN SCHOLARS 
Walpola Rahula, perhaps the best known of all the contemporary 
Theravadin scholars who have written in English, is a complex man who 
introduces into his exposition of Buddhism elements that do not belong 
strictly to the Theravadin tradition alone. He studied under Dasgupta 
in Calcutta, made friends with Radhakrishnan and Barua, and we are told 
in a biographical article about him that he 'regarded these scholars, 
and Demieville later, as his gurus•. 1 In his exposition of Theravada 
Buddhism he uses terms which were developed in the context of European 
thought, such as 'Absolute' and 'Ultimate Reality'--tenns which spring 
from philosophical Idealism and, perhaps, from Tillichian theology--to 
correspond to terms in the Pali texts. There are indeed terms in the 
Pali which it is reasonable to translate in this way, but we need to 
beware of letting them carry all of their European overtones, for example 
in the following passage the words do not mean quite what they do in 
the European context. In reply to the question 'What is Nirvana?' Rahula 
writes: 
The only reasonable reply to give to the question is that it can 
never be completely or satisfactorily answered in words, because 
human language is too poor to express the real nature of the Absolute 
Truth or Ultimate Reality which is Nirv§na. Language is created and 
used by masses of human beings to express things and ideas experienced 
by their sense organs and their mind. A supramundane experience like 
that of the Absolute Truth is not of such a category. Therefore 
there cannot be words to express that experience, just as the fish 2 has no words in his vocabulary to express the nature of the solid land. 
As we shall see, Rahula means by 'Absolute Truth' not the Hegelian Absolute 
but just a truth beyond which there is nothing to know, i .e just the truth 
that all is relative! There is a sense in reading Rahula that he gives 
with one hand and takes with the other, and that for all his protestations 
his view of Theravada Buddhism is no different from simple extinctionism. 
1somaratra Balasooriya (ed) Buddhist Studies in honour of Wal ola Rahula 
{London: Gordon Fraser, 198 rn t e memoir y . • . u owy , p. • 
2walpo1a Rahula What the Buddha Taught (New York: Grove Press 1959) p.35 
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The passage in which Rahula explains what he means by 'Absolute Truth ' 
does not make it any easier to grasp: 
Now what is the Absolute Truth? According to Buddhism the 
Absolute Truth is that there is nothing absolute in the world, that 
everything is relative, conditioned and impermanent, and that there 
is QO unchanging, everlasting absolute substance like Self, or Soul, 
or Atman, within or without. This is the Absolute Truth. The 
realization of this Truth . i. e. to see things as they are (yathabhutam) ,  
without illusion or ignoran�(avijja), is the extinction of craving 
'thirst ' (tanhakkhaya ) ,  and the ces sation (nirodha ) of dukkha, which 
is Nirvana. I 
Rahula is here placing some strain on the word 'Absolute ' when he says 
that all that exists is relative--normally we take that kind of assertion 
to mean that there are no Absolutes. It seems that he wants to have his 
modern empiricist outlook and yet retain a mystical dimension of knov,ledge. 
His denial that nibbaoa is negative indicates that this is his viewpoint: 
Because Nirvana is thus expres sed in negative terms there are 
many who have got the wrong notion that it is negative, and expres ses 
self-annihilation. Nirvana is definitely no annihilation of self 
because there is no self to annihilate. If at all, it is the 
annihilation of illusion, of the false idea of self. 
It is incorrect to say that Nirvana is negative or positive. 
The ideas of negative ' and 'positive ' are relative, and are within 
the realm of duality. These terms cannot be applied to Nirvana, 
Absolute Truth, which is beyond duality and relativity. 2 
As a Theravadin, Rahula denies the reality of 'self ' and gets around the 
charge of annihilationism in the sophistical way that the tradition adopted, 
but the second paragraph quoted here introduces a subtle addition to anything 
that we find in the Theravadin tradition. Here Rahula is doing a little 
covert back-reading into the Theravadin tradition (which was strictly dualist) 
of the Mahayanist notion of going beyond dual ity (which is monism). A s  
he goes on to say a few pages later: 
It is interesting and useful here to remember the Mahayana view 
of Nirvana as not being different from Samsara. The same thing is 
Nirvana or Sams ara according to the way you look at it--subjectively 
or objectively. This Mahayana view was probably developed out ot 
ideas found in the original Therayada Pali texts to which we have 
referred in our brief discus sion. 3 
1walpola Rahula What the Buddha]i.1htpp. 39-40 
2Ibid. pp. 37-8 
3Ibid. p.40 
49 
What Rahula writes about the practi cal results of attaining Nirv�na 
i n  this life shows what is meant by seeing Samsara as Nirv!na : 
He who has realized the truth, N i rva�a, i s  the happi est being in the 
world. He is free from all ' complexes • and obsessions, the worries 
and troubles that torment others. His mental health is perfect. 
He does not repent the past, nor does he brood over the future. He 
lives fully in the present. Therefore he appreciates and enjoys 
things in the fullest sense wtihout self-projections. He is free 
from anxiety, serene and peaceful. As he is free frora . selfish desire, 
hatred, ignorance, conceit, pri de and all such 'def ilements •, he is 
pure and gentle, full of universal love, compassion, kindness, sympathy 
understanding and tolerance. His service to others is the purest 
because he has no thought of self. He gains nothing, accumulates 
nothing, not even anything spiritual, because he is free from the 
illusion of Self, and the 'thirst • for becoming. I 
Rahula 's tracing of all of these positive ethi cal achievements to the loss 
of the 'illusion of Self' is only half plausible. All of these positive 
things are sai d in the suttas gut are nowhere put down to the g ivi ng up of 
the illusion of Self - -the relevant illusi on i s  surely believing that the 
grasping self is the true Self. Abandoning this illusion g i ves r ise to the 
state of the jivan -mukta in the I ndian mystical tradition--from which thi s  
en umeration of the qual ities of an 1 Arahant 1 does not differ in any detail . 
The Ven .  Dr. H. Saddhatissa is also firm in  hi s belief that the eali 
texts deny a self, but he adopts a more traditionally Therav�di n descri ption 
of nibbana in his books Buddhist Ethics (1970) and The Buddha 's Way (1971): 
. . .  though with the final disappearance of the potential to li ve 
there will be no more of the present state, that is by no means to 
say that there has not transpired a situation of an entirely different 
ki nd from that previously known. We have the parallel in the case of 
the ' splitting of the atom ' . when, though no new material substance was 
found within the atom, there di d transpire what is now referred to as 
a micro-world. Here the problems of the macro-world for the most 
part ceased to exi st • . • •  I n  the research i nto one type of situation 
or the solving of one set of problems one may arrive at some novel 
state which is quite unpredictable from the viewpoint of the previous 
state . • . .  What exi sts at attai nment to Nibb!na may be perfected and 
true vision but there is no content that we recognize from the present 
state. 2 
Saddhati ssa, who has carried out much detailed li nguistic work (he is the 
author of the P�li Ti pitika Concordance) proposes that the word 1 nirodho 1 , 
used in the stock formula of the goal of the Path i n  which nibbana is  the 
1Walpola Rahula What the Buddha Taught p. 43 
2 H. Saddhatissa Buddhist Ethics { London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1970) 
pp. 176-7 
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ultimate tenn, should be translated not as ' cessation ' or ' extinction ' ,  
as is the usual practice, but as ' no prevention' or ' no obstruction ' ,  
because the word stands for the removal of the craving that is the main 
obstacle  to realizing nibbana. 
The goal, as Saddhatissa describes it, is a profoundly ethical 
state beyond the highest kinds of meditative absorption, a state of 
freedom of mind and of insight which is beyond the reach of the gods in 
their deva-realms. (Saddhatissa suggests that the Buddha spoke of devas 
because they were part of the basic alphabet of the religious understanding 
of his contemporaries). In the words of the Sutta Nipata, nibbana is the 
excellence of one 'who has become attributeless'. Having put down the 
' burden of self' and been 'unyoked from the world', he is one who is 
detached, not relying on outward things, ' who has attained to the deep 
conception of Irrrnortality. • 1 From the wealth of documentation that 
Saddhatissa gives it is impossible to draw the conclusion that nibbana 
was believed by those who composed the suttas to be merely a state of 
preparation for extinction, although the end of rebirth it certainly was . 
In his much briefer study entitled The Buddha ' s  Way (1971) he speaks 
of the two aspects of nibbana as on the one hand the ' non-arising of all 
conditioned states ' ,  and on the other the attainment of the Unconditioned 
which the fonner makes possible. This effectively reaffinns the dualism 
which we have argued was an important feature of the early teaching and 
which the Theravadins preserved. This dualism is everywhere apparent: 
Nibbana defies description in the same way as does the ' kingdom 
of heaven' of the Gospel According to St Thomas. It has been called 
the deathless, the other shore. Being uncompounded, it is not subject 
to the three characteristics of all compounded things: impennanence, 
dukkha and substancelessness. It is compared to the wind. ' Nibbana 
1 s  uncompounded ; it is made of nothing at all. One cannot say of 
Nibbana that it arises or that it does - not arise, or that it is produced, 
or that it is past or present or future; or that it is cognizable by the 2 eye, ear, nose, tongue or body.' It is, however, cognizable by the mind. 
1H. Saddhatissa Buddhist Ethics pp. 190-3 (Sutta-nipata vv. 620-47) 
2H. Saddhatissa The Buddha's Way (London : George Allen & Unwin, 1971) p. 43 
Nyanaponika Mahathera, the author of a well-known book on 
Theravadin meditation techniques entitled The Heart of Buddhist 
Meditation ( 1962), is in fact a Gennan monk who brings to the 
problem of the meaning of nibbana his European background. I n  
an important article entitled 11 Anatta and Nibba:na 11 ( 197 1) he tries 
to demonstrate that the Theravada position is the true middle path 
between metaphysical assertion and nihilism. He states that it is 
the belief in a self that leads people to the two extreme positions 
which Buddhism avoids: 'eternalism ' is the belief that some aspect 
5 1  
of our personality will continue to exist forever, while 'annihilationism ' 
is scarcely different from this except that it is the fear that what 
ought to be pennanent�so unique and important do we feel ourselves 
to be�may not in fact be so. ' Thus the belief in a self is 
responsible not only for eternalism, but also for the annihilationist 
view.' 1 Neither of these rigid extremes can ' do justice to the 
dynamic nature of actuality, and still less to Nibbana which has 
been declared to be supramundane ( lokuttara) and beyond conceptual 
thinking ( atakkavacara).' 2 Because this reality is ungraspable 
Buddhism itself has fluctuated between just the extremes that the 
founder warned against: 
This happened even in early times: the sect of the Sautrantikas 
had a rather negativistic view of Nibbana, while the Mahayanist 
conceptions favoured a positive-metaphysical interpretation. 
It  is therefore not surpris1ng that both of t hese extremes 
are advocated by modern Buddhist authors. I n  Buddhist countries 
of the East, however, there is now, as far as known to the writer, 
not a single Buddhist school or sect that favours a nihilistic 
interpretation of Nibbana. Contrary to erroneous opinions voiced 
mainly by uninfonned or prejudiced Western authors, Theravada, 
i. e. the tradition prevalent in Bunna, Ceylon, Thailand, etc., is 3 definitely averse to a view that regards Nibbana as mere extinction. 
1The Ven. Nyanaponika Mahathera, 1 1 Anatta: and Nibb ana 1 1  in Pathways of 
Buddhist Thought: Essays from 'The Wheel' Edited by The Ven. Nyanaponika 
Mahathera and Selected by M. 01 C. Walshe ( London: George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd., 197 1) p. 150. 
2 I bid. p. 15 1  3 · I bid. p. 152. 
Nyanaponi ka quotes in full the passage we have a 1 ready discussed 
from Buddhaghosa, an d also the commentary on the Visuddhimagga 
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known as the Paramattha -manjusa, in order to show that the Therav�da 
tradition 1 1emphatically rejected a nihilistic conception of its 
highest ideal, Nibbana .  11 1 This he considers enough to refute the 
negative interpretation. 
On the positive metaphysical extreme he has much more to say ,  
since he views it as 1 1the far greater danger to the preservation of 
the Dha1TJTia 1 s character as a 'Middle Way ', " that is, the tendency to 
connect the goal with any nunber of theistic, pantheistic or speculative 
ideas . 2 That these were thought to be the greatest threat to the 
Dhanma can be seen from the fact that the first of all of the 
discourses collected in the Sutta Pitaka, the Brahmajala Sutta, 
is wholly devoted to refuting just these positive assertions of 
some kind of abiding self . In many other discourses too the main 
potential for misunderstanding is perceived as coming not from the 
negative view of nibbana  but from various superficial positive 
theories about it . This second part of Nyanaponika's essay contains 
his least convincing arguments and has the general tone of sectarian 
apologetics , especially in his attack on those who see parallels in Vedanta . 
The final part of the essay is entitled "Transcending the Extremes" 
and here Nyanaponika places Theravada Buddhism firmly, albeit unwittingly, 
in the main stream of via negativa mysticism . His main point is that 
the predominantly negative descriptions of nibbana h ave the purpose 
1 1of eliminating what is inapplicable to Nibbana and inco1TJTiensurate with it . 1 13 
The method enables us, he says, to make more definite statements about i t  
than by the use of abstract tenns which can only be metaphorical . S o me 
1Nyanaponika, 1 1 An atta and !iibbana" p . 160 . 
2Ibid. p. 16 1. 
3Ibid . p . 170 . 
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posi ti ve expressi ons are to be found li ke 'the profound, the pure , 
the pennanent, the true, the marvel l ous' etc. , and the emphat i c  
'There i s '  that opens the two wel l-known texts on Ni bbana i n  the Udana. 
These are incl uded, Nyanaponi ka suggests, to exclude the n i h i l ist i c  
extreme--they "leave no doubt that N i bbana is not conceived as bare · 
exti nction or as a camoufl age for an ab solute Zero 1 1 1 --but they al so 
serve to "allay the fears of those who are st i ll w i thout an adequate 
grasp of the truths of suffering and Anatta and consequentl y shri nk 
back from the fi nal cessati on of suffering, i . e. of reb i rth, as i f  
recoi l i ng from a threatening fall i nto a bottomless · 2  abyss . "  I n  
otner words, the posit i ve utterances about the goal are there si mply 
to prevent mi sunderstandi ng, whi l e  the predomi nant method of def i ni ng  
i t  is  negati on ,  as it  has to  be  for tne followi ng reason: 
Negat i ve utterances are meant to emphasi ze the supramundane 
and undepi ctable nature of Nibbana that el udes any adequate descri pt i on 
i n  posi t i ve tenns. Our l anguage i s  bas i ca l ly unsui ted for i t, 
si nce it is necessari ly related to our world, i ts quali ties, and 
i ts structure and tenns . . .  Negat ive statements are also the 
most appropri ate and reverenti al way to speak of that which has 3 been call ed the Marvel lous (acchariya) and the Extraordi nary (abbhuta) .  
Nyanapon i ka makes a further extremely valuable observat i on about the 
use of negfttion where the a im  is  practi cal and what i s  negated i s  i tsel f 
negati ve. As we know even from si mple ari thmet i c, the negat i on of 
negati on is posi t i ve in i ts fi nal si gn ifi cance: 
Negat i ve ways of expression have al so another i mportant 
advantage. Satements l i ke those defi n i ng N i bb�na as 'the 
destructi on of greed, hatred and del usi on', at the same t i me 
i ndi cate the di rect i on to be taken and the work to be done for 
actuall y reach i ng N i bbana. And it i s  this which matters most. 
These words on the overcoming of greed, hatred and delusi on set 
a clear and convincing task which can be taken up here and now. 
Further, they do not only point to a way that i s  practicable, and 
i s  worthwhile for its own sake, but they also speak of the lofty 
goal i tself which l i kew i se can be experi enced here and now, and 
not only in an unknown Beyond. For i t  has been said: 'If g reed, 
hatred and delusi on have been completely destroyed, i nsofar is 
Nibbana visible here and now, not delayed, invitin� of i nspection, 
and di rectly experi encable by the w i se ' (A III 55). 
1Nyanaponika " Anatta and Nibbana" p. 16 9 
3 T  I, � J ., , ., , 
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Here is the explanat ion, surely, for the fact that the most corrmon 
expressi ons of the goal i n  the suttas are "the end of sufferi ng" and 
"the destructi on of the asavas 1 1 , and all greed, hatred and delusi on. 
The early Buddh ists were bei ng true to thei r  most characteri st i c  
pri nci ple whi ch was a pract i cal emphas is  on the Path and an avoi dance 
of futi le speculat i on whi le pursui ng the Path. In so called v ia  negati va 
myst i c i sm i t  i s  always the 'vi a '  i tself that i s  the proper focus for 
effort. Thi s  i s  why the i ntellectual elaborati on of early Buddhi sm 
i n  the Abhi dha1T111a and corrrnentaries took the form not of rati onal 
speculat i on but of i ntri cate psycholog i cal analysi s--the Path itself 
remai ns at all t imes the focus. Adm i ttedly, a phi losophi cal element 
i s  present i n  the form of a general framework of duali sm w ith in  wh 1ch 
the psycholog i cal analysi s  i s  conducted, but th i s  duali sm i s  not i tself 
subjected to any detai led rat i onal analysi s; i t  i s, rather, the basic  
set of assumpt i ons whi ch reflected the prevail ing i ntellectual climate. 
When modern phi losophi cally-i nclined Theravadi ns approach thi s  
materi al i t  i s  the theory of how we acquire knowledge that tends to be 
the focus of thei r  i nterest, an i ssue whi ch i s  really a psychologi cal 
one. The mai n  work of K. N. Jayati lleke i s  hi s large book entitled 
The Early Buddh ist Theory of Knowledge (1963) i n  whi ch he seeks the 
traces of h is  own Emp ir ic ist outlook i n  the Pali Canon. Hav ing 
studi ed under Wittgenstei n, and wri t i ng at a : t i me when Posit i vi sm was 
sti ll flouri sh ing i n  the uni vers it ies i n  the Engli sh speaki ng countri es, 
he tri es to show that the early Buddhi sts had a very s im i lar atti tude 
to that of contemporary Verifi cat i on ism. Buddhi sm was not an ! pri ori 
system of metaphysi cs, but operated i n  terms of i nduct i ve i nferences 




1 Thi s  i s  the only menti on of the poi nt i n  the whole book, 
1 .K. N. Jayat i lleke, The Early Buddh i st Theory of Knowledge (London: 
George Allen & Unwi n  Ltd., 1 963) p. 457. 
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except for the f i nal paragraph in the book wh i ch i s  worth quoti ng 
i n  full : 
It i s  necessary to draw a d i st i ncti on between the soluti on 
of the Logi cal Pos i t i , i st and that of the Buddh i st. Uhe s ubject 
under d i scuss i on has been the reason for the Buddha's s i lence on 
certai n  questi onsJ.  The Buddhi st wh i le say ing that i t  i s  
meani ngless to ask whether one exi sts i n  ( hot i ) ,  does not exi st 
in (M hoti ) ,  i s  bom in ( upajjati ) ,  i s  not bom in ( na upajjati )  
N i rv�na, st i ll s peaks of such a transcendent state as realizable. 
The meani nglessness of these quest i ons i s  thus partly due to the 
i nadequacy of the concepts contai ned i n  them to refer to th i s  state. 
Th i s  i s  clearly brought out i n  a verse i n  t he Suttani pata. The 
Buddha was asked the queston : 'The person who has attai ned the 
goal--does he not exi st or does he exi st eternally wi thout defect ; 
explai n thi s  to me well, 0 Lord, as you understand it?  1 ( Sn 1 0 75 ) .  
Tne Buddha explai ns : 'The person who has attai ned the goal i s  
w i thout measure ; he does not have that w ith  wh i ch one can s peak 
of h i m. 1 ( Sn 1076 ) .  The transempi ri cal cannot be emp i ri cally 
descri bed or understood (�. supra 480 )  but i t  can be reali zed and 
attained. The Tathagata freed from the concept i on of form, 
sensat i on, i deas, d i s pos i ti ons and consci ousnes s i s  sai d to be 
'deep, i mmeasurable and unfathomable, li ke the great ocean ( M I 487 ) .  
'Whereof one can s peak of h i m--that h e  does not have ( Sn 10 76 ) and 
hence one has to be s i lent. In th i s respect alone i t  resembles 
the Pos i ti vi st' s  outlook : 'Whereof one cannot s peak, thereof one 
must remai n  s i lent ' . [Th i s i s  from W i ttgenstei n, Tractatus 7]. 
Th i s  att i tude has, however, to be di st ingui s hed from Agnost ic i sm. 
It was not that there was someth i ng that the Buddha d i d  not know, 
but that what he ' knew' i n  the transcendent sense could not be 
con�e�e� i n1words because of the l im i tat ions of  language and of emp 1  r, c, sm. 
Davi d Kalupahana, �'lhose contrary v i ew we s hall cons i der i n  more detai l  
later, objects to th i s  on the grounds that the Buddha "confi ned h i mself 
to what was emp i  ri ea 1 ly g i ven" and therefore rejected any transempi ri ea 1 
reali ty. 2 Jayat i lleke's pos i t i on i s  that the Buddha confi ned h i mself 
to what i s  emp i ri cally g i ven i n  all matters except for the knowledge 
of the Uncondi t ioned, to wh i ch the method does not apply. Once agai n, 
th i s  preserves the fundamental dual i sm of outlook i n  the Pali Canon-­
whereas Kalupahana 's pos i t i on would tum the Dhanma i nto somethi ng 
resembli ng modern sc ienti f i c moni sm, or the v i ew that there exi sts 
only a s i ngle ki nd o f  reality and that there i s  only one way of  
knowi ng i t, i . e .  t hrough the senses . For Kalupahana the realm i n  
wh i ch causali ty operates i s  the whole o f  reali ty. 
1Jayati lleke, The Early Buddh i st Theory of  Knowldge pp. 475 -6 
2 oav i d Kalupahana, Causali ty :  The Central Ph i l�sophy of  Buddhi sm ( Hon ol ul u : The l ln i ve rc;itv Pres s  of Ar1wr1 1 1 .  1975 '"' 1 0 c. 
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In  his more popular exposition of  the principles of Buddhism 
published posthumous in 1975, Jayatilleke examines closely the 
reasons why Nirvana has been interpreted in an annihilationist sense. 
The root of the problem, he argues, is that the word 'Nirvana' is a 
term which 11 means both 'extinction' as well as 'the highest positive 
experience of happiness'. Both these connotations are important 
for understanding the significance of the term as it is employed in 
the Buddhist texts. 1 1 1 However, the meaning of 'extinction ' here 
is not annihilation, says Jayatilleke, and those scholars who get 
around the Buddha's denial of annihilationism by saying that it is 
not annihilation for the samsaric individual to become extinct because 
there is no 'being' (satta) to be annihilated are creating a 11 merely 
verbal difference because, for all practical purposes, the 'individual 1 
is completely extinguished and if we are wrong (according to them) in 
saying so, it is because the ' individual ' did not exist in the first 
place. Such an interpretation leaves a lot of material unexplained 
in the early Buddhist texts. 1 1 2 In the first place, Jayatilleke 
continues, the Buddha did not deny the phenomenal reality of the 
individual. And in denying that he was an Annihilationist the 
Buddha explained that when a person's mind is fully emancipated even 
the most powerful and intelligent of the gods cannot trace where 
the consciousness of such a Transcendent One (tathagata) is located. 
This is so even while he is living, for such a one cannot be probed even 
in this life (I� I 140). Nibbana may be characterized as follows : 
�Jhen ones 's min'.(J is emancipated it does not become a dormant 
nonentity. If so the Buddha and the Arahants should have been 
apathetic individuals unconcerned about anything after attaining 
liberation. Instead, when the mind is purged of greed, hatred 
and ignorance it is transfonned and shines with its  natural lustre. 
It can then act spontaneously out of selflessness (Caga), 
compassion (metU) and understanding (panna) . "  
1K. N. Jayatilleke, The Message of the Buddha (London : George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd. , 1 975) p. 119. 
2Ibid. p. 120. 3Ibid. p. 121. 
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" Freed from reckoni ng i n  tenns of  the  consti tuents of h is  personali ty, " 
such a one i s  sai d to be " deep, i mmeasurab 1 e and unfathomab 1 e 1 i ke 
the great ocean ( M I 487 ) . "1 I nd i vi dual exi stence i s, by contrast, 
i nvari ably self-centred and condi t i oned. When the Buddha was asked 
whether a person cont i nues to exi st after death, hav ing attai ned such 
emancipati on, he would surely have g i ven the clear answer " He does 
not conti nue to exi st" i f  h i s  posi t i on was that the person ceases to 
exi st altogether. I nstead, he says si mply : " The person who has 
atta ined the goal i s  beyond measure.''
1 
Elsewhere i t  i s  sai d that he 
does not come with i n  ti me, bei ng beyond t ime, or that he does not 
come wi thi n reckoni ng. " I n other words, " wri tes Jayati lleke, "we do 
not have the concepts or words to descri be adequately the state of the 
emanci pated person who has attai ned the transcendent reali ty, whether 
i t  be when he l i ves with the body and the other const ituents of personali ty 
or after death. 1 1 3 
Jayati lleke goes on to support h i s  i nterpretati on further with  
two controversi al readi ngs of  some passages in  the N i kayas . The fi rst 
of these ( at D I 2 2 3 )  g i ves the answer to the questi on " \�here does the 
psycho-phys i ea 1 consciousness cease to be wi thout rema i nder? " as fo 1 1  ows : 
" Consci ousness, w ithout di st i ngui sh i ng mark, i nf in ite and shi ning 
everywhere--here the materi al elements do not penetrate but here 
i t  i s  that the condi ti oned consci ousness ceases to be . "  The second 
passage ( at M I  329-30 )  g i ves the Buddha's reply to the god Brahma : 
" Do not th i nk that thi s i s  an empty or voi d state . There i s  th is  con-
sci ousnes s, w ithout d i st ingui s h i ng mark, i nfi n i te and s h i ni ng everywhere ; 
i t  i s  untouched by the materi al elements and not subject to any power . '
11 4  
Unli ke the more chauvi ni st-mi nded Theravadi ns ( such as Rahula and 
Nyanaponika) J ayati lleke does not reject compari sons wi th the Vedanta, 
i n  fact he g i ves many conv inci ng textual examples of  d irect parallels 
1 -4 
K .  N .  Jayati lleke The Mes sage of  the Buddha pp . 12 1 -4 
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between the terms that are used to describe Brahman in Vedanta and 
the tenns used of emancipation in the Pali Canon. The most impressive 
of these is the frequently used tenn for those who have attained 
Nirv�na: ' Brahmabhutena attana viharati ', meaning ' abides with self 
become Brahman •.1 Scholars who insist that the Buddhist concept of 
anatta was conceived in opposition to the Vedantic concept of atman 
have some explaining to do here. Jayatilleke 's concluding sentences 
on the subject l eave no doubt that he takes the transcendental view: 
Nirvana is, therefore, the Transcendent Reality, whose real 
nature we cannot grasp with our normal minds because of our 
self-imposed limitations. It is a state of freedom (vimutti), 
power (vas1), perfection (parisuddhi), knowledge (anna} and 
perfect happiness of a transcendent sort. It is also said 
to be a state of perfect mental health, which we should try to 2 attain for our personal happiness as well as for harmonious living. 
The emphasis here is, however, on the value of the attainment of 
Nirvana for our present lives, which I think is a subtle shift away 
from the world -rejecting dualism which predominates in the Canon. 
Like Rahula, Jayatilleke is a modern \�esternized intellectual who 
has felt the influence of the prevailing scientific and ethi cal 
i de o 1 og i e s. He is doing no violence to the canonical material in 
drawing from it the ideas he mentions, but there is a difference 
discernible in his valuation of life in the world from what we tend 
to find in the writings of the ancient Buddhists. It is extreme.ly 
hard to maintain a dualistic outlook on the world in the contemporary 
intellectual climate, unless perhaps one is a Hell-fire and damnation 
kind of Christian. 
David Kalupahana, who was as has been already mentioned a student 
of Jayatilleke ' s  and who in fact prepared the Index for his major 
work The Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, does not see early 
Buddhism as a fonn of dualism at all. For him it is a simple monism, 
1Jayatilleke, The Message of the Buddha p. 126. 
2Ibid. p . 127. 
very much akin to and actua l l y  foreshadowing the monistic outl ook 
of modern scientific empiricism . On l y  one kind of rea l ity exists 
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and the chief thing that earl y Buddhism had to say about this rea l ity 
was that it is subject to the l aw of causa l ity (paticca-samuppada ) -­
hence the tit l e of Kal upahana's book Causal ity: the Centra l  Phil osophy 
of Buddhism (which echoes Stcherbatsky ' s  titl e  The Central Conception 
of Buddhism and T .  R .  V .  Murti ' s  The Centra l  Phil osophy of Buddhism 
which were both discussed in the previous chapter ) .  I n  the 
concl usion to his book Kal upahana writes: 
Al l this may l ead to the fol l owing concl usions . Rejecting 
an Absol ute (such as the Brahman or Atman of the Upani�ads) or 
a transempirical  real ity, the Buddha confined himsel f to what 
is empirical l y  given. Fol l owing a method - comparabl e  to that 
adopted by the modern Logica l Positivists, he sometimes resorted 
to l inguistic ana l ysis and appea l to demonstrate the futil ity 
of metaphysics . As a resul t  of his empiricism he recognized 
causal ity as the rea l ity and made it the essence of his teachings . 
Hence his statement: " He who sees causal ity sees the dhamma . "  
He has a ful l er treatment of the specific issue of the meaning of 
nibban a in his book Buddhist Phil osophy: A Historical  Analysis (1976 ) 
in which he tackl es a few of the items of textual evidence for a 
transempirical rreaning of nibbana .  For examp l e  he asks: "What, then, 
is the n ature of immortal ity (amata )  spoken of so often? According 
to what has been said so far, immortal ity and deathl essness woul d mean 
rebirthl essness (apunabhava) on l y .  With the e l imination of craving 
and the consequent rea liz ation that one is freed, a person wil l not 
be in any way interested in an afterl ife . 1 1 2 In the same vein he 
writes that the tenn transl ated so often as 'transcendent' (l okuttara ) 
refers merel y to the state of one whose dispositions have a l l become 
pacified so that he no l onger shares the attitudes of ordinary h un1an 
beings: " It is this and on l y  this that makes the l ife of one who 
has attained ni rvaoa 'transcendent' . 1 1 3 Kal  upahan a suggests, with 
1oavid J .  Kal upahana, Causa lity: The Central Phil osophy of Buddhism p . 185 . 
2 oavid J .  Kal upahana, Buddhist Phil osophy: A Historica l  Analysis 
\Honol ul u: THe University Press of Hawaii ,  1 976 ) pp. 73-4 . 
about as little plausibility: "When a dead Araha(lt was compared to 
a great ocean, deep, i1T111easur�ble and unfathomable, it meant only 
that there is no vrny of knowing what he is like. 11 1 In other words , 
Kalupahana is implying that the Buddha used the analogy merely as 
a way of expressing his empiricist scepticism of all speculation . 
This is to ignore completely the poetry in the words . Kalupahana • s  
Buddha, like Stcherbatsky 1 s, is a philosopher pure and simple, and 
pity the poor fools who later tried to make a religion out of his 
austere teaching. 
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Since this is his point of view it is easy to understand how 
disappointed Kalupahana was by his teacher Jayatilleke 1 s apparent 
about-face in saying that the Buddha was a thorough -going empiricist 
in al l matters until it came to the Unconditioned or transempirical 
reality of nibbana. Kalupahana writes: 
Jayatilleke, in his Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, made a 
great effort to show that early Bud lhism was empiricist and did 
not accept any metaphysical principle or any empirically unverifiable 
entity . But the interpretations of Buddhism by Western, Hindu, 
and Far Eastern scholars were so overwhelming that in the end he 
admitted the existence of a "transempirical which cannot be 
empirically described and understood but which can be realized 
and attained [after death] , 11  thereby undennining the whole bas�s 
of Buddhist empiricism which he was endeavouring to establish . 
When Kalupahana uses the word 'empiricism' he really means ' positivism' 
which is a particular application of empiricism to the problems of 
metaphysics. The Buddha may have been an empiricist in his method 
without drawing the anti-metaphysical or anti-transcendental conclusions 
that Kalupahana believes he drew . If Jayatilleke is right, the Buddha 
always emphasized direct experience as the test of his claims rather 
than the methods of speculative metaphysics especially when it came to 
investigating the trans-empirical reality. 'Empiricism • may, then, 
have a broader meaning of bringing everything to the test of experience , 
1oavid Kalupahana Buddhist Philosophy p . 83 
2 Ibid, p . 87 
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- -in which case it is very appropriate to use it of  the Buddha. 
The disagreement between Jayatilleke and Kalupahana has sparked off 
some debate, something that is all too rare in Buddhist scholarship. 
From Sri Lanka, A. D. P. Kalanasuriya has written an article which compares 
the two views entitled 'Two Modem Sinhalese Views of Nibbana 1 (1979) .in. 
which he finds Kalupahana 's arguments ' not unimpressive ' but suspects 
him of 'reading the meanings of advanced Western thought into the DhalTiTia 
of Buddhism '. 1 Kalanasuriya, himself also a philosopher, points out 
that there are other kinds of empiricism than that most fashionable in 
the West at present. He likens Kalupahana ' s  positivism to the 'materialist' 
position of the Buddha ' s  day and calls it 'naive empiricism •2 from which 
the Buddha dissociated himself as a doctrine 'which referred to nothing 
beyond perceptions. 1 3 The utterances of the Buddha suggest, says 
Kalanasuriya, that he was aware of the limitations of this sort of 
empiricism, for example when he spoke about ' perfect release' , 1 untraceabil­
ity 1 , being 'without measure ' (na pamanam), 'deep and unfathomable ' (gambhiro 
duppariyaqaho) and 'all modes of speech removed ' etc. These sayings 
indicate, he writes, that the Dhamma has a 'mystical core '. He then 
uses Wittgensteinian concepts --of embedded language, family resemblance, 
category errors etc. - -to criticise Kalupahana 's viewpoint as too simple. 
An irony here is that Kalupahana's viewpoint is close to that of the early 
Wittgenstein, whereas the concepts that are used against him here come 
from the later Wittgenstein--and Wittgenstein developed his later views 
partly to accomodate his own mystical apprehensions. 
Another response to Kalupahana' s work has come from his colleague 
at the Un iversity of Hawaii, Gary Doore, who takes him to task for 
ignoring the fact that yogins in the Buddha 's time all recognized a 
1A. D. P. Kalanasuriya ' Two Modem Sinhalese Views of Nibbana' 
in Religion Vol.9, Spring 1979, pp. 2 -3 
2Ibid. p. 5 3 Ibid. p. 5 �Ibid. p. 8 
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transcendental state about which they 'have generally preferred to remain 
silent, maintaining that it cannot be adequately described by concepts. •1 
Kalupahana has ignored all of this and at the same time 'imported his own 
philosophical preferences ' on the basis of 'very slender textual evidence. • 2 
The 'stoical, matter-of-fact conception of the supreme goal ' that Kalupahana 
adopts, says Doore, 'certainly does not seem the sort of thing a new 
religion would thrive on. •3 He is sharply critical of the explanation 
that Kalupahana gives of the transcendental tun, that Buddhism, on his 
account, later took, i� that it v,as 'emotionalism ' and the desire to 
have a supernatural figure to worship which resulted in his being invested 
with transcendental characteristics. This was greatly to exaggerate the 
difference between early and later Buddhism, Doore argues. 
Kalupahana appears to be a lone voice amongst moden, Theravadins 
in expressing his negative view of nibbana. Without exception, so far 
as I have been able to discover, modern teachers of the Theravctdin forms 
of meditation take the transcendental view. One of the most famous, 
the Mahasi Sayadaw of Burma, writes: 'Nibbana is a dharrana entirely liberated 
from the bodily and mental processes and all mundane notions . . .  one is 
4 absolutely free from the entire mundane sphere . '  U Thittila, lecturer 
in philosophy at the University of Rangoon, who was chosen by the Buddha 
Sasana Council of Burma to write the chapter on 'The Fundamental Principles 
of Theravada Buddhism' for The Path of the Buddha edited by Kenneth Morgan 
(1956) writes : 'To go forth out of the worldly 1 ife into the higher 
spiritual life is the advice of the Buddha. To be absorbed into what 
is real, permanent --into Nibbana- -is the end of the Buddhist way of life, 
the path of the Buddha. •5 
l -3Gary Duore 'The Radically Empiricist Interpretation of Early Buddhist 
Nirvana ' in Religious Studies Vol. 15, No. 1, March 1979, pp. 67-8 
4
u Thittila in The Path of the Buddha {ed) Kenneth W .  Morgan (New York: 
Ronald Press Co. , 1956) p . 101  
3Mahasi Sayadaw Practical Insight Meditation (Kandy : The Forset Hermitage 
197 1) p.34 
CHAPTER III 
-
THE EVIDENCE OF THE PALI NIKAYAS 
I INTRODUCTORY 
This fina l chapter, unfortunate l y  at fifty pages much too brief 
for the task, is an attempt to show that the positive interpretation 
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of the goal  of earl y Buddhism, associated at the end of the first 
chapter with the names of Coomaraswamy, Gril11Tl, Thomas, Mrs Rhys Davids, 
Horner, Conze, Murti, Pande, El iade and Perez -Rem6n (al though they are 
by no means in perfect agreement with one another), does not depend only  
on a few isol ated, peripheral texts for its support. Essential l y, it 
is a reinterpretation of texts which those on both sides of the question 
acknowl edge to be the central ones in the tradition. Just as the 
negative interpretation can be seen to be consistent with these texts 
the positive interpretation is a construction that can be p l aced upon 
a l l of the texts consistentl y. The argument is then about which is 
the more p lausible, and this needs to be carried on both at the very 
detail ed l evel and in terms of the teaching as a whol e .  In this chapter 
the focus is particularl y on texts which teach the doctrine of anatta 
with a special emphasis on the il l ustrations that are used to expl ain 
the teaching, since these are sel dom cl ose l y  examined as an aid to 
interpreting the more specifical l y  doctrinal texts. As it wil l be 
seen, the imagery and parabl es in the suttas most often run quite counter 
to the l ater Therav�din orthodoxy and the received view of Western 
scholarship. The aim of this chapter is to argue, on the basis of a 
fresh appraisal of the Pal i Nikayas, in favour of what is not a new or 
original interpretation but a growing minority opinion amongst schol ars� 
and one which if it gains ground wil l certainl y be disturbing to the 
Theravada Buddhist co111T1unities who have not yet had their confrontation 
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with the findings of modern schol arship in the way that the Christian 
churches have had theirs in the l ast fifty years. Ironical l y, the 
point of view that is advanced here is l ess threatening to their ideal s 
than the nihil istic interpretation of their texts which has been the 
standard view of Western schol ars for over a hundred years, and which 
the Theravadin co1T1Tiunities have quietl y  ignored ; but it wil l stil l be 
a considerabl e  upset to them to have the orthodox view of the anatta 
teaching ca l l ed so severel y  into question. 
In this chapter the battl e  over the meaning of particul ar texts 
is carried on on two fronts, with the Theravadin orthodoxy on one flank 
and the standard Western viewpoint on the other. This, regrettab l y, 
may seem confusing, but it is inevitabl e  that an attack on the Theravadin 
view of anatta wil l a lso undennine the Western schol ars ' position 1ihich 
is buil t on it. At times it might seem uncl ear which is the target of 
criticism when, in fact, both positions are under attack together. As 
we shal l go on to argue, the Western scholars have merel y added a further 
l ayer of rational ist misunderstanding to the original one of the Thera­
vadins. 
Essential l y, the misunderstanding by both the orthodox Therav!dins 
and Western schol ars has arisen from a misapprehension of the function 
of negative or apophatic utterances in the type of mysticism known as 
the 'via negativa' , of which the 'neti! neti ! --not this! not this! ' of 
the Upani?ads is a perfect exampl e. Gotama ' s  use of this mode was so 
uncompromising that it was al most inevitabl e  that it woul d be misunder­
stood during the phase of doctrinal consol idation that al ways fol l ows 
a strong rel igious innovation. His words were taken l iteral l y  and 
fol lowed with a dogged l oyal ty, despite the apparent absurdity and the 
serious incoherence in the doctrine that was the consequence. This 
is no exception to the nonnal pattern in the history of rel igions. 
But it is a considerabl e  irony that Western schol arship has fo l l owed 
into the sa� error and for the same reason, that is, an inability to 
lay aside the assumption that everything in a mystical teaching must 
be able to be understood and defined rationally. 
II THE PARAB LE OF THE VENOMOUS SNAKE 
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The evidence is everywhere in the Pali texts that Gotama himself 
had to contend with the rationalistic misunderstanding of his utterances 
and that he was frequently taken to be a nihilist because of his use of 
the apophatic mode. No better evidence for this exists than the " Parable of 
the Venomous Snake" ( the Alagaddupama-sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya). 
I n  this sutta the Buddha likens the wrong grasp of his teaching to 
taking hold of a snake by the tail instead of behind its neck so that 
it turns and bites. Obviously a composite work like most of the 
longer suttas this one has a certain literary unity and it draws together 
more material of extreme interest than almost any other in the Canon, 
including one of the key passages on which the Theravadin conception 
of anatta as absolute is founded�the perfect case of the snake turning 
and biting because of a faulty grasp . It vii 1 1  be worth d\'Je 1 1  i ng on 
this sutta before following the themes that it raises into other parts 
of the Nikayan literature. 
Judgin g by the force of Gotama ' s  repudiation of it , the worst 
example of grasping the snake by the tail was the accusation of nihilism 
or annihilationism. This repudiation must be placed in its context in 
the sutta because it clarifies which teaching it was that was so easily 
misunderstood as annihilationism. Gotama had just been speaking about 
the conceit ' I  am' and how it must be ' got rid of by the mon k, cut down 
to the roots, made like a palm-tree stump, made so that it can co� to 
no future existence , not liable to rise · again. ' Getting rid of the 
conceit ' I  am' is the culminating  achievement that follows upon getting 
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rid of 1 ignorance 1 , 1 faring on in births 1 , ' craving • and 1 the five 
fette rs binding to the l owe r shore • .  The passage then continues :  
Monks, when a monk \ s  mind is freed thus, the devas--those 
with Indra, those with B rahma, those with Pajapati, do not succeed 
in their search if they think : 1 This is the discriminative con­
sciousness attached to a Tathagata. 1 What is the reason for thls? 
I, monks, say that in this ve ry l ife a Tathagata is untraceabl e. 
From this it is cl ear that getting rid of the conceit 1 I am • is identified 
with the freedom which is nibbana in this l ife, the word 1 Tathagata 1 here 
meaning any bhikkhu who has attained the goal and so become untraceabl e 
e ven to the gods. But this might easil y be taken to mean that the 
essential being of the bhikkhu has ceased to exist, and evidentl y 
Gotama e ven in his own l ifetime was being misunde rstood in this way. 
He i11111ediate l y  goes on to say that this is a cal umny : 
Al though I ,  monks, am one who speaks thus, who points out 
thus , the re are some recl uses and brahmans who misrepresent me 
untrul y, vainl y, fal se l y, not in accordance with fact, saying : 
1 The recl use Gotama is a nihil ist ( venayiko ),  he l ays down the 
cutting off, the destruction, the disappearance of the existing 
entity (sato satassa) .  1 But as this, monks, is just what I am 
not, as this is just what I do not say, therefore these worthy 
recl uses and brahmans misrepresent me untrul y, vainl y, fal se l y  
Fonne rl y I ,  monks, as we� l as now, l ay down simpl y anguish and 
the stopping of anguish. 
The crux here is the meaning of 1 sato satassa 1 which I .  B. Horne r has 
transl ated as 1 the existing entity • ,  a reading which pennits the standard 
Theravadin construction to be pl aced on the passage, i. e. that al l that 
the Buddha is repudiatina here is that he eve r  said there was an entity 
in the first pl ace to be cut off, destroyed etc. If that is what he 
meant this woul d have been the ideal context in which to have said so 
in unmistakeabl e te nns. If, on the othe r hand, 1 sato satassa 1 is 
unde rstood as 1 the essential  being • or • t rue being • ( a  more probabl e 
inte rpretation of the doubl ing of the root 1 sat- 1 ) the passage takes 
on an entire l y  diffe rent significance and one which makes much more 
sense of what comes both before and after it. 
1Middl e Length Sayings I p . 180 
2 Ibid. 
The denial of nihil ism 
then takes on a meaning commensurate wi th the terms used i n  i ts 
rejecti on ,  whereas the Theravadi n i nterpretati on tri vi ali ses i t  and 
makes the vehemence of the passage puzzli ng. Supporters of the 
absolute anatta readi ng of the passage hold up the fi nal sentence to 
cli nch thei r case : ' I  . . lay down si mply angui sh and the stoppi ng 
of angui sh. 1 But surely the poi nt of thi s  i s  that all that Gotama 
has sai d i s  cut off , destroyed etc. , i s  dukkha , and most emphati cally 
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not the essenti al exi stence of  a bhi k khu. The passage therefore tells 
us clearly what the gett ing r i d o f  the concei t ' I  am ' should not be 
taken to mean. The concei t I I am I refers to pri de ( asm i mana ) whi eh 
always i nvolves the i denti fi cati on of one' s true , permanent bei ng wi th 
that \vhi ch i s  i mpermanent ,  t ransi ent , peri shable , namely the khandhas. 
A bri ef rem i nder foll ows of the moral i mpli cati ons of g i vi ng up such 
pri de wh i ch are that i n  th i s  context even such an i nsult as bei ng called 
a n ihi li st should provoke no resentment , any more than prai se should 
br ing elati on. If  we respect the li terary uni ty of the sutta we are 
bound to take the next exhortat ion as followi ng upon the deni al of 
n ihi lism and the asserti on of  the Buddha that all that is annihi lated 
i s  sufferi ng when ni bbana i s  won. The wordi ng i s  hi ghly si gni fi cant : 
Wherefore , monks , what i s  not yours , put i t  away. Putti ng 
i t  av1ay wi ll for a long t i me be for your welfare and happi ness. 
And what , monks , is  not yours? Materi al shape , �onks , i s  not 
yours ; put i t  away , putt i ng i t  away wi ll be for a long t i me for 
your welfare and happ i ness @nd so on for the rema in ing khandhas] . 
What do you thi nk about thi s ,  monks? If a person were to gather 
or burn or do as he pleases wi th the grass , twi gs , branches and 
foliage i n  thi s  Jeta Grove , would i t  occur to you : the person i s  
gatheri ng �, he i s  burni ng �, he i s  doi ng as he pleases wi th �? 
"No , Lord. What i s  the reason for thi s? It i s  that thi s ,  
Lord , i s  not our self nor what belongs to self. 11 
" Even so , monks , what is  not yours , put i t  away ; putt i ng i t  
1 away wi ll be for a long t i me for your welfare and happ i ness . . . .  
If we understand thi s  parable as a further clari fi cati on of the Buddha 's 
repudi ati on of the charge that he i s  a den ier  o f  the essenti al self i t  
1Mi ddle Length Sayi ngs p. 181 Val. I 
makes excellent sense, whereas there is no way that it can even be 
rendered intelligible in the light of the standard Theravadin view. 
The obvious meaning is that a gardener who clears up the debris of 
windfalls or whatever that is lying about in Jeta Grove is doing 
nothing to harm the grove let alone the occupants of the grove. He 
is actually beautifying the place for the benefit of the occupants. 
The grass, twigs, branches and foliage are so many bundles of rubbish 
corresponding to the bodily form, feelings, perception, habitual 
tendencies and consciousness of the bhikkhus seated in the grove. 
The Buddha 1 s teaching radically denies our ultimate identity with 
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the very things that we normally hold most dear, but he could hardly 
have devised a clearer metaphor to express his conviction that the 
destruction of the khandhas does no harm whatever to what we essentially 
are. On the other hand the absolute anatta view would have it that 
we are only the grass, tv1igs, branches and foliage, and that it is we 
ourselves who are burned up with them. This renders the parable absurd 
as well as the accompanying exhortation : 1 1 Even so, monks, what is not 
yours, put it away ; putting it away will be for a long time for your 
welfare and happiness. 11 If we are nothing over and above the khandhas 
whose welfare and happiness could ensue? And to vJhat do the pronouns 
1 yours 1 and 1your 1 refer? The implication of the parable is even 
cleare.r if we take the words ' for a long time • in the sense that they 
invite as a locution for • eternity'. 
We have dealt so far only with the concluding paragraphs of the 
sutta. Apart from some loosely and even questionably related material 
at the beginning of the sutta it exhibits a strong thematic unity, right 
from the point at which the snake metaphor is introduced. That is 
followed directly, as if to balance it, by the parable of the raft -­
having taught about right and wrong grasp it is appropriate to have a 
parable about right letting go. As we have seen, the rest of the 
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s utta i s  about letti ng go or  putti ng away from us  all that  i s  not truly 
ourselves .  It i s  there fore puzzli ng  to come u pon some li nes wh i ch 
seem to i n d i cate that i n  Gotama' s vi ew there i s  no real self anyway : 
If, mon ks, the re were Self, could i t  be sa i d :  ' The re i s  that  1t1h i ch 
belongs to Self? 
" Yes, Lord. " 
Or, monks, i f  there we re wh at belongs to Self, could i t  be s ai d :  
' There i s  Self for me ? '  
" Ye s, Lord . " 
But i f  Self, mon ks, or what belongs  to Self, do not ex i s t i n  
re ali ty an d truth, i s  not the s peculat ive vi ew : ' Th i s i s  the world 
th i s i s  the self, a fte r dy i ng I •,J i ll become pe rmanen t, last i ng, 
eternal , not li able to change, I w ill s tand fast li ke un to the 
e ternal 1 -- i s not th i s, monks, absolute complete folly? l  
The mean i ng of th i s p a s s age i s  unclea r  even i f  the t ranslati on p roposed 
here i s  accepted, but a key word in  the Pali i s  ambi g uous. Th i s  i s  the 
word ' an upalabbhamane ' wh i ch can mean e i the r ' not-exi st i ng' or else 
' i ncomprehens i ble' . I f  Self and what belongs  to Self a re i ncomprehen s i ble 
the �ean i ng of the pas s age i s  tran s formed  and Gotama i s  seen i n stead to 
be re ason i ng 111i th h i s  followe rs that s peculat i ve vi ews about someth i ng 
that i s  beyond the gras p of mi nd  mus t be s een as  perfect fooli shness. 
Th i s  readi ng gai ns s t rong s upport from the context i n  wh i ch Gotama s ays 
he can see no theory of Self " f rom the gras p i ng of wh i ch the re would 
not ari se g ri e f, s uffe ri ng, angui s h, lamentat i on, des pa i r. "  The clea r 
i mpli cati on i s  that all theori s i n g about the atta i s  doomed to the e rror 
of i dent i fy i ng  i t  wi th someth i n g  peri s h able and trans i en t  i n  the world. 
All s peculati ve vi ews th reaten the myst i cal duali sm wh i ch I am argu i n g  
i s  the true explan ati on o f  the doctri ne of anatt a : i t  s i mply means that 
all that i s  i mpe rmanent i s  not-Self, wh ile t he true Self rema i n s  beyond 
the re ach of thought, beyond all change an d beyon d all s u ffe ri ng. It 
i s  to be known only by follow i n g  the Path. 
Immed i ately follow i n g  the pa s sage quoted above i s  the bri e f  d i alogue 
about anatta an d i mpe rmanence w h ich appe ars w i t h  li ttle va ri at i on more 
1Mi ddle Length Sayi ngs I p. 177 I . B. Horne r  i n  fact tran slates 
an upalabbh amane as 1 i ncomp rehen s i ble ' and I have altered the t ranslat ion 
here to g i ve t he readi ng favoured by Theravadi n t radi t i on. 
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often in the Canon than any other teaching attributed to Gotama: 
What do you think about this, monks: is material shape pennanent 
or impennanent? 
" I mpennanent, Lord. " 
But is what is impennanent painful or pl easant? 
" Painful , Lord . 1 1  
But is it fitting to regard that which is impennanent, painful ,  
l iab l e to chanae, as 'This is mine, this I am, this is my sel f'? 
" No, Lord. I I  {t.nd so on for the other khandhas] . 
Wherefore, mon ks, whatever is material shape, past, future, p�sent, 
subjective or objective, gross or subtl e, mean or excel l ent, whether 
it is far or near--al l material shape shoul d be seen thus by perfect 
intuitive wisdom as it real l y  is: This is not mine, this am I n �t, 
this is not my sel f. {Jhis is repeated for the other khandhas] . 
This exchange, repeated so many times in the suttas ( al though it is 
interesting that it makes no appearance in the Digha Nikaya) is the 
basis for the doctrine of anatta as it was devel oped in the Theravada 
l iterature, from the Abhidhamma onwards. Given what we now know about 
the varieties of mysticism and about the doctrinal devel opments within 
the institutions that have arisen out of the inspiration of great mystics, 
it shoul d be no surprise to us that the Theravadins took this radical 
mystical teaching in the wrong way and ossified it into a perverse dogma. 
Misunderstanding is the nonn rather than the exception in the history 
of �ystical traditions , an d apophatic mysticism is the type most prone 
to being misunderstood. The nature of the error needs no expl anation 
after what has al ready been said about Gota111a's denial of nihil ism and 
the Jeta Grove parab l e. But we shoul d savour the irony of Therav�din 
schol astic rational ists concl uding from the Buddha's insistence that 
not even our feel ings or our consciousness is our true se l f  that we 
therefore must have no sel f. Their concl usion refl ects their anal ysis 
of what exists and not the Buddha's, since it is their inference and not 
his that the khandhas describe exhaustivel y  al l that we are . The sheer 
power of tradition is il l ustrated by the fact that not even Buddhaghosa, 
who coul d construe meaning through a brick wal l ,  was ab l e  to penetrate 
the error. Schol asticis� is not the same as schol arship. 
1Middl e Length Sayings I pp. 177 -8 
The mi sunderstandi ng has  ari sen because i n  every appearance of  
ti1e stock pass age wi th the re frai n :  ' Th i s  i s  not mi ne , th i s  I am not, 
th i s  i s  not my self , '  there i s  genui ne amb i gu i ty .  I t  can b e  taken 
to mean, as the Theravada trad it i on has  ta ken i t, th at there s i mply i s  
no self, or  else that Gotama was s ay i ng only what the self i s  not and 
refus i ng to tell us what i t  i s. I t  i s  obvi ous why the Theravadi n s  
rejected the latter i nterp retat i on : the teach i ng i s  too radi cal and 
mysti cally elevated . Later generati ons of  mon ks s imply could not 
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fathom what the Buddha was talk i ng about . They doggedly bent thei r 
mi nds  to what they thought he meant des p i te i ts bei ng perverse an d 
po i ntles s and not the sort of  th i ng anyone would g i ve as sent to outs i de 
the trammels o f  i nst i tuti on al reli g i on .  I n  the contexts i n  wh i ch the 
teach i ng appears i n  the Sutta Pitaka the i nterp retati on that they placed 
upon i t  frequently becomes st rai ned and at t i mes un reason able, but it  
i s  al1vays les s baffli ng than  the real sen se of  the wo rds wh i ch thrusts 
us i nto the undefi ned and unknown realm of mysti cal experi ence . The 
Theravadi n i nterp retati on i s  an example of the very gras p i ng of mi nd 
that Gotama condemned as mere s peculati on . I t  i s  the i mpos i t i on of  
a n arrow, li terali st rati onal i sm on a mysti cal teach i ng ,  yet it  di d not 
abrogate the mysti cal ch a racter of  the so-called Southern School because 
n i b b ctn a  rema i ned fo r i t  the as an khata dhatu, the uncondi ti oned element, 
the deathles s realm set over and apart from all th at i s  i mpennanent . 
So, i n  fact, much o f  the s p i ri t  of the anattct teach i ng wi th i ts rad i cal 
den i al o f  pennanence to any as pect o f  our mortal selves rema i n s un i mpa i red 
p rovi ded i t  i s  always held i n  ten s i on w i th the Theravad i n  un derstandi ng 
o f  n i  b b an a .  T h i s i s  just what Western scholars h ave fa i led to appreci ate. 
They have merely added another layer o f  rat i onali st m i sunderstand i ng to 
the Theravadi ns '  or i g i n al one. 
Now that 1ve have the benef it  o f  comparati ve stud i es i n  myst i ci sm 
a nd  a re fam i li ar  w ith  a vari ety o f  examples of  the vi a negati va and i ts 
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peculiar logic, it  is possible to read the Sutta Pitaka in a new light. 
Passages which have always seemed gratuitous or slightly nonsensical 
suddenly make strong and coherent good sense , and nowhere does the via 
negativa interpretation encounter real difficulties. 
An objection to this interpretation which has no real substance 
and can be dismissed very quickly is the charge of 'levelling', or of 
making out that all mysticism is the same teaching under various guises 
and that, therefore, there are no real differences between Hinduism and 
Buddhism. 
disguise. 
There are very deep differences which we have no wish to 
The Upani�ads belong to a different intellectual and socio-
logical world from that of the Sutta Pitaka, being an expression of 
mysticism from within the ritualistic, theistic religion of the Brahmins, 
whereas Buddhism arose in Samana religion which was atheistic and dualistic --
in the way that asceticism very commonly is. Whereas Upani�adic speculation 
developed in the direction of monism, denying the material world to be 
separate from Brahman, Buddhism remained--until the advent of Mahayana 
Buddhism--finnly dualistic in the way in which it separated sa�sara from 
ni rvar:ia. Early Buddhism belongs with its relatives the Sa�khya, Yoga 
and Jain versions of shramanism, as Eliade and Perez -Remon have pointed 
out. This is evidenced by the way in which the scriptures of all four 
schools possess the fonnula we have been examining of 'This is not mine, 
this I am not, this is not my self. • 1 In all of them it means the same, • 
i.e. that we should not misidentify ourselves with what is impennanent. 
III A STUDY OF 'THE BOOK OF KINDRED SAYINGS ON THE FACTORS OF PERSONALITY ' 
Of the one hundred and fifty -eight suttas in the main part of the 
Khandha -samyutta there is not one which invites any other interpretation 
than the one we have proposed. Most express a strong dualism between the 
1Joaqu1n Perez-Remon Self and Non -self in Ea rly Buddhism (The Hague : 
Mouton Publishers, 1980) pp.154 -7, 348-9. 
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impermanent and the permanent ( No. 18 ),  or that which is of a nature 
to crumble away and that �-1hich is incorruptible ( No. 32 ),  bet·//een bondage 
to the ' lower world' and the implied freedom of  a higher reality ( No. 55 ) , 
or between impurity and purity ( No. 60) .  O ften the dualism is more 
subtle and psychological, but the pattern is the same of  a contrast 
between a life that is still in the grip of  the delusion that the 
khandhas contain our true self and the state of knowledge that this 
is untrue ; for example there is the contrast between the state of mind 
which is ' always guessing' and ' stubbornly perverse' and the state of 
mind of one who is ' released' , ' steadfast' , happy', ' untroubled' and, 
most significantly, ' of its own self utterly well' (No. 46 ) .  None o f  
the contexts in which it is denied that the khandhas are the self create 
an obstacle for the interpretation that this means the self is something 
other than the khandhas ; on the contrary, the contexts make the traditional 
view more difficult to sustain. In a great many cases the mystical 
interpretation gains strongly in plausibility, for example when we 
are told that giving up attachment to the khandhas brings an 'aloofness' 
in which there is no longer any foothold for further consciousness in 
this world and the consciousness becomes 'freed' and thereby ' steady' 
( No. 5 3 ), or that putting away that which 'does not belong to the self' 
( anattaniya) one reaches the ' supreme goal I which 'in this very life' 
and ' of himself' the Arahant ' fully understands', 1realizes ' and 'abides 
in' ( No. 69) ,  or that having ' reduced, abandoned, scattered, quenched' all 
attachment to the khandhas the heart is set free and is able to ' ponder' 
on that which even the ' Brahmas and their consorts . do not grasp' 
( No. 79 ) .  None o f  this looks like the language that one might expect 
if  the goal was purely and simply extinction of that which is not and 
never was a true self, the khandhas. The goal certainly is the putting 
away in this life of  the khandhas and ultimately their extinction through 
the ending of  rebirth, but that is not all that it is unless the poetry 
and imagery surrounding the goal is gratuitous and misleading. 
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A striking exampl e  of such · imagery to evoke the goal comes in the 
parable that Gotama tells the frail and elderly Tissa who is despondent 
about his grasp of the dhamma ( No. 84). After instructing him in the 
usua l way about dissociating himself from the impennanent khandhas 
Gotama tells him a parable about a journey through 'thick forest' which 
represents 'ignorance', a 'great marshy swamp' representing the 'feeling 
desires', past a 'steep precipice' corresponding to 'vexation and despair', 
and promises him that if he keeps on for a little he will ' see a delightful 
stretch of  level ground' which Gotama explains 'is a name for nibbana . 
Be of good cheer, Tissa. ' This is only one of hundreds of images used 
in the Sutta Pitaka to evoke the nature of the path or the goal which 
do not lend themselves to the interpretation that the aim was simply 
extinction or khandha suicide. I have yet to find an image or parable 
that does so lend itself. A feature of the parables which it is all 
too easy to overlook is that the true subject of the story is always 
depicted as continuing to be present when the goal is attained, like 
the monks in Jeta Grove when the debris representing the khandhas has 
all been burnt, or like Tissa in the parable just quoted here.1 There 
is no hint that he \'Ii 1 1  suddenly become absent when the de 1 i ghtful 
stretch of level ground is reached. Similarly, the image of crossing 
the Ganges to the other shore which appears in the parable of the raft 
and in abbreviated fonns throughout the literature always implies the 
continuing presence of the person who has crossed over and won his �oal. 
Perhaps it is in the nature of stories that it is very hard to tell one 
aoout how good we will feel to be dead, but Gotama ' s  parables never even 
make a gesture in this direction. The point seems always to be that 
there � a beyond so we should ' be of good cheer' . 
For the purpose of our argument the most important sutta in the 
Khandha-samyutta is No. 85, the dialogue with Yamaka, the bhikkhu in 
whose mind had arisen the evil heresy : ' Thus do I understand the doctrine 
1The  story of the children who oive up playing with sand-castles is 
another case in point . Do they symbolise the self? See K. S. I I I  p . 156. 
taught by the Exal ted One : in so far as a brother has destroyed the 
asavas he is broken up and perishes when the body breaks up, he becomes 
not after death. ' F. L. Woodward gives in his footnote the view of 
the Commentary which shows how the Theravadin tradition coped with the 
sutta, i. e. by interpreting Yamaka 1 s heresy as bel ieving there was a 
sel f in the first pl ace : 
If his view were this : "the agg regates rise and cease ; there is 
a ceasing of  the round of  exi stence 1 1  it woul d  be no heresy but 
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expert knowl edge of  the teaching. But in so far as he thought : 1 " a  being is broken up and perishes 1 1  herein arises a heretical view. 
But the al ternative, in the l ight of  which the sutta as a whol e and the 
important il l ustration with which it ends make far better sense, is that 
Yamaka 1 s heresy was in denying that anything remains after the death of 
a bhikkhu who has attained the goal . The Theravadins had becon� very 
1 expert 1 at dodg ing the obvious meaning of a passage and substituting 
a sophistical one. 
Sariputta 1 s answer to Yamaka is subtl e and profound, that is , if 
our interpretation is correct. 
much more than a smart answer. 
If the Theravadins are right it is not 
The crux once again is the word 
1 anupal abbhiyamano 1 2 which Woodward transl ates in accordance with the 
Theravadin Commentary as ' not existing ' whe reas the meaning of the 
whol e sutta a l ters if it is transl ated as 1 incomprehensibl e 1 : 
Then, friend Yamaka, since in this very l ife a Tathagata is not 
to be regarded as existing in truth and real ity [or :  is not to 
be comprehended by you as he tru ly  and real l y  isj is it proper 
for you to assert : " As I understand the doctrine of the Exal ted 
One, in so far as a brother has destroyed the asavas he is b roken 
up and perishes when his body is broken up, he becomes not after 
death" ? 3 
Either reading can be made to fol l ow from the exchange between Yamaka 
and Sariputta up to that point a l though it makes more sense to infer 
that Sariputta is not just bl udgeoning Yarnaka into g iving stock answers 
1Kindred Sayings III  p. 93. 
2see Perez-Rem6n 1 s detail ed notes on this hybrid fonn, pp. 2 72-3. 
3Kindred Sayings III  p. 93. 
but is actually teaching him something by placing him in a dilerrvna 
with a series of questions that the Buddha himself is represented as 
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asking in the next sutta (No . 86). These questions are subtly designed 
to bring out the fact that a Tathagata can not be reduced to his khandhas 
yet they are his and not someone else's and we can not say he has no 
body , feelings etc. If this is the drift of the questions then the 
Theravadin version of the crux of the sutta is nonsensical. The 
Tathagata has not been shown to be non-existent but to have been placed 
beyond simple definition. 
of 'views' (ditthi). 
I t  is one more lesson on the inadequacy 
The Theravadin interpretation encounters even graver difficulties 
with the rest of the sutta. Yamaka, when asked what he would now say 
about what happens after death to a bhikkhu who has destroyed the asavas , 
says he would only assert nov-1 that what is iJ11permanent and subject to 
dukkha has been broken up. The implication is surely that he has now 
abandoned his annihilationism and no longer believes that the bhikkhu 
himself is broken up and perishes with the breaking up of his khandhas. 
This interpretation is strongly supported by the parable of the house­
father and the secret murderer which immediately follows as if to drive 
home what has been learned. It is a story about the false sense of 
security of a man who harbours his arch enemy in his own �ouse and is 
l u 1 1  ed into thinking he is his friend. The khandhas are this false 
friend and should be rejected as not belonging to us ' to be put away 
from us. To say of any of them: " It is my se 1 f" is to be like the 
rich man and harbour an alien. The rich man stands to the a 1 ien in 
his household as the true self does to the khandhas. Otherwise who 
is the rich man in the story? Once again the theory of absolute 
anatt� makes nonsense of a parable. 
Other examples of parables and similes which resist the Theravadin 
interpretation and support the one we are proposing abound in the texts. 
E ven in the Khandha-samyutta there are many more , such as the simile 
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of  the scen t an d the l otus or the soil ed c l oth that is cl eansed and 
aired, both images of the sel f in rel ati on to the khandhas ( No . 89 ) , 
or the parabl e of the man swept away in a moun tain torrent who grasps 
desperate l y  at reeds, shrubs and grasses as he is swept downstream. 
These, we are tol d, ' might break away, and owing to that he might come 
to h is destruction. Even so, b rethren, the untaught many- fo l k . 
regard the body as se l f  etc . '  ( No. 93 ) . 
the l otus, dark bl ue or white, which : 
Or  again there is the image of 
born in the water, come to ful l growth in the vrnter, rises 
to the surface and stan ds unspotted by t he water, even so the 
Tathagata having  co� to ful l growth in the worl d, passing beyond 
the worl d, abides unspotted by the worl d ( No. 94 ) .  
T h is use of  I n dia ' s  favourite ima ge for the sp iritual l ife con tains no  
suggestion that the Tathagata is non -existent or  simp l y  extin ct. The 
con text makes it very c l ear that he has t ranscen ded the khandhas in 
order to come to this ful l fl owerin g. The image has a special depth 
in its imp l ication that even if the goa l is transcen dence, hu�an l ife 
is where the Tathagata 1 s roots are. We have al ready encountered the 
idea that he is not separabl e from his khan dhas even if he is not to 
be identified with them. The metaphor  admits a mo re bal anced view 
than the harsh dial ect ic of ' this is not mine etc . 1 which finds its 
more typical anal oques in the next sutta in which the khandhas are 
l ikened to a b l ob of  foam on the Ganges, a momentary ra in -bubbl e in 
a pool , a noonday mirage, a p l an tain trun k ( an image which ap tl y sug­
gests the absence in  the khan dhas of that essence, here l ikened to the 
heart-wood, for which we seek ) ,  and, final l y, the trickery of  a juggler 
which is pure gl amour without essence. Nowhere does the sutta (No. 95 ) 
suggest that there is no essence, on l y  that we seek it in the w rong 
p l ace if we expect to fin d  it in the khandhas. Hen ce 'the wel l -taught 
Ariyan discip l e  feel s d isgust at body, at feel ing, at perception, at 
the act ivit ies, at consciousness,' and instead of seek ing his essence 
in the khandhas he makes 'the sel f' his refuge ( kareyya saraQattano) and 
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aspires 'to the state that does not change' ( accutam padaT), i.e. nibbana, 
which is thus the very opposite of foam, bubbles, jugglery etc . Once 
agatn the dtJalism underlying the whole teaching of the Nikayas is apparent . 
If the simple extinctionist view of nibbana was correct the words 1 refuge 1 
and 1 un-deceasing state' would have to be invested with a certain amount 
of black humour to be credible in the context at all . They would simply 
have to mean that the only refuge from being next to nothing is to become 
nothing at all and the only state in which there can be no more deceasing 
is that of the utterly deceased ! 
Further illustrations abound in the Khandha-samyutta which tend to 
suggest that the true self is something over and apart from the khandhas 
which has it within its power to let go of them and be released from them . 
Two suttas ( Nos. 99 and 100 )  use the simile of a dog tied by a leash to a 
strong stake or pillar . It ' keeps running  round and revolving round 
and round that stake or pillar, even so, brethren, the untaught manyfolk 
. regard body as the Self etc . .  they a re not re 1 eased the re from, 
they are not released from rebirth, from old age and decay, from sorrow 
and grief, from woe, lamentation and despair The leash stands 
for attachment and the stake samsara to which we are bound unless we give 
up our attachment . To be released is not ann ihilation but freedom, 
just as a dog off its leash does not vanish into thin air but gets on 
with its doggy life . What can the dog stan d for but the essential self? 
Or can we afford to operate under canons of interpretation in which not 
all of the dramatis personae in a story have to be accounted for? 
Often it i s  overinterpreting a story to seek meaning  in every detail, 
but in the following illustration from Sutta 102 we can hardly overlook 
the role of the sun which strongly suggests the reality of the essential 
self as it perceives the impermanence of the khandhas : 
Just as, brethren, in the autumn season , when the sky is 
opened up and cleared of clouds, the sun, leaping up into the 
firmament, drives a\'1ay all darkness from the heavens and shines 
and burns and flashes forth ; even so, brethren , the perceiving 
of impermanence, if practiced and enlarged , wears out all sensual 
lust , wears out all lust for body , all desire for rebirth, all 
ignorance, wears out , tears out all conceit of 1 1 am ' . 
I t  m i ght be objected from the The ravad in  po i nt of vi ew that the 
sunl i gh t  wh i ch di spe l s  the darkness in the s im i l e  corresponds onl y  
to ' the pe rce i v inq o f  i mpe rmanence' . Who then i s  the pe rcei ve r? 
We are tol d  that the conce i t ' I  am' i s  ' wo rn out' and ' to rn out' 
th rough perce i v i ng the i mpermanence o f  the khandhas. Th i s  concei t  
( asrn i mana ) cons i sts i n  wrongl y  i denti fyi ng the sel f w ith the empi r ical 
facto rs . I t  means that 'tie possess the conce i t  that one o r  mo re o f  
the factors whi ch make up our own pe rsonal i ty i s  pe rmanent. The 
Buddha' s analys is  of the factors destroys th i s  conce i t  by mak i ng i t  
no l onger possi b l e to asse rt that the ' I ' ( whi ch i s  by de fi ni ti on 
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pe rmanent) res i des in any of the khandhas. I ron ical l y ,  the The ravad in  
unde rstandi ng of  the teach i ng i s  a subtl e vari ant o f  asmi mana i tse l f 
because i n  assumi ng the khandha ana lys is  to be e xhausti ve they assumed 
that the ' I ' must be i dent i fi ed  w ith the khandhas o r  i t  i s  noth i ng. 
\�e have not ful l y  escaped from asmi mana as l ong as we assume that the 
khandhas are al l that we eve r i magi nab l y  coul d be. 
I n  fai rness to the Theravadi n trad i ti on, howeve r, i t  shoul d be sai d  
that i t  found ways o f  compensati ng for the mi sunderstand i ng o f  the anatta 
teach i ng, wh i ch was, after al l ,  very eni gmati c. The tradi ti on prese rved 
i ts or i g i nal  character remarkabl y through  the centuri es o f  dogmati c  con-
sol i dati on and rati onal i zati on o f  the teachi ng. Any mysti cal teachi n0 
that depended upon i rony and e l l i psi s to the extent that Gotama's 
teach i ng o f  anatta di d toul d h a rdl y be e xpected to surv ive as part o f  a 
system. Hi s most marked character isti cs as a teache r we re h i s  refusal to 
say anyth i ng whi ch m i ght encourage mere specul ati on and h i s  steady focus 
on the p racti cal nature o f  the path. The tradi ti on al so preserved these 
character i st ics i n  i ts teach ing :  ni bbana became the term wh i ch conveyed 
the whol e o f  the transcendental s igni f icance wh i ch at f i rst was shared  by 
the negati ve l y  def ined  atta, but i t  too was p l aced beyond specul at i on .  
The Therav!di ns al so p rese rved the emphas is  on the goa l  as utterl y 
beyond a l l i mpermanent, condi ti oned exi stence. But i t  i s  just here that 
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both the Theravadin tradition and the P�lf texts upon which it is based 
have been misunderstood by Western scholars until recently . Neither 
the suttas nor the corrmentarial literature of the Theravadin school 
( beginning with the Abhidbarrma Pitaka) assert that conditioned existence 
is the whole of existence . Both take the view that reality is of two 
kinds: impermanent and permanent, or conditioned and unconditioned . 
Gotama 1 s constant stressing of impermanence is given no plausible 
explanation by the Western scholars who have taken the negative view, 
where as in the ne\v perspective v1hich is beginning to emerge in \�estern 
scholarship his stress on impermanence is recognized as typical of the 
dualistic samana ascetic teachers of the day . I t  is increasingly clear 
that his religious quest was the same , essentially, as theirs: the quest 
for the eternal, the atman, the deathless realm . This is the conclusion 
to which the imagery we have examined i n  this section lends support . 
Before leaving this subject one famous counter-example of imagery 
which suggests that there is no self deserves to be considered .  This 
is the simile of the chariot, best known in its extended form in the 
early Theravadin work the Milinda-panh� in which the sage Nagasena w akes 
dazzling but unconvincing use of the image in order to persuade his 
hearers that the self has no reality but is merely a name or a convention 
of language. The image appears once in the Sutta Pitaka, very briefly, 
in a poem of one of the Sisters, Vajira, who has had an encounter with 
Mara the tempter in which he has asked her whence 1 being 1 ( satta ) a rises: 
1 Being 1 ! Why dost thou h arp upon that word? 
'Mong false opinions, M�ra, hast thou strayed . 
Mere bundle of conditioned factors, this ! 
No 'being ' can be here discerned to be . 
For just as, when the parts are rightly set 
The word ' chariot' ariseth in our minds 
So doth our usage covenant to say : 
1 A being I v1hen the aggregates are there . 
N ay, it is simply I ll that rises, I ll 
That doth persist, and I l l  that wanes away . 
Naught beside I ll it is that comes to pass . 1 Naught else but I ll it is doth cease to be . 
1 i � i ndred S ayings I pp . 16 9 -70 . 
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Ma ra, be ing a ve ry \ve ak  l i nguist ic  ph i l osophe r, o f  course s l inks av-1ay. 
Unfo rtunate l y, the k i nd o f  bamboo z l i ng cl eve rne s s  e x h i bited i n  th i s  poem 
came to be at a preMium in the Theravctda tradi ti on as i t  s trugg l ed to 
ma inta in  fidel i ty to a teachi ng that was no l onge r prope rl y understood. 
The poem i s, neverthe l e s s, evi dence that the theory of  abs o l ute anattct 
h ad g a ined a footho l d in the earl y Buddh i st comnun i ty by the t ime that 
the S aroyutta Nik�ya was compil ed. 
From so short a poem we can not te l l  Vaj i r� · s  view o f  n i bb�na but 
a l l that she  s ays i s  compati b l e  with the view that it  i s  the so l e  pe rmanent 
rea l i ty and re fuge from s uffer ing . ThP. re i s  noth ing to indicate that 
s he woul d h a ve been unab l e to g i ve a positi ve i nterpretati on to te nus for 
ni bb�na i n  the co l l ection of • sayings about the Uncompounded 1 • These 
i ncl ude : 1 the end 1 , 1 wi thout asavas 1 , 1 truth 1 , 'the furthe r shore • ,  1 the 
s ubtl e 1 , ' the h a rd to see • ,  1 the unfadi ng ' ,  1 the stab l e 1 , 1 the undecay ing 1 , 
1 the i nvi s i b l e 1 , ' the ta int l e s s 1 , 1 the deathl e s s • ,  1 the exce l l ent • ,  
1 the b l i s s fu l ' ,  1 the securi ty • ,  ' the destruction o f  craving • ,  1 the 
v1onde rful ', 1 the marvel l o us ' ,  1 the free from i l l ' ,  ' the state of freedom 
from i l l ' ,  1 ni bbana ' ,  1 the h arml ess' , ' dispas sion 1 ; ' pur ity • , 1 re l e ase 1 , 
1 non-attachr.1ent 1 , 1 the is l and 1 , 1 the ca ve o f  s he l te r • ,  ' the strongho l d' ,  
' the re fuge' , ' the goal ' . 1 T hose who h ave taken the negative vi ev, o f  
ni bbana have to regard many of these  te nns as hol l ow rheto ric and sham 
o r  e l se  a s  the s ubversive g rowth of  a s o ft • re l i g i ous ' opti on within the 
e a rl y  t radition ( wh i ch was approximate l y  Stcherb atsky ' s  po i nt o f  v i ew ) .  
IV THE BUDDHA' S S ILENCE REGARDING THE SELF 
R. C. Zaehner writes in the Introduction to h i s trans l ati on o f  the 
B h agavad Gita : ' The B uddhists we re so care ful not to define what the 
s e l f was that it has o ften been maintained that they deni ed the existence 
1Kindred Sayings IV pp. 261 -3. 
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of a self altogether . • 1 An increasing n umber of respectable scholars 
are daring to say this . But we must now attempt to say why, if t he 
earliest Buddhists believed in the atta, they were silent about its 
positive attributes! Most puzzling of all, why did Gotarna remain 
silent when he was explicitly asked w hether or not the atta exists? 
As we have seen, the most characteristic teaching of the Pali 
Nikayas, apart from instruction in morality and me ditation and the 
chain of causality, was to do with  the anatta status of the f i ve 
factors of personality . The logic of this is perfectly �niform : 
because the f i ve factors 1<Jhich make u p  our worldly existence are all 
impe rmanent we are asked to admit that they are painful, then we are 
asked whether i t  is reasonable to thin k of what is painful that it 
belongs to us, that we are it . or t hat it is our self . Quite clearly, 
the conception of the atta that they had in mind was religious and 
philosophical rather than merely psycholo0ical . The key defining 
characteristic of atta for them \'las its permanence from which followed 
its freedom from dukkha. We can say all of this prior to any decision 
about whether they believed in it or not . 
understood the word, that is all . 
I t  is the way in which they 
It can be stated in an equally abstract way why, given this notion 
of atta, they \'1ere in no position to define it positively even if they 
did believe in its reality . According to the theory of the five factors 
of personali ty even consciousness itself is impermanent an d not-self . 
All that we are in a worldly sense is impe rmanent . Therefore we have 
no ordinary consciousness of anything which qualifies as self and no 
categories ( other than negation) drawn from our worldly experience by 
which to describe the self . 
If the Buddha ' s  own mystical experience was such that he was able 
to associate i t  \vith nothing whatever in ordinary e:npirical expe ri ence 
1R .  C .  Zaehne r ,  The Gha9avad Gttct ( Lon don : Oxford University Press, 1969) 
p . 1 0 .  I d o  not wish to endorse his polemical views about mysticism. 
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i t  i s  not s u rpri s i n g th at the h a l l ma rk of  h i s  teac h i n g  wa s d i s s a t i s fa c t i on 
wi th emp i ri c a l  e xperi ence ( e xpres serl  i n  the fi rs t nob l e  truth of dukkha ) . 
Di ss ati s fact i on be came the p l a t fonn on \vh i ch  h i s ent i re teach i ng  v; as 
rai s e d .  H e  syste�ati ca l l y deva l ued the worl d a nd  a l l enjoymen t of i t  
th rough the senses.  Pe rsona l i ty i ts e l f wa s deva l ued by a ruth l es s l y  
c l i n i ca l  di s i n te0rat i on of i t  i nto i ts factors. E ve ryth i ng that g i ves  
va l ue to ordi n a ry human l i fe v,as  e i the r nega ted or cons i gned to a l m,,e r 
l e vel o f  endeavour  s u i tab l e  for l ay peop l e .  ( E ven i n  te rms of l ay et h i cs 
the B uddha  pa radoxi ca l l y  p romi sed  h a pp i ne s s  i n  a future l i fe on l y  a s  a 
rewa rd for mov i ng i n  the di recti on of a s ceti ci sm i n  the p resent  l i fe ) . 
H i s  con tempora r ies  mus t  s u re l y  h ave un de rs tood t h a t  t h i s enti re p rocess  
of  deva l uat i on found i ts co1:1pens at i on in  the  B uddha ' s  enormous l y  h i g h  
con tra s t i n� va l uat ion of . . .  what?  E ven  to n a�e i t  in  worl d l y  terms 
1'ia s to cor;p rord se i t .  A pos i ti ve te rmi nol ogy 1,,t0u l d l en d  i tse l f too 
ea s i l y to t he con s t ruc ti on of a s pecu l a ti ve system for wh i ch he h a d  a 
deep di s ta s te . The re l en t l e s s  emphas i s  on 1t1 h a t  the u l t i ma te va l ue i s  
_Q.Q!_ v,a s  h i s p re fe rred o pproach . He cou l d even a fford to use the te rm 
most favoure d  by the s aman a  1:1y s ti cs of h i s day, the v1o rd ' atta 1 or 
1 atnian_
1 , p rovi ded i t  v1a s  con f ined  to thi s ne9at i ve or a pophat i c u s a 0,e. 
No oth er  te rm s uqge sts a wore i n t i ma te or fun damenta l  rea l i ty than 1 .9tta 1 , 
a n d  the re was  no rnore aporop ri a te con cept ion ava i l ab l e  to h i m  i n  the 
tradi ti on by 1"lh i c ll to i nterpret h i s o�-m myst i c a l  experi ence . Yet he 
refuse d  to a s sert the  exi s tence of atta i n  unmi s takeab l y  pos i t i ve te nr.s 
when he wa s q ues ti oned di rect l y about i t. Why? 
Th i s  can bes t  be e xp l a i ned  by taki n g  some i l l u s trat i on s  a nd  b ri ef 
di a l ogues from the book o f  1 Ki n d re d  S ay i n0 s  on the S i x-fo l d Sphe re of Sense'. 
I n  th i s  book tne s ame ana ly s i s and  l ogi c i s  app l i e d to the senses  that  
we h ave s een app l i e d to the  khandhas.  At ti mes even the s ame i l l u stra t i on s  
appe a r, for examp l e  t he J et a  Grove ana l ogy i s  adapte d  to  a p p l y  to  the 
senses  i n  a way wh i ch conf i nns the i n te rp retat i on t h a t  the a t ta i s  re a l : 
What i s  not of you, b rethren, put i t  away. Putt i ng i t  away w ill 
be for your prof it  and welfare. 
And what, b rethren, i s  not of you? 
The eye, b rethren, i s  not of you. Put i t  away. Putt i ng  i t  
away wi ll be for your profi t and welfare. 
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Objects are not of you . . .  eye-consci ousness . . .  eye-contact 
that weal and woe or neutral stae experi enced wh i ch ari ses owi ng to 
eye-contact . . .  @nd so on for tongue etc. down to m i nd] .  Put 
them away. Putti ng  them away w i ll be for your profi t  and welfare. 
Just as i f, b rethren, a man should aather, burn or do what he 
li kes wi th all the grass, all the sti cks : branches and stalks i n  
thi s  Jeta Grove, pray would we say " Th i s  man i s  gatheri ng, i s  
burn i ng �, doi ng what he pleases wi th us" ? 
" Surely not, Lord. " 
Why not? 
" Because, Lord, th i s  i s  not our self, nor the nature of self. " 
Even so, b rethren, the eye i s  not of you. Put i t  away . .  
Objects and the rest are not of you . Put theT away. Putt i ng 
them away wi ll be for your profi t and welfare. 
I n  the li ght of the th i ngs that have just been sai d about re l at i ve values 
thi s  passage i s  soli d evi dence that i t  was i ndeed the atta or i nnennost 
self that was the g reat compensati ng value i n  Gotama 1 s ax i olo0y . The 
value-contrast i mpli ed i n  the i llustrat i on i s  the huge di fference i n  
worth between the group of people s i tti ng  i n  the grove and the me re 
rubbi sh and debr is  from wi ndfalls and so on that i s  cleared away and 
burned by An athap i D Q i ka 1 s caretaker. The analogy i nv i tes us to consi der 
not only whether the real self is harmed by the loss of the s i x senses 
( i ncludi ng  as always the m i nd) but also the g reat value of the self 
compared to the senses. The lumi nous obvi ousness of the li ne : " Because, 
Lord, th i s  i s  not our self, nor the nature of self ' '  ari ses from the fact 
that the bh i kkhus are si tti ng secure and apart from that whi ch i s  destroyed 
and from the fact that they are not of commensurate value w i th what i s  
destroyed. The message i s  surely that there i s  that w i thi n us whi ch i s  
of i mmense value when we recogn i ze i t  and wh i ch i s  untouched by the 
destructi on of all that i s  i mpermanent. 
But how does thi s  beg i n to explai n the Buddha's refusal to affi rm 
the self i n  any posi t i ve tenns? The answer i s  that the senses are not i n  
fact li ke the g rass, sti cks and rubb i sh i n  Jeta Grove i n  be i n g separate 
from us to the po i nt where i t  i s  absurd to identi fy wi th them . Our 
1 Ki ndred Sayi ngs I V  p p . 48-9 , repeated f i ve mo re t i mes on pp. 83-4 . 
co111110n -sense viev� of sel f  iden tifies it very cl osel y wit h the actual 
opera tion of the six senses ( incl udin g  as a l ways in I n dian psychol ogy 
the min d  itsel f as the sixth sense ) .  I f  the Buddha had a ffinned the 
sel f in posit ive tenns he woul d not ha ve been ab l e  to drive his \vedge 
so finnl y between the mystica l sel f and  the common-sense sel f. The 
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Jeta G rove an a l o9y is an exampl e of his attempt  to do this by means of 
hyperbol e--it exagge rates ext reme l y  the separateness of the sensory 
consciousness (or  of  the khan dhas in the other exampl e of it tha t  we 
from the mystica l or essent ia l  se l f ,  t he at ta. The reason why the 
Buddha woul d not give cl ear positive a ffinnation of the at ta was that  
it  coul d then be con fused v d th conman -sense views of the sel f. H is 
entire strategy 1>1as to hol d his conception of  atta a l oof from common 
sense in order to preserve its ineffab il ity and  a l so to make it cl ear 
to peopl e that it was not one more specul ative system but a practi€a l 
mystica l path. 
Other systems of  the Buddha ' s  day made more compromises with 
common -sense . The S an khya school which was al so radical l y  dua l istic 
saw)  
and envisaged the goa l as the ' isol ation' ( ka iva lya )  of  the true sel f 
from a l l tha t  is perishab l e  and changing  neverthel ess incl uded conscious-
ness on the side of  the pennanent an d unchanging. The very radical ness 
of the 8uddha ' s  conception of atta woul d have ensured that, in the 
vigorous in tel l ectua l cl ima te for which the N ikayas themsel ves a re our 
best ev idence, he was constant l y  forced onto the defensive. This is 
an ob vious an d comparativel y t riv ia l reason for the predomin ance of 
negation in discussions of the atta in the encounters with the fol l owers 
of  other teachers recorded in the N i  kayas . In most of these encounters 
the Buddha' s in terl ocutors are portrayed as t a king a common-sense view 
of sel f and  ident ifying it with the khandhas , providing him with many 
opportunities to deny the comnon-sense sel f to be the true sel f ,  or att� .  
Tha t  this is precisel y what the Buddha denied, a l l eged l y  hundreds of 
times over, is ha rd l y  some thin g about which there need be any more dispute . 
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There are no adequate grounds for thi nk i ng that the Buddha den i ed that 
the corrmon-sense sel f i s  a real i ty .  That he anal ysed i t  s o  met i cul ous l y  
i s  suff ic ient ev i dence that he bel i eved i n  i ts real i ty .  �./hat he very 
expl i c i tl y  den i ed ,  so many ti mes and i n  so many ways that there i s  no 
room for mi sunderstandi ng, i s  that any feature of th i s  coITTT10n-sense sel f 
qual i f i es as the atta known to mysti cal rel i g i on. Of thi s much we can 
be certai n .  \·Jhether he bel i eved i n  th i s  atta i s  another quest i on -
al though we mi ght wel l ask \'1hat pos s i b l e  moti ve he coul d have had for 
denyi ng  the common sel f to be the atta i f  he d i s bel i eved i n  the atta . 
The theory that he was an utter scept ic  has prob l ems of i ts own. 
Whoever takes th i s  po i nt of vi ew has to expl ai n why the Buddha never 
sai d " there i s  no atta ' 1 i n  unm i s takeabl e  tenns, just as from the poi nt 
of vi ew taken here there i s  the probl em of expl ai n i ng h i s never havi ng 
sai d i n  so many words that the atta exi sts . We have been abl e  to g i ve 
reasons  for the s i l ence, whereas i t  i s  doubtful that the supporters of 
the 1 scepti ci sn 1 v i ew can q i ve comrarabl y  pl aus i b l e  reasons.  They 
woul d al so have a further prob l em of expl ai n i n g how a rel i g ion cl ose ly  
resemb l i ng other samana mysti cal rel i g i ons  grew up  on the bas i s  of such 
compl ete d i s bel i ef .  
None of the i l l ustrat i ons credi ted to the Buddha v1h i ch we have 
exami ned woul d be i ntel l i g i b l e  on the 'scept i ci sm' theory ei ther. 
Another exampl e can be g i ven whi ch woul d be parti cul arl y absurd un l es s  
he bel ieved both i n  the real i ty and i n  the great val ue and des i rab i l i ty 
of the atta . Th i s  i s  the parab l e  of the l ute, al so from the book of 
Ki n dred  Sayi ngs on Sen se ( ifo. 205) : 
Suppose , brethren , the sound of a l ute has never been heard 
by a rajah or royal mi n i ster. Then he hears the sound of a l ute 
and says : " Good man, pray what i s  that sound so entranc i ng ,  so 
del i ghtful , so i ntox icati ng, so ravi s h i ng ,  of such power to b i n d? "  
Then they say to hi m :  "That , lord , i s  the sound of what i s  
cal l ed a l ute , that soun d so entranci n g ,  so del i ghtful , so i ntox ­
i cati ng, so ravi sh i ng, of such power to b i nd . " 
Then he says : 11 Go, my man . Fetch me that 1 ute . 1 1  
So they fetch h i m  that l ute and say to hi m :  " Th i s ,  l ord , i s  
that l ute , the s oun d of wh i ch i s  so entranc i ng . . .  of sucn power 
to b i n d . " 
Then he says : " Enough o f  th i s lute , rPY man. Fetch me that 
sound. " 
They say to h i m :  " Th i s  lute , s o  called , lord , con s i s ts o f  
di ve rs parts , a great number  o f  parts. I t  s peaks because i t  i s  
compounded of  di ve rs parts , to wi t ,  owi ng  to the belly , owi ng to 
the parchment , the handle , the frame , the stri ngs , owi n g  to the 
b r i dge and proper e ffo rt of a playe r . . . 
Then that rajah breaks up that lute i nto ten or  a hundred 
p i eces. Havi n g  done so he s pli nte rs and s pli nte rs i t  agai n. 
Havi ng  done that he burns i t  i na fi re then make s a heap of ashes  
and w i nnows the heap o f  as hes in  a strong wi n d  o r  lets them be 
borne down by a swi ft st ream of a ri ve r. 
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Then he says : " A  poo r  th i ng  i s  v1hat you call a lute , whateve r 
a lute may be. H ere i n  the 1vo rld i s  e xceedi ngly carele s s  and led 
astray. 
Even so , b rethren , a brother  i nve sti gat i n g  body as far as 
the re i s  scope for body , i nves t i 9at i n g  feeli ng , pe rcepti on , the 
acti vi ti es ,  i nvesti gati ng consci ousnes s so fa r as the re i s  scope fo r 
consci ous ne s s , --i n all of  these  i nvesti gati ons , whateve r th! re be 
o f  ' I ' or ' I  am' or  · ;� i ne' , there i s  none of that for h i m. 
W h i le i t  i s  true that i n  the i nterpretat i on o f  all stor i es  whi ch functi on 
as parables the re i s  a need to set as i de detai ls wh ich  are pre sent only 
fo r the sake o f  the story ,  i n  thi s case the reali ty and beauty o f  the 
sound of the lute i s  �uch stressed i n  the rhetoric and i s  too fundamental 
a part o f  the sto ry to ove rlook i n  i nterpreti ng its  mean i ng as a parable. 
Wnat other  n�an i ng  could the story have than that the true s elf i s  li ke 
the sound o f  the vi na and i s  no mo re to be found i n  the khandhas than 
the deluded rajah i s  able to fi nd what has so ravi s hed and begu i led h i m  
i n  the mere parts o f  the i n strument? ( v!e may n ot i ce ,  howeve r ,  that i n  
the vers i on i n  wh i ch i t  has come down to us the sto ry already has a sli ght 
i ns i nuat i on of a reducti on i st Theravad i n  i nte rpretati on at the po i nt whe re 
we are told that the lute " s peaks because i t  i s  compounded o f  di ve rs parts " ) . 
T he ab solute anatta theo ry i nvi te s  compari son w i th the stup i d i ty o f  the 
rajah i n  that i t  too takes the i nstrument to p i eces and f i nds no sound ! 
What would be an i rrelevant i n fe rence to make from the sto ry i s  that 
w i t hout the i n strument the re can be no sound. The moral po i nted up by 
the Buddha i s  not  th i s  but that i n  i nvesti gat i ng as far as pos s i ble i nto 
each o f  t he aspects o f  our phenomenal personali ty we s hall not  di scover 
the e s senti al self. vih at he wi s hes  us to take from the s tory i s  h i s 
characte ri st ic duali sm. He s hares the rajah 's relati ve valuati on o f  
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the sound an d the mere instrument, so it seems ! The stock description 
of the breaking up of  the in strument is  used here as elsewhere to s uggest 
the fate of all component things . If anything, the conclusion s hould 
be that to destroy the in strument is  not to destroy the sound. Their 
relation is  that of  the material to the spiritual, or of  what we can 
see and touch to what is ungraspable and transcendent. This, at least, 
is what the rajah 1 s inability to locate the intan gible sound s uggests. 
I f  these are illegiti�ate inferences from the story it must mean that 
the B uddhists were u sing  an image- -which probably circulated as part of 
the common stock of illustrations of religious teachers - - for a markedl y 
narrov:er p urpose than any contemporary teachers would have had in usin g  it . 
The story would be only half  applicable to the Theravadin view of anattct, 
the details about the sound and its qualities having to be dismis sed as 
only so much embellis hment and the parallel of the sound to the self 
having to be s uppres sed in the �ind  of the hearers, something which the 
Buddha makes no apparent effort to do. 
Indirectly , the story furnis hes us with further evidence in s upport 
of the view already expres sed that the reason for the 8 uddha 1 s silence 
concernin g the se l f was that it is ineffable and ungraspable in any crude 
phys i ea l 1·1ay. A reason for his silence which we have not yet discus sed, 
although it has been fores hadowed, is the avoidance of inevitabl e  mis under­
s tanding  in a situation in which the Buddha 1 s interlocutor has a different 
idea of 1 self 1 in min d from his own. That is to say , the interlocutor 1 s 
idea of  self is one which identifies it with one or more of the k han dhas 
and is therefore an example of the error of sak kayaditthi. An example 
of  s uch a dialogue which s upporters of the Theravadin interpretation of 
anatta o ften appeal to is the dialogue with Vacchagotta the �anderer from 
the end of the book of Kindred S ayings on Sen se :  
Then Vacchagotta the Wanderer went to visit the E xalted One 
. an d sai d :  
" Nm·1 , master Gotaw.a , is there a self? ' 1 
At these words the Exalted One was  silent . 
" Hovi then , mas te r Go tama , i s  the re not  a se l f? " 
Fo r a secon d ti me a l so the E xa l ted One  was  s i l en t . 
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Then Vacchagotta the \f ondere r  rose from h i s seat  a n d  wen t  ai'1ay . 
Nm·1 , n o t  1 on g a fte r the depa rture o f  the Wande re r  the vene rab l e 
An anda  s a i d to the Exa l te d One : 
" Hm'i i s  i t ,  l ord , that the Exa l te d One gave no  an swe r to the 
que s t i on of the \.i an de re r  Vacchago tta ? "  
" I f , An an da , when as ked by the \�ande re r :  ' I s the re a se l f? ' 
I had  repl i e d  to h i m :  ' The re i s  a se l f ' , then  An anda that  wo u l d 
be s i d i n q wi t h  the rec l us es an d b ra hm i n s  who are e te rT1 al i s ts . 
B ut ._ i f , .ll.na n da , 11Jhen a s ke d :  ' I s the re n o t  a s e l f? ' I had 
rep l i e d that  i t  does not  exi s t ,  that , An an da , wo ul d be s i d i n q  
w i t h  tho s e  re c l us e s  a n d  b rahmi n s  who a re a n n i h i l at i on i s ts . 
Aga i n , .An an da , \vhe n  as ked by the \>J an de re r : ' I s there a se l f? '  
had  I re pl i e d that  the re i s ,  wo u l d my re pl y have been i n  acco rdance 
vii th  my knowl edge that a l l th i n qs a re not-se l f? "  
" S u  re 1 y n o t  , 1 o rd . " 
" .'\g a i n ,  Ananda , v1hen  as ked by Vacchagotta the v! an de re r :  ' I s 
there not  a se l f? '  h a d  I repl i e d  tha t the re i s  not , i t  wo u l d have 
been mo re bew i 1 dennen t  fo r the bew i  1 de re d Vacchaqotta . Fo r he 
wo u l d h a ve s a i d : ' Fo nne rl y  i n deed  I had  a se l f , but no\:1 I h a ve not 
one any mo re . ' " 1 
Froffi the e a rl i e r  pas sa ge s  col l e cted i n  t h i s i mpo rtant s e c t i on of the 
boo k ,  the " S ay i ng s  abo u t  the Un re ve a l e d " , .,.,e know that Vacchago tta an d 
the o the r ' Wandere rs ' we re a l l i de n t i fi e rs o f  the atta wi th the k handha s . 2 
T h i s i s  how B uddh i sm cha racte ri sed a l l he re t i c s  and  a dhe ren t s  o f  o the r 
fa i t hs , i n c l ud i n g  both catego r i e s  �ent i oned  i n  the  s utta h e re q uo te d  i n  
fu l l . The ' e tern a l i s ts ' , a cco rdi ng  to the B uddh i s ts ,  attri b u ted 
permanen ce to s ome fea ture o r  othe r of the phenomenal  s e l f ,  wh i l e  the 
' an n i h i l at i on i s ts '  ( l i kew i se be l i e vi n g  that  the se l f  i s  i de n t i ca l wi t h  
one  o r  mo re o f  t h e  k handha s )  be l i e ve d  that  s e l f i s  de s t roye d a t  death . 
We know , too , from the way i n  wh i ch the B uddha res ponds to the ten 
' Unans we red Ques t i on s ' that  ne i the r o f  the se  po s i t i on s  ' fi t  the case ' 
when the s u rvi v a l  a fte r death o r  o the rwi se o f  the T athgga ta i s  i n  
q ues t i o n - -s i mp l y  because  he i s  n o t  to be i de n t i fi e d  wi t h  t he k handha s . 3 
B u t  s i l en ce i s  a l ways amb i guous an d s ome take t h i s to mea n  tha t  the 
T a thagata does n o t  rea l l y  e x i s t  as we have seen . An examp l e o f  a recent 
e x p re s s i on of the ne9at i ve i nte rp retat i on w h i c h  h a s  a certa i n  fo rce i s  
1 Ki n d re d  S ayi ngs I V  pp . 281 -2 .  
2 I b i d .  p . 2 77 . 
3 I b i d .  p . 26 7 . 
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J. G. Jones 's discussion of this passage : 
If it is maintained, as it sometimes is, that, because the dharrma 
is a "middle way" betwixt, amongst other things, the extremes of 
eten1alism on the one hand and annihilationism on the other, it 
cannot therefore be purely negative, this is to completely mis­
represent the canonical passages concerned. In KS IV 282, for 
example, it is made perfectly clear that the refusal to say that 
there is no self to survive death (i. e. the opposite of eternalism, 
which has also been rejected) is due simply to the desire to avoid 
the confus�impression that "fonnerly indeed I had a self, but 
now I have not one any more". It is wrong to say "no self survives 
death" because to Gotama 's enlightened eye there simply is no self. 
If one were to say to a child "there are no unicon,s in London", 
the child might well thin� that there are unicorns, but not in 
London ; the correct i nfonnati on would be "there are no uni corns ". 
For precisely similar reasons, Gotama refuses to say "no self 
survives death" ; in1his view, the correct infonnation is simply, "there is no self" .  
In keeping with this interpretation Jones sums Buddhism up with the 
words : "It flees sorrow by fleeing life itself. 112 This makes it even 
more negative than annihilationism which at least grants that there is 
a temporary self with which to make the most of life ! In Jones ' s  view 
the denial of self refers primarily to the existential core of personality 
and it is the master-stroke in the Buddha ' s  devaluation of human life 
to have denied that our lives have a centre or focus. Without this 
we can neither value ourselves nor one another and all relationships 
are emptied of meaning. (I am only paraphrasing the general message of 
Jones ' s  book and also the content of many conversations with him here). 
In tenns of human values this is a powerful criticism. It can 
hardly be gainsaid that the Buddha 's doctrine of self is life-denying 
and that the khandha analysis undennines respect for persons and love 
between individuals. From a moral point of view it makes little real 
difference whether the Buddha denied value to the factors of personality 
because he believed in no self whatsoever, as Jones contends, or because 
he believed that the self is something utterly transcending personality, 
as I have been arguing. In either case ordinary life is devalued and 
the Buddhist path entails bringing it to an end. But in tenns of the 
passage under discussion, the Buddha ' s  silence is surely more intelligible 
1 John Garrett Jones, Tales and Teachings of the Buddha p. 153 
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if the 'correct information • is that att� transcends our ordinary 
concepts of self than if it is that 'simply, 11 there is no self 11 • 1 
I f  anything, silence tends to indicate that the correct information 
is not simple. Silence is an appropriate way to corm,unicate to someone 
that he or she has come with qui te the wrong idea in the first place. 
This we know, from the othe r suttas in the group, to be true in Vaccha­
gotta's case. The signal should be taken to mean that, given what 
Vacchagotta understands by 'self', his questions are ill -conceived. 
The contemporary discussion of this issue is greatly complicated 
by the way in which scholars introduce entirely tangential meanings of 
' self' into the debate. Gotama would be silent with them too! The 
irrelevant idea that Vacchagotta brings with him is that some conditioned 
thing is atta. Gotama can affirm only what is in keeping with his own 
'knowledge that all things [meaning conditioned things} are anatta. 1 
I n  view of this the silence with which he meets the Wanderer is surely 
intended compassionately, in order to help him to rise to a higher 
conception. The remarkable thing about this sutta is that, even 
through the explanations to Ananda, the silence remains unbroken, 
preserved for all posterity! Plainly, the wily Gotama considered 
that it was in no-one' s best interest to be allowed to entertain any 
speculative views about that which is ineffable and only to be experienced 
for oneself by following the path. He would either say what it was 
not, or say nothing. If  he left Vacchagotta somewhat at a loss it 
was because he considered that a salutary state for him to be in, as 
Gotama tells him i n  so many words in one of the dialogues with him 
recorded in the Middle Length Sayings: 
You ought to be at a loss, Vaccha, you ought to be bewildered. 
For, Vaccha, this dharrma is deep, difficult to see, difficult to 
understand, peaceful, e xcellent, beyond dialectic, subtle, intelligible 
to the wise ; but it is hard for you who are of another view, another 
allegiance, another objective, of a different observance and under a 
different teacher. I 
1Middle Length Sayings I I  p. 165 
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However, Gotama does not leave him in this state ; it is merely the 
crisis to which he has been brought to make him receptive for what 
follows, an analogy drawn from the burning out of a fire : 
. . .  if someone were to question you thus, Vaccha : that fire 
that was in front of you and has now been quenched--to which 
direction has that fire gone from here, to the east or west or 
north or south? On being questioned thus, Vaccha, what would 
you reply? 
11 It does not apply, good Gotama. For, good Gotama, that 
fire blazed because of a supply of grass and sticks, yet from 
having totally consumed this and from thP. lack of other fuel, 
being witho1Jt fuel it is . reckoned to be quenched. " 
The lesson here is explicitly about situations in which it is a mistake 
to make positive assertions (the whole sutta has been about the standard 
ten ' Unanswered Questions'). We have met with •grass and sticks ' before 
and know precisely their significance in the patterns of symbolism from 
which Gotama draws his imagery. So it is with the Tathagata after death: 
Even so, Vaccha, that material shape by which one recognizing 
the Tathagata might recognize him --that material shape has been got 
rid of by the Tathagata, cut off at the root, made like a palm -tree 
stump that can come to no further existence and is not liable to 
arise again in the future. Freed from denotation by material 
shape is the Tathagata, Vaccha, he is deep, irrmeasurable, unfathom­
able as is the great ocean . . . .  That feeling • • .  That perception 
. . . Those habi tua 1 tendencies . . . That consciousness by whi eh 
one recognizi ng the Tathagata might recognize him --that consciousness 
has been got rid of by the Tathagata . . .  1 Arises 1 does not apply, 
1 does not arise• does not apply, 1 both arises and does not arise • 
does not apply, •neither arises nor does not arise • does not apply. 
It is unthinkable that Gotama would go to such pains to explain the 
need for silence if all that he was concealing was a sour and cynical 
scepticism about the existence of the att� of the mystics. One may 
speak of a deep scepticism, but one that is ' immeasurable, unfathomable 
as the great ocean ' ?  And if the • extinction only 1 interpretation of 
the dhanma was correct, surely 1 does not arise• would apply to the 
condition of the Tathagata after death. What conceivable reason could 
Gotama have for rejecting the tenn if simply not arising was the goal? 
The final gem in this sutta is the stock simile with which Vacchagotta 
indicates his wish to become Gotama 1 s disciple : 
When this had been said, the Wanderer Vacchagotta spoke thus 
to the Lord : "Good Gotama, it is like a great sal-tree not far from 
a village or market town whose branches and foliage might be 
dissolved because of their impermanence, whose bark and young 
shoots might be dissolved, whose softwood might be dissolved, 
so that after a time the branches and foliage gone, the bark 
and young shoots gone, the softwo�d gone, clear of them it 
would be established on the pith . . .  1 even so . . . has dhamma been made clear by the· revered Gotama . 
Although the image is expressive of the way in which the essence of 
the message now stands revealed to Vacchagotta, the image of  the pith 
( or better the 'heart -wood ') appears in many places in the canon as a 
symbol of the goal itself or of the atta which stands free when all 
that is impermanent has fallen away from it, or which the woodsman 
reaches when he has chopped away all that is impermanent . 2 It is 
scarcely likely that Gotama would have employed such an image if he 
believed that we have nothing within us that truly lasts like the 
heartwood of a tree . 
- -
V THE THEORY TESTED AGA INST THE DIGHA N I KAYA 
93 
In this final section the aim is to put the theory of the meaning of 
anatta so far outlined to a further test of its credibility , i . e .  whether 
it gains support from , or at least is not contrary to the dhamma as we find 
it in the longer Dialogues . To su1T111arise three large volumes in a few 
pages is not possible, but it is possible to lay out the major themes 
and select the crucial statements in order to judge whether they accord 
with the interpretation that we have placed on the teaching . 
The key to the interpretation of anatta, we have suggested, is to 
view it against a background of dualism . Understood dualistically, 
anatta always implies a polarity between that w hich is not-self and 
that which, by implication, is self (although for reasons we have explored 
this self is discussed only by means of apophasis or indirect implication). 
1Middle Length Sayings II pp . 166-7 
2For example the two suttas on the 'Simile of  the Pith ' in the Majjhima 
Nikaya ( Nos . 29 and 30) point strongly to the reality of atta as that 
for which the 'heartwood ' stands . KS III pp . 1 19-20 is not a true 
ccun"";e.r -e.xa,nple. - -t�e. p i th/�-:,$ p.lc.il1 ci.1vi re.pre- enh <Mlj 'fYI .  kk.tl'J Li i Hi� . 
The heart of the teaching in the Dtgha Nik�ya is practical, to do with 
morality, meditation and insight into the nature of impennanence, so 
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that there is less emphasis on the anatta teaching which, if we can judge 
from the sheer frequency of its repetition in the other Nikayas, was the 
favourite short piece of instruction of the Buddha 's or at least of his 
early disciples. 
The first sutta in the collection, however, is strictly theoretical 
or rather, anti-theoretical. The 1 Brahma-ja l a 1 is the 'perfect net ' in 
which the Buddha purports to catch all 62 of the speculative views opposed 
to the correct understandi ng - of the dhamma. The opening fonnula of 
each part mentions 'some recluse or Brahmin who is addicted to logic and 
reasoning ', for example the semi-eternalist who 'gives utterance to the 
following conclusion of his own, beaten out by his argumentativeness and 
based on his sophistry ' :  
1
1 This which is called eye and ear and nose and tongue and body is 
a self which is impermanent, unstable, not eternal, subject to change. 
But this which is called heart or mind or consciousness is a self 
which is permanent, steadfast, eternal, and knows no change, and it 
wi 1 1  remain for ever and ever. 11 l 
Here, dualism in the sense in which we have defined it is obviously the 
subject under discussion. The semi-eternalist merely employs a mistaken 
dualism, claiming something to be pennanent which is not, in discriminating 
between the permanent and the impermanent. There is no hint anywhere 
in the sutta that dualism is itself a wrong way of thinking which is what 
we should expect if the 'extinction only ' theory of earl y Buddhism is 
correct. For if there was absolutely nothing to place on the 'permanent ' 
side of any dualism then surely dualism itself would be under attack. 
On the contrary, there is positive evidence that the Buddha was 
a dualist. In  the section of the sutta about 'eel-wrigglers' the second 
type is said to deny, out of his 'dullness and stupidity ', that there is 
another world. Since the previous example given of eel -wriggling is of 
1oialogues of the Buddha I p. 34 
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the type who 'does not understand the good in its real nature, nor the 
evil 1 , the failure to admit the existence of another world is placed on 
the same level as moral crassness. Eel-wriggling is equivocating about 
matters about which one ought to be firm, as distinct from indulging in 
speculative views. Not to see that there is another world is to be 
as blind as one who will not admit the difference between right and 
wrong--although that too is not apparent to our immediate senses. The 
equivocation is mocked with the comic flair that we so often find in 
the suttas: the eel-wriggler speaks as follows: 
1 1 If you ask me whether there is another world, - -well, if I thought 
there were, I would say so. But I don ' t  say so. And I don't 
think it is thus or thus . And I don't think it is otherwise. And 
I don't deny it. An d I don't say there neither is nor is not another 
world. 1 1 l 
It might be objected that by 'another world' here is meant simply the 
other worlds of the devas etc . But in other passages such as Sutta 34 
of the Majjhima Nikaya the 'world beyond '  is clearly identified as 'what 
is not Death's realm', i. e. nibbana. (The basic metaphor in this sutta 
is of a herd of cattle crossing the Ganges to the other shor:e representin g 
nibbana while the 'safe ford' is the dhannia). The inclusion of three 
further issues on which eel-wrigglers wriggle is an extraordinary piece 
of clumsiness on the part of the compilers of the sutta, because it places 
the Buddha himself in the category of an eel-wri ggler- -in view of the 
things he said elsewhere on these issues (namely, whether there are 
chance beings, whether there is fruit of good and bad actions, and 
whether a man who has penetrated the truth continues to exist after 
death) the last is surely a case of the compilers misclassifying their 
material. On this question the Buddha chose to be silent. 
The most interesting section of the Brahma-jala Sutta is the last 
in which various recluses and Bratlnins are alleged to hold that we can 
attain 'in this visible world to the highest nibb�na' merely by attaining 
1oialogues of the Buddha I p. 3 9 
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to one or other of the four jhanas. The criticism levelled at these 
arguers is that their nibbana is based upon contact { through the senses) 
which gives rise to sensation, craving, the fuel of becoming, rebirth 
and death, grief . lamentation, pain, sorrow and despair: 
It is, brethren, when a brother understands, as· they really are, 
the origin and the end, the attraction, the danger, and the way 
of escape from the six realms or contact, that he gets to know 
what is above, beyond them all . 
Can we think for a moment that this knowledge of what is 'above, beyond 
them all '�that is, beyond the 'entrapment in the net of the sixty-two 
ITX)des' in which people 'plunge about, this way and that . . .  included 
in it , caught in it ' -could be simply and purely extinction? The 
refrain of the sutta, which would be repeated at least a dozen times in 
a full recitation of the Brahma-jala, also belies the suggestion that 
the Buddha 's 'far better ' knowledge is mere extinction: 
Now, of these, brethren, the Tathaga ta knows that the·se 
speculations thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such 
and such a result, such and such an effect, on the future of those 
who trust in them . That does he know, and he knows also other 
things far beyond { far better than those speculations) ;  and having 
that knowledge he is not puffed up, and thus untarnished he has, 
in his own heart, realized the way of escape from them, has under­
stood, as they really are, the rising up and passing away of sen­
sations, their sweet task, their danger, how they cannot be relied 
on, and not grasping after any (of those things men are eager for) 
he, the Tathagata is quite set free . 
These, brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult 
to realize, hard to understand, tranquillizing, sweet, not to be 
grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise, 
which the Tathagata, having himself realized and seen face to face, 
hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would 
2 rightly praise the Tathagata in accorcance with truth, should speak . 
What is implied here is that the Buddha is in possession of a positive, 
saving knowledge about which speculation of any sort is hannful because 
it lies beyond the grasp of our ordinary intellect. 
Implied, too, is the existence in the Buddhists ' system of a sort 
of staircase or ladder of mystical. achievement such as we find in many 
of the European mystics of the Middle Ages . This l adder of mystical 
1Dialogues of the Buddha I pp. 53-4 
2 Ibid. pp. 45-6 et c .  
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achievement is the core teaching of the first volume of the D igha Nikaya. 
It consists in a progression from morality ( sila), through an account of 
the stages of meditation (jhana), to the culminating insight (pan�a) into 
the nature of impennanence and release from the asavas. The core 
material outlining these stages is first given in the Sarnan�a-phala 
Sutta and repeated in the subsequent dialogues in the first volume. 
This foundation sutta is about the justification for having an 
Order which Gotama gives to the k ing Ajatasattu in reply to his question: 
'What is the irrmediate fruit, visible in this very world, of the life 
of a recluse?'. The advantages are given in ascending order, beginning 
with the 1 hon�ur and respect ' shown to members of religi ous orders, then 
proceeding through the 1 sflas 1 which involve mercy and kindness to all 
living things, honesty, chastity, avoiding lying, slandering or frivolous 
talk, and various minor rules for monks. Beyond these rules and the 
sense of joy and ease which mastering them brings are the more character ­
istically monastic mental disciplines such as guarding the senses and 
practicing mindfulness and learning to be content with simplicity. 
These disciplines in turn prepare the recluse for an achievement 'better 
and sweeter ' which is feedom from the five hindrances of worldly longing, 
the desire to harm, lassitude, nervous anxiety and mental perplexity. 
Five similes are given for this release from the hindrances, each told 
as a brief story with a satisfying amount of detail. Since these sections 
of the sutta were repeated whenever one of the next dozen or so suttas 
were recited, the similes for release from the hindrances must have been 
some of the best known illustrations of what might be gained from the 
life of a monk: a small evocative story is told about indebtedness and 
regaining solvency, sickness and recovery, imprisonment and release, 
slavery and freedom, and, finally, being lost in a desert and finding 
one 's way home. In these stories it is surely not hard to see the 
characteristic dualism of the whole cast of mind of the early Buddhists. 
Although we are not yet speaking about the attainment of the goal, 
there is a foreshadowing of the imagery and the emotions that surround 
descriptions of the goal . 
Beyond these steps in the ascending scale are the Four Jhanas or 
progressive levels of Meditation , followed by the paranormal powers 
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which accrue to the practitioner of meditation. Throughout the account 
of these levels of attainment the emphasis is on detachment , as one 
would expect in a world-rejecting or dualistic type of mysticism . This 
is nowhere more marked than in the description of the attainment of the 
Heavenly Eye, by which a monk is able to see beings ' as they pass away 
from one state of existence, and take fonn in another' : 
. he recognizes the mean and the noble, the well-favoured 
and the ill-favoured, the happy and the wretched, passing away 
according to their deeds . 
Just, 0 king, as if there were a house with an upper terrace 
on it in the midst of a place where four roads meet, and a man 
standing thereon, and with eyes to see, should watch men entering 
a house, and coming forth out of it, and walking hither and thither 
along the street, and seated in the square in the midst . l 
This is certainly a position above the fray, and since it is not balanced 
in this sutta by any mention of the meditations upon the different kinds 
of love (friendliness, sympathy, joy in others ' happiness and equanimity) 
or of the way in which monks should 'live together on friendly tenns and 
harmonious, as milk and water blend, regarding one another with the eye 
of affection • , 2 one might easily draw the conclusion that the aim of 
the monastic life is to acquire a cold indifference and superiority to 
the situation of ordinary mortals . This view of Buddhist morality as 
entirely self-serving and inward-looking has been expressed by some 
scholars who take the negative view of Buddhism . 3 It needs to be 
contested as part of the case for a positive view of the goal . 4 For 
1oialogues of the Buddha I p . 9 2 
2Middle Length Sayings I p . 258 
3For example R .  H .  Jones 1 s article ' Theravada Buddhism and Morality • 
Journal of the American Academy of Religions Sept. 1979, pp . 371-87 
4see N .  R. Reat' s reply to Jones, and book and articles by H .  Aronson 
listed in Bibliography. 
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although  early Buddhism was ideologically dualistic its ethics present 
us with a paradox of rejection of the world on the one hand and concern 
on the other. I ts attitude was certainly not ' let the world go hang'. 
I n  the ethics we can disce rn a pulling away from the dualistic ideology 
of the samana ascetics which provided the frame of thought or world-view 
of early B uddhism, so that in the wider view there is no discontinuity 
between the compassion that Gotama both showed and advocated, and the 
vow of the Mahayana Bodhisattva not to go to his reward until the last 
blade of grass had been brought to salvation. There is, however, 
development, and there are many ways in which the Mahayana tradition 
can be seen to have gone deeper, both ethically and p hilosophically, 
than the Southern tradition. The weakness of t he dualistic phase of 
I ndian thought ( which Gotama, in his distaste for speculative views, seems 
to have appreciated )  is reflected in its inabil ity to produce a plausible 
cosnX>logy or any sort of ' theodicy ' in order to explain now we can have a 
morally orderly universe and yet suffer. According to the theory of 
karma we are responsible for our own suffering, b ut karmic theory within 
a dualistic frame has no way of explaining the interpenetration of samsara 
with nibbana that a positive ethical outlook implies. 
That this dualistic frame profoundly influenced the way in which 
the early Buddhists conceived the goal is well demonstrated in the final 
attainment of the recluse as it is described in the S amanna-phala sutta. 
The highest step on the mystical stairway that we have been describing is 
'knowing as it really is ' the origin of pain, conbined with the ceasing of 
the asavas, i. e. freedom from hankering for future existence on either the 
sensuous plane or the higher planes of temporal existence , and freedom from 
ignorance. In other words, there is no longer a vestige of clinging to 
samsaric existence. This must either be because the goal was conceived 
as mere extinction, or because it was conceived  as utterly beyond the entire 
samsaric level of reality. Looking back then at samsara is likened to the 
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detached and tranquil experience of looking into a rock pool at the 
fonns of life that one sees there : 
Just, 0 king, as if in a mountain fastness there were a pool 
of water, clear, translucent and serene ; and a man standing on the 
bank, and with eyes to see, should perceive the oysters and the shells, 
the gravel and the pebbles and the shoals of fish as they move about 
or lie within it ; he would know: "This pool is clear, translucent and 
serene, and there within it are the oysters and the shells, the sand 
and the gravel, and the shoals of fish are moving about or lying still. 
This, 0 king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, 
visible in this world, and higher and sweeter than the last . and 
there is no fruit of the life of a recluse, visible in this world, 
that is higher and sweeter than this. 1 
This simile could easily be seized upon by the 'extinction only ' school 
of thought to prove that the Buddha envisaged nothing higher than a state 
of perfect detachment and calm with regard to all life in the world . 
But it must be borne in mind that Ajatasattu 's question was a quite 
specific one, about the ' irrmediate' fruit of being a recluse which is 
' visible in this world' . His outlook is this-worldly, and so far as 
he can, Gotama accomodates this orientation of the king ' s  by answering 
him in tenns of the immediate, practical results of following the path. 
It is a very different kind of dialogue from what he might have with 
someone who had a passion for the ultimate questions, like Vacchagotta, 
to whom Gotama would always indicate (without spelling it out ) that 
there was an ineffable knowledge to which the path would also lead . 
A great many of the dialogues are of this kind, that is to say, 
they are discussions with fairly limited and down-to-earth inquirers 
whose interest is confined to the il111lE?diate benefits of the path. 
They are never sent packing ; instead Gotama pitches his talk at their 
level, as in the following sutta in which he speaks of 'generosity', 
of right conduct, of heaven, of 'the vanity and defilement of lusts' , 
the advantages of renunciation, of sorrow, its origin and cessation, 
and of the path. This sutta, too, could be taken as evidence that 
1oialogues of the Buddha I pp.93-4 
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all that the message of the Buddha amounts to is  expressed i n  the stock 
fonnula: ' Whatsoever has a begi nni ng i n  that i s  i nherent also the necessi ty 
of di ssoluti on. •1 However, the meani ng of thi s  fonnula, whi ch i n  thi s  
sutta the Brahmi n  Pokkharasadi utters when he attains the 'Eye for the 
Truth', does not appear i n  the same li ght i f  we view it  as an expressi on 
of the recogni t ion that nothi ng i n  thi s  world can assuage the thirst for 
the i nf in ite-- in  other words, i f  the fonnula i s  vi ewed as only one s ide 
of the i mpennanece/permanence polari ty or duali sm. 
The next f i ve suttas are a ll  si m ilar i n  the one respect that they 
afforded the compil�rs - of the Di alogues further opportuni ti es to i nclude 
the core materi al g iven fi rst i n  the Samanna-phala Sutta. When Gotama 
spoke to anyone, the suttas show, he put hi mself as far as possi ble i n  
the pos iti on of h i s  i nterlocutor, attacki ng none of the person ' s  most 
cherished beli efs, but f i ndi ng some cormion ground. Often he accepts 
an opponent 's tenni nology and teaches by the sly means of placi ng a 
hi gher meani ng on the words, as i n  the noti on of a 'true Brahmi n 1 
( i n the Sonadanda Suttanta) or of the best •sacrif i ce •  ( i n the Kutadanta 
Suttanta) or even the otherwise ali en noti on to Buddhism of union w ith 
God ( i n the Tevijja Suttanta). If Gotama 1 s a i m  throughout these suttas 
was to teach these followers of other teachers and tradi t ions that the i r  
expectati ons of f i ndi ng i n  h is  system any f i nal, pos it ive reli g i ous goal 
was m i staken and that the sole purpose of the dhamma that he taught was 
to awaken them to the i mpennanence and worthlessness of all exi stence, 
h i s  ai m got bur i ed somewhere i n  the process of transmi ss ion !  Everything 
i n  the suttas i s  i n  accord w i th h is  be i ng a beli ever i n  somethi ng that i s  
transcendent and pennanent, i n  fact, a beli ever i n  the atta. 
The Mahali and Jaliya suttas are examples of thi s. In them the same 
di alogue occurs i n  whi ch Gotama i s  asked by two recluses i f  the 'soul i s  
1oialogues of the Buddha I p. 135 
the same thing as the body, or is the soul one thing and the body 
another?' His reply is to give them the teaching about the jhanas 
and the ultimate insights into impermanence and the loss of the asavas, 
culminating in the stock formula for the attainment of Arahantship: 
'In him, thus set free, there arises the knowledge of his emancipation, 
and he knows: " Rebirth has been destroyed. The higher life has been 
fulfilled. What had to be done has been accomplished. After the 
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present life there will be no beyond!'" Gotama then asks the recluses 
whether anyone who has reached this point would be ready to take up the 
questions that they have asked: · 1,  sirs, know thus and see thus. And 
nevertheless I do not say the one or the other. •1 The word used for soul 
here is 1 jiva 1 rather than 'atta ', but the reasons for Gotama' s silence 
are no different, we can infer, from those we have already discussed. 
On the other hand, if he was a total disbeliever and sceptic concerning 
any kind of soul this was surely an unsurpassable opportunity to have 
made himself perfectly understood on the matter. There is no conceivable 
reason why he would not have given the recluses a straight answer. 
The discussion of soul -theories occupies an important part in two 
other suttas in the collection, the Potthapada and Maha-Nidana Suttantas. 
In  the Poithapada sutta the question discussed is very similar to the one 
we have just encountered: Potthapada seeks an answer to whether the 
consciousness 'is identical with a man 's soul (atta ), or is consciousness 
one thing and the soul another? 1 2 Because the asking of this question 
follows directly upon Gotama 's instruction to Potthapada on hgw even the 
most refined kind of consciousness experienced in the highest states of 
meditation can be brought to cessation, we must infer that the question 
that Potthapada is really asking is whether Gotama teaches that the soul 
1Dialogues of the Buddha I p. 204. The translation of the Arahant formula 
here by T .  W. Rhys Davids, ending in : 'there will be no beyond ', is biased 
towards the ' extinction only' interpretation which he espoused. All that 
the words mean is that there will be no further samsaric existence. 
2 Ibid. p. 252 
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is al so itsel f of a nature to cease. This is certainl y the question 
that we find Gotama attempting to answer squarely and in the negative. 
He proves to Potthapada that whatever notion of soul  he possesses , it 
must be distinct from that which is impennanent or it is not worthy of 
being termed ' sou l · �  In the obviousl y styl ized account of the dial ogue 
that we have in the sutta Potthapada runs through the standard specul ative 
views about soul ( that it is identical with the body , with the six senses 
as a functioning compl ex incl uding mind , or with the forml ess consciousness 
experienced in meditation). I n  each case , Gotama points out, the same 
fatal objection applies, that is, that the theory in question identifies 
soul  with something that is of a nature to arise and pass away. Thus , 
he says to Potthapada, on each account , 'you can see how consciousness 
must be one thing, and soul  another. ' ( My emphas i s). 2 How can this 
be construed as a denial of the existence of soul ?  The l esson is surel y 
not to identify the atta with anything which our experience tel l s  us is 
impermanent. Soul is not of a nature to cease , therefore not even the 
subl imest states of consciousness experienced in meditation should be 
confused with it, the context of the dial ogue indicates. I t  is remarkabl e  
how the obvious meaning of Gotama's words came to be l ost under the l ayered 
encrustation of l ater dogma. 
The il l ustrations which fol l ow reinforce our interpretation. The 
soul  theories which Gotama says spring from indul ging in the specul ation: 
'The soul is perfect l y  happy and heal thy after death' are l ike a man saying 
that he is in l ove with the most beautiful  woman in the l and yet he is unab le  
to describe her because he has never seen her ; or again, l ike a man putting 
up a staircase at a crossroads when he has no idea even in which of the four 
directions he wil l buil d the mansion to which the staircase wil l be the entry. 
1oial ogues of the Buddha I pp. 2 52- 4. T. W. Rhys Davids again shows his 
bias by having Gotama ask Po�thapada: ' Do you real l y  fal l back on the sou l ? '  
instead of the onl y question that makes sense in the context: 'What 'soul ' 
do you fal l back on? ' which is the question Pot\hapada promptl y answers. 
2 Ib id. p . 2 53. 
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Only an extremely superficial reading of these illustrations could lead 
to the conclusion that they imply that the soul simply does not exist. 
The absurdity of the soul-theories in question is that they are built 
on no adequate present experience of happiness from which to infer the 
soul 's happiness after death. As always, these indulgences in speculative 
views are based on asmimana, or pride in some aspect of our present life 
which is denied to be impennanent and therefore subject to dukkha. To 
conclude that there is no soul from this passage is to read it out of 
context. Soul is not denied, only that those who hold speculative views 
about it have not experienced the real atta - -which in the illustrations 
corresponds to the beautiful woman or the fine mansion. As usual in 
Gotama 's imagery the atta is likened to things which are supremely 
desirable and also real . We do not find the atta likened anywhere to 
things which do not exist, such as uniconis or the classic example in 
Indian argument, the hare' s honi. It is logically impossible that the 
most beautiful woman in the land should not exist! 
That Gotama was pointing to the real atta in these illustrations 
is made perfectly obvious in his subsequent use of the same imagery in 
the same sutta. He asks Poithapada (rhetorically) what 'personality ' we 
have to put away in order to be rid of the evil dispositions and increase 
the dispositions that lead to purification, enabling us to 'see face to face ' 
and 'realize the full perfection and grandeur of wisdom '--and answers it 
himself: 'Why this very personality that you see before you is what I mean. •1 
This is to put up one 's staircase 'at the very foot of the palace itself. ' 
The illustration has been given an adept twist here in order to show that 
we can locate the right place instantly for our staircase up which to 
mount into the palace of the atta through recognizing precisely where and 
what is our false self (i. e. this self which is characterised in the three 
modes--material, mental and fonnless--all of which are anatta) � 
1Dialogues of the Buddha I p. 261 
By putting 
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away from us that which is impennanent, in subjugating or purifying this 
ordinary personality, we erect our staircase in just the right place from 
which to enter the palace of the true atta. If this is not what is meant, 
what does the palace stand for? The Theravadins can say that it stands 
for nibbana, which is reasonable enough except that it overlooks the fact 
that the imagery is specifically related to soul-theories in this sutta. 
But the ' extinction only ' theory which is constructed on the absolute 
view of anatta plus the further inference that nibbana only meant extinction 
has nothing in it to whi ch the palace imagery could plausibly correspond. 
Those scholars who take the completely negative view of early Buddhism 
tend, like David Ka1 upahana, to emp�asize the teaching of causal i ty as the 
central doctrine. This teaching we have not so far discussed in any 
adequate detail in order to show how it can be acolTITlOdated in the positive 
account tnat we have given of atta and nibbana. Reference is first made 
to it in the Digha Nikaya in the Mahapadana Suttanta, the ' Story of the 
Great Ones ', which is a late Nikayan production containing a developing 
Buddho1 ogy. (There is reason to think, too, that the theory of causality 
was considerably developed after the time of Gotama and given a more 
prominent place than it perhaps deserves by the lovers of system in the 
Order. If the fully-fledged paticca-samuppada sterrmed directly fro� Gotama 
it makes it easier to cast him in the role of philosopher, as Stcherbatsky 
and Ka1 upahana would like to do, rather than as the founder of a mystical 
religion, as he has been portrayed in the present study). In this sutta 
the Buddhas of the past aeons are said to have taught the doctrine of the 
chain of causality just as Gotarna now teaches it: 
Then to Vipassi the Bodhi- s.at, breth�n, this occurred:--"Lo!, I · 
have won to this, the Way to enlightenment through insight (vipassana] . 
And it is this, that from name-and-fonn ceasing, cognition ceases, and 
conversely ; that from name-and-form ceasing, the six-fold field ceases ; 
from the six -fold field ceasing, contact ceases ; from contact ceasing 
feeling ceases ; from feeling ceasing, craving ceases ; from craving 
ceasing, grasping ceases ; from grasping ceasing ; becoming ceases ; 
from becoming ceasing, birth ceases ; from birth ceasing, decay and 
dying, grief, lamentation, ill, sorrow and despair cease. Such 
is the ceasing of this entire body of 1 1 1 . 1 
1Dialogues of the Buddha II p. 27 
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This, of course, is only a surrmary of the chain of causality { which appears 
in both ten and twelve-fold versions ) .  It is also the negative or reverse 
way of listing the sequence of causes , the opposite mode being the full 
explanation of how the 'entire body of Ill' comes about. Un 1 ess we take 
a dualistic view of this causal sequence, that is, unless we look for 
what it implies in religious terms, the passage which irmiediately follows 
is almost unintelligible: 
"Ceasing to be, ceasing to be! " --at that thought, brethren, 
there arose to Vipassi the Bodhisat a vision into things not called 
before to mind, and knowledge arose, reason arose, wisdom arose, 
1 i g h t a rose . 1 
It is just possible that this kind of language might be used to hail an 
important philosophical realization, i.e. that all things are impermanent 
and that there is a way to bring suffering to an end just because of this. 
This could be the sum total of Gotama's discovery: simply that if we nip 
in the bud the whole chain of causality there will be no more suffering 
because there will be no more arising of individual existence. But, if so, 
how can we account for the lines of poetry that are put in Vipassi 's mouth 
when he accepts Brahma ' s  challenge to teach the dharrrna to all men: 
Wide open are the doors of the Deathless! [Amatassa dvara 
Let those that hear renounce their empty faith in rites etcJ 
Despairing of the weary task, 0 Brahma, 
I spake not of this doctrine, sweet and good to men. 2 
Surely, the two things are merely opposite sides of the one coin--the 
doors of the Deathless are flung open upon the realization that suffering 
is not permanent. 'All that is impermanent is suffering! Therefore put 
away what is impermanent, ' --this is the message that is repeated hundreds 
of times in the suttas. The chain of causality is only one more piece of 
analysis with the purpose of distancing the disciple from his attachments, 
working in the same way as the khandha analysis works by casting a cold 
and dispassionate eye on all that man is in a worldly sense. 
1oialogues of the Buddha II p. 28 
2Ibid . p.33. Unaccountably, T. W. Rhys Davids translates 'amatassa' 
as 'Nirvana' --to accord with his view that nirvana rileant simple extinction? 
The fullest exposition that the doctrine of paticca-samuppada 
receives in the Canon is in the Maha-Nid�na Suttanta , but this sutta 
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is of more interest for our purposes because of its discussion of the 
soul-theories in its second half. The details about causality are the 
same in principle as the sumnary forn, of the teaching that was quoted 
above. From Section 23 onwards the discussion about soul-theories 
introduces arguments which we have not yet considered , although the 
theories themselves we have met with--all of which the wi se ' do not 
declare ' according to Gotama , 'with regard either to the present life , 
or to the next life '. 1 He then goes on to give a rrore detailed refutation 
of the identification of the att� with one of the khandhas than is to be 
foL1nd anywhere else in the Pitakas. This is a rejection of 'feelings ' 
as a candidate to be the soul or true self : 
Herein , Ananda , to him who affirms : -- "My soul is feeling"-­
answer should thus be made : - - " My friend , feeling is of three kinds. 
There is happy feeling , painful feeling , neutral feeling. Of these 
three fellings , look you , which do you consider your soul is? " 
When you feel a happy feeling , Ananda , you do not feel a painful 
feeling or a neutral feeling ; you just feel a happy feeling. And 
when you feel a painful feeling , you do not feel a happy feeling or 
a neutral feeling. And when you do not feel a neutral feeling , you 
do not then feel a happy feeling or a painful feeling ; you just feel 
a neutral feeliQg. 
Moreover , Ananda , happy fee 1 i ng is impermanent , a product Csar;, kha ta), 
the result of a cause or causes , liable to perish or pass away , 
to become extinct , to cease. So too is painful feeling. So too 
is neutral feeling. If when experiencing a happy feeling one thinks : - -
" This is my soul , 11 --when that same happy feeling ceases , one will also 
think : - -" My soul has departed. " So too when the feeling is painful 
or neutral. Thus he who says : - - "My soul is feeling , " --regards as 
his soul something which , in this present life , is impermanent , is 
blended of �appiness and pain , and is liable to begin and end. 
Wherefore , Ananda , it fo 1 1  �ws that this aspect : --"My soul is fee 1 i ng" 
--does not conmend itself. 
The reasoning here depends upon the unspoken premise that it is absurd 
to conceive of the self in such a way that we could say of it 'byaga me 
att� · , or ' my self has vanished. ' The very definition of atta is that 
it is permanent. Nowhere is it implied that this atta does not exist. 
1Dial ogues of the Buddha II p. 63 
2Ibid. pp. 63-4 
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On the contrary, the dialogue loses its gravity and coherence within 
the context unless it is assumed that Gotama is attempting to teach 
Ananda the real nature of the atta by way of negative instances. The 
next part of the argument is subtly counterpointed against the passage 
which we have just quoted : 
Herein again, Ananda, to him who affinns:--"Nay, my soul is not 
feeling, my soul is not sentient, "--answer should thus be made:-­
"My fri end, where there is no feeling of anything, can you there 
say :-- 1 1 am 1 ? 11 1 
A further variant, the denial that the soul is feeling etc . while claim­
ing that it has these properties, is dismissed on the grounds that even 
then one could not say 1 I myself am • because there would be '. no feeling 
whatever '. Obviously, the absolute view of anatta could be thought to 
be necessarily implied in this pincer movement of Gotama 's logic, but if 
this view is taken the following passage is rendered unitelligible --for 
it shows another way to understand Gotama 1 s purpose in driving us from 
both apparent logical alternatives in a case like this. This is not 
( as the tradition has naively thought) to give up believing in the atta 
at all but to give up grasping at concepts of it because it lies beyond 
the reach of conceptual thought. What other construction could be placed 
on the following passage? 
Now when a brother, Ananda, does not regard soul under these 
aspects,--either as feeling, or as non-sentient, or as having feeling, 
--then he, thus refraining from such views, grasps at nothing whatever 
in the world; and not grasping he trembles not; and trembling not, 
he by himself attains to perfect peace [paccatta�yeva 6arinibbahati, which would be better translated 'he attains utter ni b�na in is 
very self '] . And he knows that birth is at an end, that the higher 
life has been fulfilled, that what had to be done has been accomplished, 
and that after this present world there is no beyond [or better, 'there 
is no more life in these conditions ' as other translators give this 
stock fonnula for the attain�nt of Arahantship) . 
And of such a brother, Ananda, whose heart is thus set free, if 
anyone should say:-- 1 1His creed is that an Arahant goes on after death" 
--that were absurd. Or: "His creed is that an Arahant does not go on 
does, and yet does not, go on . . .  neither goes on or does not 
go on after death" --a 1 1  that were absurd. Why is that? because, 
1Dialogues of the Buddha II p. 64 
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Anan da, whatever verbal expression there is and whatever system 
of verbal expression, whatever explanation there may be, and 
whatever system of explanation, whatever communication is possible 
and whatever system of co1T1T1unication, whatever knowledge there is 
and whatever sphere of knowledge, whatever round of life and how 
far the round is traversed,--by mastery over all this that brother 
is set free. But to say of a brother who has been so set free 
by insight : --"He knows not, he sees not" --that were absurd ! l 
Surely, no clearer rebuttal than this could be given of both the pure 
extinctionist and the pure agnostic positions that are often attributed 
to Gotama. Scholars who main tain the ' extinction only ' view of the goal 
might agree that agnosticism is ruled out (by the last sen tence) but still 
wish to assert that what the bhikkhu set free by insight 'knows and sees • 
is a vision of engulfing nihilism that makes speculation irrelevant. But 
this is scarcely coherent  as well as being quite out of keeping with the 
emotional tone of the passage. The passage is not fully intelligible 
on any other interpretation than the one we have taken, an d which the 
context also strongly corroborates, i. e. that the reality of the att� 
lies beyond  all our known modes of communication or expression. It is 
beyond conceptual thought and beyond samsara, yet it can be 1 known 1 and 
1 seen 1 --the refusal to elaborate upon these words preserves Gotama 1 s 
purposeful and pregnan t silence which we have learned to expect when the 
true nature of the atta is in question. If the non-existence of the atta 
of the mystics was what he wished to communicate we can only observe that 
silence was a singularly ineffective way of doing it, whereas on the opposite 
view that it was the reality of the atta that he wished to co1T1T1unicate it 
is at least clear that he had no alternative to silence even at the risk of 
misunderstanding. 
There is a great deal more .i.n, the Dfgha Nikaya \'lhkh . deserves mention 
- . . 
in relation to the theme of this study, but this chapter must be brought 
to a close--unfortunately without deali n g  with the material in the sequence 
of mythological suttas which throw light on the relation between the Brahma 
1oialogues of the Buddha II pp. 65-6 
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world and nibbana, or the important detail with which meei tation is 
treated in the Maha-Satipatth3na Suttanta or the interesting treatments 
of the theme of eternalism in the Sampasadaniya Suttanta and evolution 
in the Agganna  Suttanta. 
Something must be said, however, about the last words and teachings 
attributed to Gotama in the sutta in which his death is recorded, the 
Maha-Parinibbana Suttanta. This sutta is a mosaic of early and later 
material which is sometimes not hard to discen1, for example we know we 
are dealing with later material where Ananda is held to blame for the 
Buddha 's death because he did not plead enough with him to stay (having 
heard from the Master ' s  own mouth that a Buddha can prolong his life for 
an aeon). This is repeated many wearying times then, suddenly, we find 
what seems to be part of the older tradition in which Gotama says: 
But now, Ananda, have I not formerly declared to you that it 
is in the very nature of all things near and dear to us that we 
must divide ourselves from them, leave them, sever ourselves from 
them? How, then, Ananda, can this be possible--whereas anything 
whatever, bon1, brought into being and organized, contains within 
itself the inherent necessity of dissolution --how then can this be 
possible that such a being should not be dissolved? No such 
condition can exist! And that which, Ananda, has been relinquished, 
cast away, renounced, rejected and abandoned by the Tathagata--the 
remaining sum of life surrendered by him--verily with regard to that 
the word has gone forth . . . at the end of three months from this 
time the Tathagata will die! l 
Whatever we make of his alleged prediction of his own death, the language 
here, in the first sentence especially, deserves conment. It is not just 
Ananda 's impending bereavement obviously, that Gotama is talking about 
here, but 'all things near and dear to us ', and the question must arise 
as to who and what is meant by 'we . • • ourselves ' in this context where 
it is said 'we must divide ourselves from them, leave them, sever ourselves 
from them '. If Gotama' s central teaching was that we have no self, this 
language would surely be inappropriate at such a moment, especially when 
the utterance is plainly a general teaching intended to transcend the 
1oialogues of the Buddha II pp. 126, repeated at 15 8-9, 177, 179, 1 84 -5 
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particular situation in which it was delivered (as the repetitions of 
the passage in the sutta acknowlege). If  the ordinary khandha-sel f  
was all that was meant then what is to be 'divided . . .  left . . .  
severed ' from what? And, further on in the quoted passage, what is the 
Tathagata who is able to 'relinquish . . • cast away . . .  renounce 
reject . . .  abandon . .  surrender' what is left of the life of his 
khandhas? Have we merely caught Gotama at an unguarded IT()ment, or did 
he use naturally and uninhibitedly language which takes for granted the 
reality of self as what we are intrinsically, over and apart from our 
khandhas? 
I t  would be best to pass over the much disputed farewell to his 
disciples in which Gotama tells them t() be 'lamps to yourselves, a 
refuge to yourselves • ,  ( or ' take the self as lamp, the self as refuqe ' ? ) , 1 
because the argulll::!nt is too complex--it will be enough to say that the 
issue is far from settled as to how the lines should be translated, 
and even if the reflexive use of atta is intended here it does not create 
an obstacle to the thesis that has been put forward about the interp ­
retation of anatta in the texts in which the khandhas are said to be 
not-self. Our inability to find examples of the positive use of atta 
( which has not been established) would show nothing IT()re than that Gotama 
was extraordinarily consistent in applying his negative method of defining 
the atta. I think that there are in fact hundreds of positive uses of 
the word in the Canon which apply quite naturally and unaffectedly to the 
core of personality which, as it were, inhabits the khandhas or mere 
factors of personality. But this needs to be argued elsewhere. 2 
One such use of att�, followed closely by an image which attests 
to the reality of atta , may be used to conclude this chapter. 
1Dialogues of the Buddha II  p. 108 
In the 
2 ,, / Johansson and Perez-Remon have gone a good way towards clarifying how 
the core of personality was understood by the early Buddhists, both in 
relation to ethical activity and to the attainment of nibbana. The pioneer 
work in this area by Mrs Rhys Davids and I. B. Horner also needs to be 
fresh l y  c1 c:; c:; e c:;c:;prl , c:; i n rP i t  a pCle � rs to. con t a i ri  nwch t\>,at i s  o f  va l ue ,  
midst of what appears to be late material in which Mara tempts Gotama 
to die irrmediately while Ananda pleads for him to live on for an aeon, 
there appears a pas sage which seems to be groun ed in an actual event 
despite the mythology with which it is surrounded: 
Thereupon the Exalted One, at Capala Shrine, mindful and 
self-possessed let go his life 's aggregate (a*usankharaT]. And when the life ' s  aggregate was let go by t e  Bles sed One 
there was a mighty earthquake, and there burst a terrific hair­
raising thunder. And then the Blessed One, knowing this to be 
its meaning, at that time, uttered these solemn words: 
Weighing the ilTITleasurable and becoming, 
The sage rejected the aggregates of his becoming, 
In love with the inner self a · ·hattarato , well -composed, 
He split his individual existence attasambhava 
as it were a coat of armour. 1 
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The word 1 ajjhattarato 1 is translated by T. W. Rhys Davids as ' inward joy ' 
whereas Perez-Rem6n gives the literal meaning ; but taking it in either 
sense, the dramatic action of Gotama ' s  spirit and the attitude of mind 
and heart with which it is done are well conveyed. The pas sage does not 
refer to his actual death but to an earlier event (perhaps three months 
earlier) which must have been of some significance for him and for his 
disciples. The image of a man breaking out of, or free from, a coat of 
armour--here specifically referring to the temporal part of his being-­
surely bespeaks the reality of the inner self in comparison to something 
external to it which, in this life, imprisons it as if in a case of iron. 
Here, once again, is imagery that is particularly unsuitable to express 
the doctrine of absolute anatta if that is what was in the minds of the 
early Buddhists. The pas sage rather calls to mind the description of 
the freed man in Gotama 's dialogue with Vacchagotta: 'Freed from 
denotation by consciousness  is the Tathagata, Vaccha, he is deep, 
immeasurable, unfathomable as is the great ocean. •2 
1Joaqu�n Perez -Rem6n Self and Non -Self in Early Buddhism pp. 36-7. 
The corresponding passage in Dialogues of the Buddha is in Vol. II, p. 113. 
2Middle Length Sayings II p. 166 
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CONCLUSION 
This study was begun with the aim of showing that nibbana, as the 
early Buddhists understood it, could not have been simple extinction as 
some scholars s till maintain, but a transcendent goal which is beyond 
everything impermanent and caught up in suffering. It seemed too 
implausible that monks, nuns and lay people would have worked with such 
earnes tnes s, joy and energy towards nothing more than extinction. As 
the first chapter was researched it became obvious that what led Western 
scholars to think that this was the goal was nothing that the texts say 
about nibbana--they passed over with only a vague unease the many texts 
which show nibbana to have been in the minds of the early Buddhists sorre­
thing extremely positive with narres like ' the Imperishable' (amata) and 
'the Transcendent ' (lokuttara). What impressed scholars . as the purest  
nihilism was the doctrine of anatta, the belief that there is in a human 
being no persisting es sence, when it was combined with a passion to bring 
rebirth to an end. These scholars conceived the ending of the samsaric 
series in a way analogous to the extinction of a biological species, such 
as, let us say, the New Zealand moa. When the moa became extinct it was 
because there was no permanent es sence of 1 moa-nes s 1 over and above its 
genetic characteristics that the species will never arise in the world 
again. In this way, scholars argued, nibbana mus t  have been for the 
early Buddhists merely extinction or nothingnes s ,  in the absence of any 
es sence in the human being which could survive the ending of the karmic 
lineage. 
As the second chapter of the s tudy shows, however, the Buddhists 
themselves never drew this inference; it is entirely a construction placed 
on Buddhism by the Western mind. As reasonable, indeed inescapable, as 
it seems to draw the inference, the Buddhists themselves always stopped 
short of it, instead holding in tension the teachings of 'no self' and 
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of nibbana as a mystical paradox. They were able to point to many 
texts in their scriptures which speak of the goal as being beyond the 
grasp of the mind, or to the Buddha 's silence when he was asked whether 
or not a liberated person exists after death (the very silence that Western 
scholars thought gave them licence to assume that the goal was nullity) . 
. In the scriptures, too, there were texts such as the following: 
For him who has gone home there is no measure; that whereby he 
might be designated no longer exists ; where all phenomena have 
ceased, there also all possibilities of naming are gone. (Sutta­
ni pata 1074 -6) 
This suggests an abstract continuity of some kind about which it is not 
possible, and indeed expressly forbidden, to speculate. 
Yet the third chapter of this study has shown that it is almost 
certain that Gotama gave his followers more to hope for than this. As 
improbable as it seems, our evidence strongly suggests that there has 
been a two thousand-year misunderstanding of Gotama 1 s original teaching . 
Not only the nuances and the imagery in his utterances, but also their 
logic, imply an inner essence in the human being that is so unimaginably 
free of all worldly entanglements that we do not begin to grasp its nature 
until we have ceased to identify ourselves exclusively with the perishable 
body and mind. If the passage quoted above is understood in this light 
the goal does not appear as abstract and unattractive, since that which 
finds its true 1 home 1 is the essential self, the 1 I 1 which alone persists. 
We have shown in the final chapter that Gotama's refusal to speak in 
positive terms of this true self sprang from his penetration of our habit 
of understanding ourselves entirely in terms of our day-to-day experience, 
which was not for him the highest or truest experience. If he affirmed 
the self he knew that it would encourage us to continue to grasp at the 
perishable self or some feature of it mistaking it for what is permanent ; 
so he confined himself .to speaking only of what the self is not, letting 
his affirmation consist in teaching compassionately a path that could lead 
to an experience like his own of that self. 
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